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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis is titled Re-thinking the Thai-Lao border in International Relations: Can anti-
geopolitics reveal a human dimension? It argues that mainstream International Relations1 
inherited the colonial characteristics of space management from traditional geopolitics. 
This space management, especially in regards to territorial borders, is important in 
International Relations. Without territorial borders, it would be difficult to conceptualise 
the idea of International Relations as a discipline. However, more attention could be 
given to the contested nature of territorial borders conceptualised in the theory, especially 
in political realism. In relation to borders, the voices of the elites have been heard but the 
voices of the peoples along the borders have been ignored. The concept of Westphalian 
borders is strongly attached to International Relations and peoples’ relationships that did 
not fit the Westphalian norm have often been overlooked. Theorists in disciplines thus 
very often run the risk being caught up in the territorial trap of Agnew and Corbridge 
(1995). 
 
The concept of territorial borders presented by International Relations, especially 
political realism in the 1980s, lacks a human dimension when it is used to analyse 
international politics. The Thai-Lao border is a good example of incongruence between 
juridical and cultural maps. The Siam-France Treaty in 1893 that gave France control 
over the eastern banks of the Mekong River, the international boundary, separated a 
significant number of Lao people on the two sides of the river (Winichakul, 1994). Since 
pre-colonial times, North-East Thailand received an exodus of Lao people from the 
eastern banks of the Mekong and in 1961, it was estimated that ten million Lao people 
lived in the area and it was considered the largest Lao settlement in the world 
(Ngaosyvathn & Ngaosyvathn, 1994).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This thesis follows the normal practice of using ‘International Relations’ to indicate the academic 
discipline, whilst ‘international relations’ indentifies the range of political, social and economic activities 
that is studied. 
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During the Cold War, this incongruence continued as the superpowers contested with 
each other. After 1975, when Lao and Hmong people, a group from the highland regions, 
fled Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) to Thailand, they were labeled in 
International Relations as refugees. However, Hmong populations had been scattered in 
Northern Thailand and Lao PDR before the establishment of modern state boundaries. 
Scott (2009) argued that state-centric literature often overlooks these stateless 
movements. According to the anthropologists, colonisation was responsible for the plight 
of the Hmong who either failed to or chose not to establish their own state. They became 
illegal when their movements cut across state boundaries (Chanthavanich & Pliansri, 
2011). Lao and Hmong people on both banks of the Mekong, despite living in two 
different nation-states, had cultural and kinship ties for centuries but Westphalian 
territorial border logic made them refugees.  
 
Fieldwork in this area has been conducted by a number of anthropologists, such as 
Pholsena (2006), Pholsena and Banomyong (2006), High (2009), Leepreecha (2011), 
Chanthavanich and Pliansri (2011), and Baird (2013), and many issues are left for others 
to pursue academically, anthropologically, and ethnographically. This thesis does not 
intend to conduct fieldwork but aims to present a theoretical challenge to the existing 
border approaches to studying borders and their related issues, such as the movements of 
peoples in the areas. The strengths and weaknesses of different theoretical frameworks 
related to border issues are examined, common themes are identified, and issues related 
to the Thai-Lao border after 1975 that have cultural, juridical, and security implications 
are analysed.  
 
The thesis uses a number of critical political geographers’ interpretations to examine the 
Thai-Lao border issue of the 1970s. Agnew and Corbridge’s concept of territorial trap 
(1995) is used to analyse territorial borders conceptualised in International Relations at 
that time. When International Relations theorists discuss the Thai-Lao border, they are 
caught within the traps of the reification of territorial borders from maps, the 
dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside, and the myth of a self-contained state. 
The thesis also discusses the arguments by dissident International Relations theorists that 
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challenged the conventional interpretation of territorial borders. For example, to escape 
from the territorial trap, Ruggie (1998) emphasised the historical construction of social 
structure. Ashley (1987), likewise, was interested in genealogy focusing on the ways in 
which space was historically defined and the silenced set of historical narratives that 
differed from the mainstream. Walker (1993) examined the ways in which the 
inside/outside understanding of borders shaped the military security concepts and 
economics. To show that International Relations ignored the voices of the peoples along 
the Thai-Lao border, historical analysis of the shift from indigenous spatial 
conceptualisation, described as “mandala” (Wolters, 1999, p. 27) and “zomia” (Scott, 
2009, p. xi), to Westphalian during the colonial era is presented. Alternatives to state-
centric trans-border relations are discussed utilising an anti-geopolitical concept proposed 
by Routledge (1998) to challenge what has been accepted in mainstream literature.  
 
The Thai-Lao borders were drawn according to Westphalian logic during the time of 
French influence in Indochina and were passed on to the post-World War Two Lao 
administration. The European ways of space conceptualisation were similarly presented 
in International Relations especially in the Cold War. Since 1893, Siam and French 
Indochina had border conflicts from time to time. From 1954 to 1975, though Laos was 
an independent state, both Thai and American troops intervened in its domestic affairs. 
However, after Laos became a communist state, the colonial logic of Westphalian borders 
was resurrected and border conflicts between the Thai and Lao states occurred regularly. 
The Thai-Lao border not only separated the two nation-states of Thailand and Lao PDR 
but also the two ideological worlds of liberal democracy under American influence and 
communist socialism under that of the Soviet Union. This delineation caused by the logic 
of Westphalian borders cut across the cultural ties of more than ten million Lao and 
Hmong peoples along the Mekong and requires examination.  
 
Therefore, this thesis aims to examine the following issues. Firstly, the ways in which 
geopolitical colonial legacy was presented in International Relations are examined, and 
International Relations discussion of the Thai-Lao border after 1954 to the present is 
analysed. Secondly, the thesis examines whether the colonial era geopolitical 
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representations of the Thai-Lao border remained in International Relations after 1989 and 
how anti-geopolitics can be used to challenge these representations. Thirdly, the thesis 
considers how the concept of the territorial trap can be used to criticise the existing 
literature in International Relations regarding Thai-Lao border issues between 1975 and 
1989. How such a critical point of view can be enriched is explored. Lastly, this thesis 
examines how the human dimension has been neglected in International Relations theory 
through examining the Thai-Lao border issue from1975 to the present. It further explores 
the ways in which Routledge's concept of anti-geopolitics can be used to enrich the 
discipline.  
 
In grounding these statements, territorial borders conceptualised by International 
Relations literature and other related disciplines are reviewed and examined in this 
chapter in a sequence of three connected themes: geopolitics, International Relations, and 
the territorial trap; criticism from dissident International Relations; and critical political 
geography with research questions. 
 
Geopolitics, International Relations, and the territorial trap 
 
There is a strong inter-relationship between geopolitics and International Relations. 
Dodds (2005, p. 1) defined geopolitics as “the study of the state, the border and relations 
with other states” and Williams (2002, p.737) believed that without territorial borders, 
International Relations was impossible.  
 
Dodds (2005) identified four important characteristics of traditional geopolitics; stating it 
was an objective discipline; represented a colonialist perspective of the world; showed 
the separation of places and peoples; and stood as a set of knowledge for nationalistic 
advice. These characteristics were passed on to mainstream International Relations, 
especially in political realism. When the state was essentialised and its borders were 
perceived as fixed, geopolitics and mainstream International Relations scholars tended to 
become attached to the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 2009, p. 22).  
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This section discusses the four geopolitical characteristics in International Relations and 
shows the inter-relationship of the two disciplines. It illustrates how these characteristics 
result in the territorial trap. Recognition of the trap challenges the understanding of 
Westphalian understanding of territorial borders. Borders should not be taken for granted 
and not treated as static and depoliticised in International Relations.  
 
Objective Cartesian mapping 
 
Geopolitics is expected to be an objective explanation of locations. Spykman (1938, p. 
236) said, “…geography does not argue. It simply is.” However, this thesis insists that 
such a claim is not the case. Geopolitics is not objective but is the imposition of space 
management by the politically superior on the inferior. Specifically, geopolitics served 
the purposes of European colonisation which, by means of violence, silenced other 
peoples’ voices in that space. For example, Mackinder’s spatial details in The 
Geographical Pivot of History facilitated colonisation. Mackinder (1904) said that maps 
were drawn according to what was naturally given, and his map in The Natural Seats of 
Power gave details of land geography and became very influential in both geopolitics and 
International Relations.  
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The spatial conceptualisation proposed by Mackinder was influenced by Cartesian 
mapping. In the 19th century, like other intellectual disciplines, geography had to become 
scientific (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Geographical knowledge was divided from what was the 
‘out there’ knowledge that needed to be discovered and what was in human’s inner 
thought. Thus a geographer was the ‘detached subject’ who observed the space outside as 
‘viewed objects’ in the most neutral manner (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Therefore, geographical 
discourse was claimed to be a neutral perspective for universal knowledge. It went hand 
in hand with the brutality conducted by the Europeans in the colonies. Mackinder stated 
that by 1904, the world had reached the end of geography, a condition he called the 
“post-Columbian epoch”, as the world had been completely mapped over the previous 
400 years during the “Columbian epoch” (Mackinder in Ó Tuathail, 2005, p. 107-109).   
 
Though Mackinder claimed that geography was an objective science, this could be 
considered a one-sided truth. The mapping of the globe was contaminated by cultural 
subjectivity as space outside Europe, with colonial brutality, was to be conquered and 
Eurocentrically defined (Ó Tuathail, 2005). This situation occurred at the time of Siam’s 
modernisation when ocularcentrism replaced the ancient spatial conceptualisation of 
mandala, for example. The then Siamese-French Indochina border, which is now the 
Thai-Lao border, was established by means of violence. The French colonialists 
introduced the Westphalian form of state, and the Siamese elite accepted it. The border 
settlement silenced tiny Lao kingdoms along the Mekong that still were attached to the 
mandala system that is discussed in chapter 2. Geopolitics cannot be totally objective 
because the sense of European superiority was implied in the discipline and this colonial 
characteristic can be found in mainstream International Relations as well. 
 
In International Relations, objectivity is similarly claimed in classical realism and neo-
realism. The classical realist forefather, Morgenthau (1948), mentioned the importance of 
geopolitical location to the national interest though he did not explicitly claim it to be 
objective. Morgenthau was aware of the difficulty of making international politics a 
‘science’ compared with natural science, caused by the challenge that human behaviour is 
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more complicated than physical interactions in nature. Unlike natural substances, humans 
cannot be positioned as fixed objects when studied by other detached groups of people. 
Morgenthau thus concluded that “politics is not science but arts” (1947, p. 16). However, 
in terms of space management in international politics, the existence of Westphalian 
territorial borders was taken for granted by Morgenthau as factual and objective. 
Morgenthau said that “…in the same way in which in a certain district of the national 
territory the municipality represents the nation and exercises its authority, each nation of 
the globe will represent humanity and in its natural boundaries act for it” (1947, p. 82). 
The concept of objective territorial borders expressed in Morgenthau’s work was a 
product of Cartesian mapping. However, this thesis contends there are groups of peoples 
who claim to be nations but cannot establish their Westphalian territorial states, and these 
non-state actors are downgraded in political realism, if Morgenthau’s insistence on 
territorial nation-states is applied.  
 
The claim for objectivity is more explicit in neo-realism. Waltz (1979) stated that 
objectivity was expected in analysis in international politics, when the state was 
universally seen as a political unit interacting with others in the international system. This 
Cartesian mapping, with the claim of objectivity, led to the assumption that the state was 
self-contained, one of the three territorial traps noted by Agnew and Corbridge (1995), in 
traditional geopolitics and International Relations. Such a state-centric worldview can be 
noted in the neo-realists’ comparison of the state with a black box or billiard ball 
(Mearsheimer, 2001) and treatment of the state as a unit (Waltz, 1979). However, the 
classical realist Herz (1959, p.40) also used the term “impermeable hard-shell” that 
resembled Mearsheimer’s metaphors.  
 
Indeed, different communities in the territory cannot be completely taken for granted and 
downgraded as less important than the territorial states in international politics. 
Commercial, ethnic, religious, and family ties cannot always be contained by territorial 
borders. Even Waltz (1979) recognised non-state actors’ movements, such as 
transnational firms, but downgraded them to have less impact on the international system 
than the state. Westphalian territorial states, accepted as a truth in International Relations, 
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were but one form of space management that originated in 16th century Europe and 
passed on to other parts of the world during the colonial era. The assumption of a state 
being like a self-contained black box, as a colonial legacy, has been a problem examined 
in International Relations theory for decades, especially the reliance of state decision-
making on the assumption that the outcomes of complex internal processes approximate 
to rational utility maximisation with the concern for national interest underpins Foreign 
Policy Analysis as a sub-field of International Relations. The problematic assumption of 
state being a black box that privileges security and power of the US applied with Laos 
during the Cold War was criticised by Stevenson (1972) that is discussed in the following 
chapters. 
 
Colonial characteristic: White man supremacy 
 
Geopolitics reflects a European way of looking at the world that helps support 
colonisation (Ó Tuathail, 1998). This thesis argues that this European perspective needs 
careful examination. Adopting a philosophy from Greek civilisation that sight is more 
important than words, maps can be termed ocularcentrism and Cartesian mapping 
provided the ability to see and tell.  
 
An ocularcentric and Cartesian map offers three visions, the stage of the whole world 
over which a geopolitical gaze can be applied, a fixed scene for strategic international 
politics, and a distantiation gaze – the ability to compress time to understand location 
from a long distance (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Ocularcentrism focuses more on space over time 
and, after a viewing of a map, one understands how places are located without having to 
go to the site. Space thus is depoliticised, totalised, de-temporalised, and controlled by 
humans, as if humans were God (Ó Tuathail, 1996). This led to the belief that the 
disorganised and chaotic barbarian world could be organised (Ó Tuathail, 1996). This 
approach was used in the colonisation of lands but there was also the imposition of 
superior Western culture on them. The depoliticisation and totalisation of space in maps 
had two characteristics. First, when reified, legitimacy of the state boundaries was 
established and violence to reconfirm them was justified. Second, violence among the 
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states as a result of territorial conflicts was seen as normal, and this element was accepted 
in political realism (Ó Tuathail, 1996). The lack of objectivity regarding maps confirmed 
the unequal power relationships that existed between the superior Europeans and the 
inferior non-Europeans. 
 
Ocularcentrism in the Cartesian maps that represented power relations in hierarchical 
ways are argued by this thesis to be the colonial legacy passed on from geopolitics to 
International Relations. For instance, Mackinder’s map that indicated the Pivot Area, 
Inner Crescent, and Outer Crescent was portrayed in Morgenthau’s Politics Among 
Nations (1948). The world maps, in addition, that represented a Eurocentric view were 
included to indicate the location of nation-states, populations, and natural resources. 
Similarly, maps with the ability to see and tell can still be noted in neo-realism. In 
Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, for example, there were nine maps 
that represented states with their Westphalian territorial borders and explanations of how 
great powers in the past aimed to expand their territory. The map indicating Japan’s 
targets during World War Two clearly provided information to readers of how Japan 
conducted its imperialistic foreign and military policies at that time, similar to the 
European powers’ colonisation campaigns (Mearsheimer, 2001).  
 
The assumption of unequal relations between different locations is also noted throughout 
Morgenthau’s work. Inside the state, civilisation can be expected, while outside barbaric 
space was waiting to be tamed. That invited colonisation by the more sophisticated 
Europeans of other parts of the world. For example, Morgenthau included the map to 
indicate the “colonial area” presented as if colonisation was presupposed knowledge 
(1948, p. 283). More explicitly, justification for colonisation can be noticed in 
Morgenthau’s book In Defense of the National Interest, as the US President William 
McKinley justified his country’s imperialistic foreign policy in the 19th century by using 
biblical allusions, saying that the Philippines was annexed by the US because it was 
guided by God (Morgenthau, 1951).	  This revealed the sense of superiority that 
Americans had towards other peoples in the rest of the world. Mearsheimer (2001) 
similarly justified territorial acquisitions as means to increase national power according 
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to the reason of state. Imperial and colonial legacy, hence, were implicitly supported and 
reified.  
 
Westphalian territorial borders as a colonial legacy were thus accepted and taken for 
granted. This rendered practices in international politics, such as citizenship, 
immigration, national defences, and diplomacy, possible and normal. However, borders 
are never static as viewed by mainstream International Relations. What happened was 
that a significant number of peoples’ voices were silenced by the reification of ideas from 
the map as a territorial trap that resulted from the ideational factors of territorial borders 
in the map. They became material factors when citizens were expected to defend the 
national interest during times of conflict. 
 
Separation of peoples and space 
 
The maps, influenced by colonial ocularcentrism and Cartesian mapping, drawn 
according to different territorial states in the Westphalian style implied the dichotomous 
understanding of the inside/outside of a political unit. Walker (1993, p. 151) proposed the 
explanation of this dichotomy as the “double canon of Western political thought”, 
defining the inside space and outside space of the state taken for granted in International 
Relations. The inside guaranteed justice and order, justifying national defence, military 
operations, and very often violence, while the outside suggested anarchy. This thesis 
argues that when Westphalian borders were reified and imposed on colonised areas 
outside Europe, drawings on maps constituted territorial conflicts that displaced and 
killed people. 
 
The dichotomous inside/outside understanding of territory was common to classical and 
neo-realism. Morgenthau (1948) cited international treaties that suggested binary 
opposition to the inside/outside of the state. Herz (1957) also discussed that the sovereign 
should be supreme within its delimited territory and should not be interfered with by 
others. In Waltz’s work, this dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside was again 
noted. In the international system, domestic politics differed from international politics. 
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The structure in domestic politics was hierarchical and the sovereign power was supreme 
to give and enforce laws. However, this was impossible in the anarchical international 
arena (Waltz, 1979).  
 
The Westphalian concept of borders is characterised as decontextualised reification found 
among the classical and neo-realists. Though Morgenthau (1948) and Herz (1968) 
discussed history in their writings and their standpoints on borders varied, that history is 
of the elites in Europe. While the norms of non-intervention and territorial integrity 
should be observed, their violation was allowed at times in the interests of the nation and 
international peace and order. For instance, territorial integrity needed to be suspended 
for Atomic Development Agents to control atomic weapons (Herz 1959; Morgenthau, 
1948). Eventually, Morgenthau (1948) and Herz (1968) insisted that Westphalian 
territorial borders were universally important.  
 
Similarly, the neo-realists, Waltz and Mearsheimer, with less historical and contextual 
concerns, homogenised the state as a unit that interacted with others in the international 
system. Waltz offered a systemic explanation with three variables: the ordering principles 
of the structure, the character of the state, and the distribution of the capabilities among 
states. First, hierarchic domestic politics differed from anarchic international politics. 
Second, units in domestic politics were different as they performed different tasks, while 
international units were undifferentiated (Waltz, 1979). Third, the state as a unit imitated 
the security strategies of others to survive international anarchy. When states maximised 
their strength, some became major powers. The number of major powers at one time led 
to different international systems. A bipolar system was more stable than a multipolar 
system, while a unipolar system did not last long and rarely occurred. The neo-realists 
were attached to the territorial trap – the dichotomous understanding of inside/outside -- 
when they assumed the borders existed as attributes of a Westphalian state as the best 
form for survival in the anarchic international system.  
 
The assumed binary opposition between domestic and international politics is 
problematic. For example, even in the colonial era, economic policy in domestic politics 
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could not be limited within state territory. As the state had then to participate in 
international economic competition, economic policy of one state resulted in conditions 
of international trade, such as the mercantile competition among the European powers in 
the 17th and 18th centuries (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995). Additionally, the neo-liberal 
movement of non-state actors, such as business firms that transcended state boundaries in 
the Cold War and more obviously in the post-Cold War period, reconfirmed the fact that 
the dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside was insufficient in International 
Relations theory. The anthropologists, Donnan and Wilson, further suggested that state 
boundaries in some parts of the world, such as Europe in 1960s, changed their function 
and resulted in blurred national space. Border studies thus at that time focused more on 
the integration and problems of peoples in the border zones (Donnan & Wilson, 1999). 
State boundaries became even more porous as they were challenged by what Donnan and 
Wilson termed “twin threats” (1999, 1). These ‘threats’ were transnationalism from 
above in the form of supranational organisations and multi-national corporations, and 
from below in the form of the flows of peoples, such as refugees and illegal immigrants. 
The latter group, this thesis argues, represented the voices of peoples on the ground – 
they were included in what Routledge (1998, p.245) called “anti-geopolitics” that is 
discussed later.  
 
Provision for nationalistic policy advice 
 
Geopolitics is a set of knowledge for nationalistic advice in international affairs. This 
thesis argues that geopolitics, somehow, is limited and monopolised by certain groups of 
people. These elites are what Ó Tuathail described as “intellectuals of statecraft” (1998, 
p.81). For example, during World War Two, German geopolitical advisors, Karl 
Haushofer and Friedrich Ratzel, had nationalistic mindsets that served their state interest. 
Though Haushofer rejected any influence on Hitler’s Mein Kampf, similar ideas to 
increase the German living space – lebensraum – can be found in it (Haushofer, 1998; 
Hitler, 1941; Ó Tuathail, 2005). Likewise, Ratzel believed that a larger colonial space 
meant greater power and lebensraum helped justify Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy (Ó 
Tuathail, 1996). Again, such a characteristic of geopolitics was Eurocentric and not 
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objective, policy being driven by national interest. Geopolitics was used for purposes of 
colonisation and its colonial legacy was passed on in the Cold War as a different brand of 
International Relations. 
 
In the western hemisphere, similarly, the geopolitician Mahan was seen as the innovator 
for the idea of the Great Fleet’s push for territorial and commercial power for US (Ó 
Tuathail, 1996). It was even argued that the US President Theodore Roosevelt already 
had that plan for building the fleet in mind to expand the US naval power. Fortunately, 
Mahan’s writing could be used to justify Roosevelt’s policy (Ó Tuathail, 1996). 
Additionally, Mahan was fond of naval maps in the Cartesian style and, as a result, they 
were used to provide the strategy for the US naval warfare. Thus, it is difficult to deny 
that the Cartesian maps did not, in the following decades, play a role in International 
Relations discourse in the US.  
 
International Relations narratives can be linked to state foreign policy in two aspects as a 
reading source for practitioners and for theorists as practitioners themselves. For 
example, Le Bow (2003) stated that Morgenthau’s book Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace was a great source for policy-makers in international 
politics. In addition, George Kennan was regarded as both a theorist and practitioner. As 
a diplomat to Soviet Union, Kennan wrote a famous article in International Relations The 
Source of Soviet Conduct discussing an appropriate foreign policy the US ought to have 
taken in the 1940s. He said that to defend the US national interest, statesmen must be 
patient and a containment policy should be conducted. This was because there was no 
time to exert pressure as the communist doctrine suggested that capitalist society itself 
would decline eventually. Hence, there was no need to attack capitalist states before the 
time was ripe (1947).  
 
The colonial characteristic that geopoliticians provide nationalistic policy was passed on 
to International Relations. The fact that the interpretation of borders was monopolised by 
the elites and claimed to be objective still remained. It represented a colonialist’s 
perspective of the world with the separation of places and peoples that resulted in the 
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territorial traps: the myth of the self-contained state, the dichotomous understanding of 
the inside/outside, and the monopolised interpretation of borders when reified. The 
geopolitical worldview passed on to International Relations silenced the voices of the 
peoples, those whose lives were sacrificed due to foreign policy decisions of the elites 
based on theory.  
 
Criticism from dissident International Relations 
 
John Ruggie, Richard Ashley, and R.B.J. Walker, generally viewed as dissident 
International Relations scholars, despite their different self-labels as neo-classical 
constructivists and poststructuralists, provided useful historical awareness that challenged 
Westphalian territorial borders in mainstream International Relations. However, the 
common limitation with the three scholars was that they overlooked the colonialists’ 
views of ocularcentric maps as the colonisers’ voices that defined the meaning of 
territorial borders. It was indeed the geopolitical legacy passed on to mainstream 
International Relations theory they criticised. Stopping at the awareness of the territorial 
trap was hence insufficient since the colonial legacy had not been unveiled. However, this 
awareness of the territorial trap and the proposed challenges, this thesis argues, was the 
springboard for further development of a human dimension in territorial borders. This 
section thus aims to discuss the criticism of territorial borders in International Relations 
through Ruggie’s analysis of border as social episteme and social empowerment; 
Walker’s criticism of the problematic dichotomous understanding of inside/outside; and 
Ashley’s genealogy of the territorial borders. Together with the awareness of the 
territorial trap, such discussion of borders within International Relations academia paves 
the way forward to bringing the human dimension of anti-geopolitics into the discipline. 
 
The territorial border as social episteme and social empowerment 
 
Ruggie proposed the importance of historical examination of the formulation of 
territoriality (1998). He emphasised the historical transformation of social structure that 
rendered the territorial state in the form of “distinct, disjoint, and mutually exclusive” as 
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it is in International Relations theory today (Ruggie, 1998, p. 172). Ruggie did not treat 
territorial borders as naturally given and noted two issues that constituted the 
Westphalian territorial state, “social epistemes” and “social empowerment” (1998, p. 
184). 
 
Social epistemes refers to the ways in which the significance of a state are produced, 
imagined, and reified by a society. Ruggie focused on the shift from feudalism to a 
modern state in Europe in the 17th century. After the Thirty Years War, in which the 
Treaty of Westphalia was agreed, the principle of “cuius regio eius religio” (the religion 
of the ruler dictates the religion of the ruled) and “rex in regno suo est imperator regni 
sui” (the king is the emperor of his own realm) were set as social epistemes in Western 
Europe (Ruggie, 1998, p. 184). Next, the process by which collectivity of a territorial 
political unit is enforced is coined as social empowerment. This form of modern spatial 
conceptualisation was a clear-cut separation of political units. However, the transition 
from feudalism to modern spatialisation took decades. Modern territorial units, different 
from feudal ones, required a strong and centralised government within its clearly 
separated space and the use of force was important. The dichotomous understanding of 
the inside/outside originated from this context. Inside, the state monopolised the 
legitimate use of force either to maintain peace and order or to collect taxes. Outside, 
state affairs including military expansion and aggrandizement were expected (Ruggie, 
1998).  
 
However, the historical recognition by Ruggie (1998) echoed the European elites and the 
international structure in international affairs was dominated by intellectuals of statecraft. 
Thus Ruggie was caught in the same Eurocentric and elitist cage as geopolitics and realist 
International Relations. When he examined the shift of the spatial form from feudalism to 
modernity, he only privileged the European historiography. For example, his discussions 
only included European narratives, such as the Peace of Westphalia, the wars of 
succession in Spain, Poland, and Austria, and the replacement of mercenaries by national 
armies in Europe (Ruggie, 1998). Moreover, though Ruggie recognised other forms of 
territorial states different from the Westphalian form, the sense of European superiority 
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can be noted. For instance, he described a state which was not territorial to be ruled by a 
“primitive government,” a territorial state whose territory was not fixed was labeled as 
that of “tribal Mongols,” and a fixed territorial but non-mutually exclusive state was 
explained to be backward as those in “feudal Europe” (Ruggie, 1998, p. 178). Hence, the 
Westphalian state was still implied as the best form though Ruggie recognised other 
forms of territoriality. The terms ‘tribal’ and ‘feudal’ denote a less developed form of 
statecraft which is in contrast to the more developed Westphalian one. Ruggie never 
mentioned pre-colonial territorial borders in Southeast Asia, but the above comments 
suggested that the Southeast Asian forms of spatial conceptualisation would be regarded 
as deviant forms of territorial space of the state. For example, mandala borders would 
possibly be compared with ‘feudal Europe’ as its border conceptualisation was not fixed. 
Ruggie’s views challenged the mainstream conceptualisation of borders, but how these 
borders as a colonial legacy silenced the voices of the peoples in non-European spaces is 
yet to be unveiled. 
 
Criticism of the dichotomous understanding of inside/outside 
 
Walker examined the dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside of the state 
embedded in the theory of International Relations. Walker (1993) said that the concept of 
sovereignty was important in rendering the imagination of the internal and external space 
as it is today. To speak of Max Weber’s term, if the state monopolised a legitimate use of 
force within its delimited territory, three issues needed to be noted. First of all, the space 
outside was defined as barbaric and inside as orderly. Second, the geographical limit of 
the state was indicated which led to the imagination of military and diplomatic activities 
to interact with other sovereign states. Third, Walker’s stance was similar to the argument 
of this thesis that if the sovereign had the authority to let its subjects live or die, legal and 
constitutional boundaries should thus be delimited. It was not only that the space of the 
inside peace and outside violence was imagined but also the temporal issue of progress 
inside and lack of progress outside (Walker, 1993). To return to Weber’s quote that “the 
state monopolizes the legitimate use of force of the sovereign state in a delimited 
territory” (2008, p. 156), when this idea was challenged by other states, it was necessary 
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to think of military activities that became one of the issues in International Relations 
(Walker, 1993).  
 
Walker discussed Waltz’s theoretical explanation that focused on the structure of 
international politics in which the Westphalian state was the best form to survive anarchy. 
He examined the reasons why territorial borders were conceptualised by neo-realists that 
way. Walker said that historiography hinted at by Waltz in explaining the shift of the 
sovereignty type and state form was one-sided as it focused on European history. To 
maximise security, concerning military activities to defend territorial borders, less 
successful states imitated more successful others. If the weaker states failed to do so, they 
would have been eliminated. Other non-Europeans who could modernise their states into 
nation-states would survive colonialism, at least de facto, such as Siam in the 19th 
century.  
 
Nevertheless, such historiography of sovereignty that resulted in the dichotomous 
understanding of the inside/outside could be criticised as focusing too much on European 
experiences and one-sided narratives. As this thesis has argued that Westphalian 
territorial borders are a product of European imaginative geography, Walker (1993) also 
realised that the assumption of a self-contained state reflected in European Cartesian 
maps resembled European painting and was contaminated with cultural bias. This 
cartography was influenced by the idea of Euclidean geometry applied to space that 
separated peoples in the sense of inviolable territorial states. It was used as an instrument 
to discover the world by the Europeans in 16th century. However, it was criticised as the 
boundary lines in the maps were too linear and ignored spatial contingency.  
 
Genealogy of the territorial border  
 
Though Ashley’s insights provided sharp criticisms on territorial borders conceptualised 
in International Relations, he focused too much on criticising mainstream International 
Relations. If his criticisms move beyond the “realist debates”, International Relations 
could be significantly enriched (Ó Tuathail, 2005, p. 171). This is because to be attached 
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to criticism on the state backfired as Ashley was caught up with the state-centric 
paradigm he intended to problematise. Opposition to the mainstream thus ended up being 
a form of discourse of Eurocentric International Relations (Ó Tuathail, 2005). What was 
further missing in Ashley’s work was the geopolitical awareness that the map influenced 
by the Western ocularcentrism was used as a tool for colonisation. Nevertheless, Ashley’s 
comments are useful to pave the ways forward to bringing human dimension into 
International Relations. 
 
Ashley connected geopolitics with genealogy, an approach that questioned the fixed 
conceptualisation of space using historical analysis with these following characteristics. 
Indebted to Michel Foucault (1978), Ashley’s genealogy did not see historiography as 
fixed but discontinuous (Ashley, 1987), meaning that the narrative of history was 
continually interrupted by power struggles. Historiography should not only focus on the 
centre of the state, such as the capital, but also the marginal area such as the borderlands 
(see chapter 4). A universal truth of the conceptualisation of space required constant 
questioning, and the conquest of social space was examined when Ashley’s genealogy 
was applied to a state space. In addition, state borders were problematised and the voices 
of the peoples on the ground were attended to. This problematisation of the knowledge of 
territorial borders paved the way to the last characteristic of the examination of the 
normalisation of the state space. Ashley’s genealogy could be used with the 
conceptualisation of the Thai-Lao border, because the historiography of the Thai and Lao 
states should not be taken as a smooth transition from ancient to a modern Siam in the 
19th century. The process of military clashes between and struggles of Lao kingdoms that 
occurred along the Mekong when the Siamese-French Indochina boundary was drawn 
was the origin of the establishment and normalisation of the Thai-Lao border.  
 
Criticising the dichotomous inside/outside of the state conceptualised in political realism, 
Ashley (1987) said both genealogy and critical geopolitics focused on the relations of 
space and power. Realists viewed geopolitics as naturally given results from the “double 
move” within the realist school itself (Ashley, 1987, p. 411). First, realists treated the 
space inside as a unified and hence self-contained community, and, second, the space 
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outside was seen as endlessly anarchical. Therefore, communities outside the state were 
not possible according to realism. This led to the “double effect” which included the 
assumption of the self-contained state represented by statesmen and the silencing of other 
peoples’ history of territorial border conceptualisation (Ashley, 1987, p. 413). However, 
Ashley (1987) also contended that the line to separate the space inside/outside perceived 
as fixed by realism was problematic, as the voices of other histories were silenced by the 
unified set of history promoted by statesmen. Consequently, these “rituals of realism 
discourse” which were about the relations among the states represented by statesmen 
were practiced and echoed in realism (Ashley, 1987, p. 421). Such discourse was the 
language reified with and monopolised by the European experience of a sovereign state 
that privileged the dichotomous inside/outside understanding of space. 
 
Ashley (1988) said that to confirm such dichotomy, the state very often resorted to 
violence. To be successful, resistance was excluded from domestic politics and different 
voices were silenced. This imposition by the state, called “double exclusion,” rendered 
the dichotomy of the inside/outside (Ashley, 1988, p. 256). Also, events in one state 
impacted on others. When the double exclusion was practiced in one location with one 
set of rules for justification, it tended to affect other double exclusions. It meant that the 
assumption that the state was a self-contained black box might not always be the case. 
 
Thus the belief that the state was a unitary actor was a myth (Ashley, 1988).	  Very often, 
state interest was contested among different groups of peoples in that very state and was 
never settled. When those who represented the sovereign reified their imagination, it did 
not mean that they acted for the common interest. What was included or excluded from 
the national interest was seldom settled and, if it was, it was settled for one group of 
people (Ashley, 1988). The interpretation of the elites on behalf of the state about 
territorial borders was echoed in International Relations, though the meaning of borders 
was contested among different groups of peoples. This problem confirmed the first 
territorial trap of borders being interpreted only by some peoples. 
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Moreover, Ashley (1988) argued that the definition of non-state actors should not be 
limited to the neo-liberal discourse such as firms and transnational interest groups. He 
wanted to reach the peoples whose voices were excluded from neo-liberal discourse — 
peoples with marginalised histories. This thesis argues that the group includes peoples 
along borders that cannot be ignored. For example, the non-state actors of the borderland 
cities in the Thai-Lao border that shared pre-colonial historiography such as Ubon 
Ratchathani of Thailand and Champassak of Lao PDR should be recognised (see chapter 
4). This recognition of non-state actors challenges the traditional concept of territorial 
borders as natural and foundational. To understand non-state actors better, two images, 
lateral and vertical, were proposed. In the lateral image, a territorial state was seen as 
weaker compared with non-state actors because it lacked mobility. In the vertical image 
however, the territorial state was advantaged since the sovereign was supreme in 
exercising power within its territory (Ashley, 1988). Nevertheless, the lateral and vertical 
images were both important. However, transnational actors – the non-states – cannot be 
overlooked and territorial integrity should not be removed as it maintains peace and 
order.	  Ashley did not argue that the silenced political interpretation should replace the 
dominant one as that would end up establishing a hierarchical reversal. Instead, 
epistemologically speaking, as both lateral and vertical images were equally important, 
Ashley (1988) tried to reveal the ways in which the privileged vertical territorial state 
established its account and examined its consequences. This would thus open space for 
never-ending debates, allowing other silenced lateral transnational to be heard. 	  
 
In sum, a combination of the ideas of Ruggie, Ashley, and Walker could provide a 
springboard to a more human dimension in International Relations. This combination 
would include Ruggie’s examination of the historical transformation of social structure 
and sovereign states in Europe, Ashley’s interest in the territorial borders 
conceptualisation that resulted from the geopolitics of the elites and political realism, and 
Walker’s initial awareness of Eurocentric imaginative geographies. Though Ruggie still 
wanted to retain important commitments to the claimed reality of social phenomena and 
the potential for objectivity, this awareness was already an initial stage since it critically 
examined the materialisation of knowledge of space from the social episteme and social 
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empowerment. Walker and Ashley shared a Foucauldian approach of post-structuralism 
which critically questioned the concept of space in political theory. To add to dissident 
International Relations, ocularcentric maps used to colonise other non-European zones 
were analysed by Ó Tuathail. Indeed, this is the legacy of traditional geopolitics in the 
19th century that influences territorial borders conceptualised in International Relations 
nowadays. Colonisation was a process in which one state exploited others and, very 
often, the colonised peoples were dehumanised by the colonisers. If ocularcentric maps 
were used to facilitate 19th century geopolitics and colonisation, they can be considered 
as instruments to facilitate dehumanisation in the past. To question the meaning of 
colonial borders drawn according to ocularcentric maps, what Said called the “European 
imaginative geographies,” thus involved a human dimension as it questioned the ways in 
which geopolitical knowledge of space facilitated dehumanisation of the colonised (Said, 
1977, p. 54). After the decolonisation period, at the end of World War Two, territorial 
borders of former colonies that became independent states were drawn according to 
Westphalian norms influenced by the European imaginative geographies. The reification 
of territorial borders accepted in mainstream International Relations only represented the 
geopolitics of the colonisers and the elites in the colonised states and ignored the 
geopolitics of the peoples on the ground. This requires more careful examination. 
 
Critical political geography 
 
Traditional geopolitics and its legacy in International Relations were countered by critical 
political geographers (Dodds, 2005). The fact that geopolitics and its legacy silenced the 
voices of peoples and were monopolised by the intellectuals of statecraft was questioned 
and criticised by authors such as Agnew, Ó Tuathail, Dalby, Donnan and Wilson, and 
Routledge. This thesis proposes to take two steps based on Jones (2006) to examine the 
neglect of the human dimension by International Relations. Firstly, ocularcentrism that 
facilitated colonisation in the past and significantly influenced International Relations 
needs to be examined. Secondly, this thesis aims to look for ways in which anti-
geopolitics can promote a human dimension by the incorporation of literature from other 
related disciplines. As the first step, this section outlines Ó Tuathail and Agnew’s re-
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conceptualisation of geopolitical discourse during the Cold War and Dalby’s arguments 
that geopolitical characters still influenced space conceptualisation in international 
political theories in the post-Cold War era. Consideration of Donnan and Wilson’s 
analysis of twin cities along the border and transnationalism from below, and Routledge’s 
proposal for anti-geopolitics as a human dimension follows.  
 
Geopolitical space in International Relations 
 
Ó Tuathail and Agnew’s re-conceptualisation of geopolitical discourse during the Cold 
War  
 
Ó Tuathail and Agnew’s definition of geopolitics reconfirms the arguments of this thesis 
that International Relations and geopolitics are interrelated. First, geopolitics is about the 
foreign policy of the state concerning space such as invasion or military intervention that 
is also the focus of International Relations. To be critical of the geopolitical discourse 
resembles Ashley’s genealogy that focused on the analysis of problematic territorial 
borders. Second, Ó Tuathail and Agnew paid particular attention to the words of state 
practitioners that shaped the knowledge of space and how the words uttered by the US 
state officials became normalised knowledge. Such rhetoric in state policy, argued Ó 
Tuathail and Agnew (1998), was very important as it was not only words uttered by 
statesmen but also discourse that shaped the understanding and practice of the 
geopolitical space in the world. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1998, p. 78) thus realised that 
geopolitical discourse very often was monopolised by those statesmen defined as 
“intellectuals of statecraft.” Traditional geopolitics, in forms such as the claim for 
objective knowledge, separation of places and peoples, and Western superiority justifying 
colonisation, were still reflected in the ways in which these statesmen viewed the world. 
This thesis argues that such monopolisation of spatial conceptualisation, as it tends to 
provide nationalistic advice in state affairs indeed silences the voices of a significant 
number of peoples on the ground, especially when geopolitical imagination is put into 
practice. 
 
23	  	  
Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1998) examined the geopolitical discourse of the US foreign 
policy during the Cold War and stated a number of reasons for the importance and 
analysis of the rhetoric of the US statesmen. First, though only the elites defined 
geopolitics, the political consequences were not confined to them but extended to the 
whole world. Second, the common sense of the dichotomy between the Selves and Others 
was formulated by such rhetoric. Ó Tuathail and Agnew categorised the rhetoric into 
practical and formal. Most practical geopolitical rhetoric was found in the statements of 
the state practitioners themselves. They gave interviews to the press and acted on behalf 
of the state. This was different to the words uttered by traditional geopoliticians in the 
past who gave ideas for state policy that were described by Ó Tuathail and Agnew as 
formal rhetoric.  
 
Ó Tuathail & Agnew (1998, p. 81) stated the practical rhetoric provided “common sense” 
that produced the picture of binary opposition across a wide range of social relationships 
at all scales. For example, during colonial times, the binary opposition was between the 
civilised and backward. This affected the policy of colonisation of European states in the 
19th century – a justification of white man supremacy for European expansion.  In the 
Cold War era, the binary opposition was liberalism-democracy against socialist-
communism as found in the US President Harry Truman’s statement in 1947 (Truman, 
1998). Liberalism-democracy denoted the world of freedom and, in contrast, socialism-
communism denoted the regimes of terror and suppression. For the statesmen in the US 
Cold War foreign affairs, the Selves represented the American people and the country’s 
allies, while the Others were the Soviets and its satellite states in the communist camp. 
This binary opposition rhetoric of the Selves versus Others was produced and reproduced 
to persuade citizens to agree with certain foreign policies.  
 
Third, such geopolitical rhetoric was also reflected among academia. Cartesian maps with 
clear-cut lines to separate nation-states, at least, were observed as basic geographical 
knowledge in international politics. This thesis adopts the analysis of binary opposition of 
Agnew and Ó Tuathail regarding the Thai-Lao border as the separation line of the two 
ideological worlds during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The criticism of 
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practical rhetoric uttered by the US statesmen during the Cold War is utilised to support 
the criticism of territorial borders reflected in academic International Relations (see 
chapter 4). 
 
Fourth, Ó Tuathail and Agnew’s method was necessary at the fundamental level as they 
critically examined the rhetoric of geopolitics among elites. Examples of the statesmen 
during the Cold War cited by Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1998) were George Kennan and 
Henry Kissinger. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1998, p. 81) boldly accused them of controlling 
the American media at that time as they “commanded what should have been written in 
newspapers and journals” in the 1970s. If that was true, world geopolitics during the Cold 
War was dominated by only a few people. Therefore, careful examination of the 
subversion of certain norms such as the territorial integrity of Southeast Asian nation-
states is important. A significant number of American soldiers were then sent to die in a 
war far away from their homes in Southeast Asia, though this action could have been 
argued as a violation of the territorial borders of Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam that further 
led to suffering, displacement, injury, and death for the locals. 
 
To clarify the fact that the voices of the elites were more recognised, Agnew and 
Corbridge (1995) suggested the division of world geopolitical order into three periods, 
the combination of the European Concert and British Domination from 1815 to 1875, the 
Inter-Imperial Rivalry from 1875 to 1945, and the Cold War Geopolitical Order from 
1945 to 1990. This division reconfirmed the continuation of the spatial conceptualisation 
of the elites. This thesis adds the post-Cold War period from 1989 to the present to 
confirm the argument that geopolitical characteristics remained. In the Cold War era, the 
rules of international relations were regulated by the American intellectuals of statecraft 
(Ó Tuathail, 1996). The world was divided into three categories, the US as the First 
World, the Soviet Union as the Second World, and both tried to economically, 
ideologically, and militarily influence the ‘less developed’ Third World countries – the 
former colonies. The International Monetary Fund, General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade, and World Bank were accepted as international economic institutions in the 
capitalist bloc. International norms such as transnational corporations were mediated 
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under the US influence on its allies. The US also extended its military operations that 
transcended state boundaries as a military alliance, and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization was formed in Europe and the South East Asia Treaty Organization were 
formed to counter the communist states led by the Soviet Union. According to the 
transnational norms, economic and military activities transcended Westphalian 
boundaries. Without the consent of the elites of the American allies in the Third World, 
the success of economic transnationalism and military intervention by the US was 
impossible. Meanwhile, the transnationalism of the border peoples was largely left 
unexplained. This still remains so even after the Cold War.  
 
Dalby’s analysis of the geopolitical legacy in the post-Cold War era  
 
Dalby’s analysis of the geopolitical legacy in the post-Cold War era was an extension of 
the geopolitical discourse of Ó Tuathail and Agnew discussed in the previous sub-
section. Critical examination of rhetoric by state officers and scholars during the Cold 
War could still be utilised in the post-Cold War era as the first step to supporting the 
voices of the peoples on the ground. During colonial days, the picture of binary 
opposition of the common sense of geopolitical discourse, as normalised knowledge, was 
between civilised and barbaric space. During the Cold War, it was between liberalism-
democracy and socialism-communism, and in the post-Cold War era, it was between 
rapid economic space and slow economic space. Similarly, the Thai-Lao border was no 
longer the line that separated the two ideological worlds of liberalism-democracy and 
socialist-communism as it did during the Cold War. In International Relations, the Thai-
Lao border became the line between the rapidly developing economy of Thailand and the 
slower one of Lao PDR in the post-Cold War era.   
 
Dalby recognised that “traditional geopolitics elements” still remained in international 
political theories (1998, p. 309). Dalby’s argument was supported by Ó Tuathail’s 
recognition of the situation he called “post-geopolitics” (1997, p. 47). For example, 
Cartesian maps with clear-cut lines to separate nation-states still remained as basic 
geographical knowledge in academia especially in International Relations, despite some 
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changes in international politics. The manual Cartesian map was transformed on to an 
electronic screen, providing rapid, intensive, and extensive information (Ó Tuathail, 
1997). Also, geopolitical discussion was no longer confined to intellectuals of statecraft 
but extended to mass media and consumers. Moreover, the increase in non-state actors in 
interstate politics that led to de-territorialisation of political space was apparent. The 
geopolitics since the end of the Cold War was a combination of the victory of Western 
democracy and the heyday of transnational liberalism (Dalby, 1998).  
 
Though transnationalism became more prominent in International Relations theory, 
leading to increased actors in international politics the voice of the elites is more echoed 
in International Relations theory. For example, globally, the poor’s income declined from 
2.3 to 1.3% during the past three decades while that of the rich has risen from 70 to 85% 
(Dalby, 1998). Politically speaking, the poor’s geopolitics is still overlooked by the 
spatial conceptualisation put into practice by the elites who were states officers and later 
businesspersons. Transnational corporations became more powerful economically in the 
supposedly borderless world after the end of the Cold War. Dalby (1998) said that 51 of 
the largest economies were transnational corporations while 49 were states. Mitsubishi 
produced sales higher than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of some states. This kind 
of transnational liberalism was taken for granted as “an appropriate organization of power 
and wealth” in international political theories (Dalby, 1998, p. 307). Though 
transnational economic arrangements such as the World Trade Organization and North 
America Free Trade Area were set up, these were criticised as a part of the elites’ 
exploitation of the inferior (Dalby, 1998). On the Thai-Lao border, similar situations 
occurred as it was expected that the end of the Cold War would bring benefit to more 
people. This thesis argues that ASEAN Free Trade Agreement projected in 1992 merely 
echoed the voice of the elite and business sectors of the country members. Only some 
groups of people benefitted from this economic transnationalism (Rigg, 2005). Those 
who did not fully benefit from the economic integration were described as “marginal 
people” (High, 2009, 78). High said that a supposedly borderless world often claimed by 
policy-makers and International Relations theorists after 1989 was for the rich, and 
discourse about turning the battlefields into marketplaces was not for the poor.  
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Anthropology as anti-geopolitics 
 
Donnan and Wilson’s cultural analysis along the border and transnationalism of peoples 
on the ground 
 
Donnan and Wilson (1999) argued that culture received the least attention in social 
science when borders were examined and insisted that it was important for the following 
reasons. First, diplomatic relations between states were affected by culture. Second, 
culture in the border areas affected state policy. For example, if the border areas were 
different from the core of the state, it was expected that the state, in the traditional sense, 
must attempt to project its nationalism campaign to reconfirm its authority within its 
delimited space. Third, the process of cultures meeting at borders never finishes as 
peoples constantly cross every day. Cultural analysis, they argued, should no longer be 
confined within ethnography but should be extended to political theory (Donnan & 
Wilson, 1999).  
 
This thesis argues that Donnan and Wilson’ analysis of culture along the borders was 
related to political issues and international politics. The concept of nation, for example, 
according to Donnan and Wilson (1999) was a common membership of a cultural 
community. Donnan and Wilson believed that that definition was too idealistic as every 
nation would have its own state with an independent government and its own territory – 
self-determination. A nation that failed to establish its state would be regarded as an 
ethnic minority and tended to be viewed as a threat of the state as they were different 
from the majority (Donnan & Wilson, 1999). Since a state is by no means self-contained 
and people in a state, including ethnic minorities, with transnational ties that cut across 
and challenge territorial borders need to be recognised, such as Mexicans in the US and 
Mexico (Donnan & Wilson, 1999).  
 
Anthropology contributed to political studies in that its focus on local levels added to the 
national level in political science (Donnan & Wilson 1999).  Intensive studies of 
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borderlands, including their historiography, helped International Relations escape from 
the territorial trap instead of focusing on the history of the capitals (Donnan & Wilson, 
1999). Such historiography could indeed be an extension of the problematisation of the 
state boundary found in the work of Walker and Ashley, as it sounds the histories of the 
marginal areas. In addition, anthropology examines the challenges to state boundaries 
both from above – supranational structure – and below – ethnography. Donnan and 
Wilson (1999, p.1) called these “twin threats” to Westphalian territorial borders. The 
above transnationalism was so-called transnational corporations and international regimes 
and the below comprised movements of peoples such as refugees, illegal immigrants, and 
even terrorists. The fact that anthropologists pay less attention to but do not ignore state 
governments benefits border studies in International Relations. Anthropological analysis 
along borders is even more appropriate with the growing trend of transnationalism in the 
post-Cold War era, as non-state actors have been playing significant roles in international 
politics.  
 
Routledge’s human dimension as anti-geopolitics 
 
Routledge categorised the concept of anti-geopolitics into three phases: colonial anti-
geopolitics, Cold War anti-geopolitics, and new world order anti-geopolitics. The voices 
of the elites regarding spatial conceptualisation silenced the peoples on the ground and 
were echoed in geopolitics during the colonial era and in International Relations in the 
Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. A number of anti-geopolitics scholars challenged 
colonial geopolitics by insisting that the voices of the marginalised and colonised, 
regarding space conceptualisation, needed to be heard more (Dodds, 2005). For example, 
Fanon (1963) and Said (1977) believed that decolonisation should not be limited to 
merely the physical removal of the colonisers but also the intellectual aspects such as 
rules and regulations imposed by them.  
 
The Thai-Lao border is a good example of space where the European imaginative 
geography of Westphalian borders was imposed during colonial era. Such imposition 
ignored incongruence between juridical and cultural maps. The Siam-France Treaty in 
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1893 that gave France control over the eastern banks of the Mekong River, the 
international boundary, separated a significant number of Lao people on the two sides of 
the river (Winichakul, 1994). The imposition of European imaginative geography of the 
Thai-Lao border continued during the Cold War and was reflected in International 
Relations as the superpowers contested with each other. As a result, a number of 
International Relations scholars were caught in the territorial trap of Agnew and 
Corbridge with a heavy geopolitical influence regarding spatial conceptualisation. From 
1954 to 1975, despite the acceptance of the Westphalian border, the presence of foreign 
troops was frequently justified by International Relations. However, after 1975, the Thai-
Lao border became the line that separated the two worlds of liberalism-democracy and 
socialism-communism. Unfortunately, the spatial conceptualisation of the elites was 
echoed in the theory, while that of peoples on the ground was downgraded. When Lao 
and Hmong people, a group from the highland regions, fled Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (PDR) to Thailand, they were labeled in International Relations as illegal 
immigrants and refugees (Chanthavanich & Pliansri, 2011). In the post-Cold War era, the 
Thai-Lao border became a gate rather than a fence in International Relations, but the 
voices of the elites were still prioritised. The Thai-Lao border as part of a supposedly 
borderless world often claimed by policy-makers and International Relations scholars 
after 1989 was for the rich, and discourse about turning the battlefields into marketplaces 
was not for the poor, said High (2009). In sum, since the colonial days, the voice of the 
elites’ have monopolised spatial conceptualisation in International Relations. This thesis 
argues that to rethink the Thai-Lao border and to support spatial conceptualisation of the 
peoples on the ground would enrich the discipline of International Relations. To 
introduce the human dimension using anti-geopolitics, the following questions are asked 
in this thesis. 
 
Research questions 
 
1. To what extent has the concept of territorial borders in traditional geopolitics 
influenced discussion of the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to 1975 in International 
Relations theories?  
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2. Is geopolitics as a colonial legacy represented in International Relations theories, 
with particular reference to political realism, on the issue of the Thai-Lao border 
after 1975? If yes, in what ways? 
3. In what ways can Agnew and Corbridge’s concept of the territorial trap be used to 
criticise existing literature in International Relations regarding Thai-Lao border 
issues after 1975? How can such a critical point of view be enriched further? 
4. How has the human dimension been neglected by International Relations 
regarding the issue of the Thai-Lao border after 1975. In what ways can 
Routledge's proposal for anti-geopolitics be used to enrich the human concept in 
the theories? 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis proposes to examine the explanation of the Thai-Lao border after 1975 by 
International Relations. It argues that the juridical map drawn after the Franco-Siamese 
conflict in 1893 was incongruent with cultural maps since people of Lao ethnicity lived 
on both sides of the Mekong. After Laos gained independence in the 1950s, there were 
more than ten million Lao with Thai citizenship. Nevertheless, in the 1960s, the Thai-Lao 
border was subverted as Thai and the US troops intervened in Lao internal affairs. Very 
often, International Relations scholars, with particular reference to realism, justified the 
US intervention in the region. However, after Laos became a communist state in 1975, 
the reification of the colonial legacy during the French heyday was resurrected. Border 
conflicts between Thailand and Lao PDR occurred regularly between 1975 and 1989. The 
Thai-Lao border did not separate only the two states but also the two worlds of different 
ideologies influenced by the two superpowers at that time, the US on the Thai side and 
the Soviets in Lao PDR. However, the trans-border movements and lives of the Laos, 
Hmongs, and other peoples from Lao PDR tended to be downgraded and silenced in 
International Relations. Even in the post-Cold War era, when economic liberalisation was 
supposed to introduce a borderless world to the region, the Thai-Lao border has still 
remained an obstacle for a significant number of marginalised people. This thesis not 
only examines the Thai-Lao border as a colonial legacy in International Relations but 
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also proposes that other struggles should be adequately recognised as geopolitics from 
below. This examination is discussed according to the following plan.  
 
Chapter 2 answers the first and the second research questions. It looks at the extent to 
which the concept of territorial borders in traditional geopolitics influenced discussion of 
the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to 1975 in International Relations theory. It additionally 
examines the ways in which geopolitics as a colonial legacy was represented in 
International Relations theories, with particular reference to political realism, on the issue 
of the Thai-Lao border after 1975. Chapter 2 argues that the four geopolitical 
characteristics of self-claim of objectivity, separation of space and peoples, white man 
supremacy, and provision for nationalistic policy found in Mackinder, Mahan, and 
Spykman were still to be found in Morgenthau, Herz, Mearsheimer, and Waltz. The fact 
that the four geopolitical characteristics has remained in International Relations over the 
past sixty years of the political narrative of the Thai-Lao border blinded the theorists and 
resulted in the theoretical attachment of the territorial traps of Agnew and Corbridge. The 
first two characteristics led to the myth of the self-contained state and the dichotomous 
understanding of inside/outside. The third and the fourth led to the trap of reification of 
territorial borders monopolised by the elites that silenced the voices of peoples on the 
ground.  
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In Chapter 3, the third research question is answered. The territorial trap of Agnew and 
Corbridge is used to criticise the existing literature in International Relations, with 
particular reference to political realism regarding Thai-Lao border issues from when Laos 
became Lao PDR in 1975, to the end of the Cold War in 1989. It also examines how such 
a critical point of view can be further enriched in the post-Cold War era. Chapter 3 argues 
that the proposal from Agnew and Corbridge that theoretical consideration of historical 
relations, the broader social and economic structures of a hegemon, and changes in the 
geopolitical order have already been accepted by International Relations scholars to some 
extent. Yet, the three solutions were insufficient to erase the territorial trap because 
history embedded in the theory focused on the centre of the state that presupposed the 
Westphalian space. 
 
Chapter 4 answers the fourth research question exploring the theoretical neglect of the 
human dimension when political realists are attached to the territorial trap. It examines 
the enrichment of the human dimension in International Relations by related disciplines 
such as history and anthropology. As an extension from the perspective of western 
supremacy provided by Ó Tuathail’s in chapter 2, Orientalism and second order of 
Orientalism of Said are utilised to examine the spatial conceptualisation embedded in 
International Relations when the Thai-Lao border is discussed from 1954 to the present 
days. Geopolitical discourse on the Thai-Lao border in the theory is also analysed. 
Furthermore, transnationalism of the peoples recognised by historians is examined to 
pave the way for an anthropological approach. Chapter 4 argues that anthropological 
discussion of the Thai-Lao border supports the voices of the peoples by the presentation 
of the history of the borderlands and transnationalism of peoples from below during the 
Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. Though it was impossible to reject the spatial 
conceptualisation of the Wesphalian state, anthropologists tackled the territorial trap 
successfully by speaking for the voices of peoples on the ground. Chapter 4 contends that 
the incorporation of this framework in International Relations leads to the inclusion of the 
human dimension on the Thai-Lao border in the future. Finally, chapter 5 summarises the 
common themes of all the chapters to theoretically voice the silenced and marginalised 
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peoples in the discussion of the Thai-Lao border since 1975. Possibilities for future 
research and limitations of the thesis are also discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Geopolitical space of the Thai-Lao border in International Relations from 1954 to 
the present 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter answers the first research question regarding the extent that geopolitical 
characteristics were passed on and their influence on International Relations discussion of 
the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to 1975. It further answers the second research question 
in relation to the degree that geopolitics has influenced International Relations, with 
particular reference to political realism, in the discussion of the Thai-Lao border from 
1975 to the present day. The four geopolitical characteristics are claims of objectivity, 
separation of space and peoples, Western superiority and representation of unequal space 
as justification for colonisation and intervention, and provision of nationalistic advice. 
The fact that the four geopolitical characteristics have remained in International Relations 
during the past sixty years of the political narrative of the Thai-Lao border blinds the 
theorist and results in the theory falling foul of the territorial trap of Agnew and 
Corbridge. The first two characteristics led to the myth of the self-contained state and the 
dichotomous understanding of inside/outside. The third and the fourth led to the trap of 
reification of territorial borders monopolised by the elites that silenced the voices of the 
peoples on the ground. 
  
To maintain that the Westphalian style borders presupposed in International Relations 
was one form of spatial conceptualisation, this chapter begins by discussion of the 
downgrade of the pre-colonial state of the lowlands and non-state space of the highlands 
in Indochina. The fact that the geopolitical characteristics in International Relations 
played down the indigenous spatial conceptualisation of the lowland mandala described 
by Wolters (1999) and highland zomia described by Scott (2009) reconfirmed the 
colonial knowledge of space introduced to the peoples along the Thai-Lao border. After 
World War Two, scholars in International Relations presupposed that a state must be 
Westphalian, including the former French colonies in Indochina.  
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After 1954, as the politics that affected the contest for power around the Thai-Lao border 
changed, the effect of these four characteristics recognised in International Relations 
varied. For example, from the time of Lao independence after the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements, the self-claim of objectivity was more common. Cartesian maps, for 
example, led to the perception of a state as a domino. Communist developments in 
Indochina were compared with a series of falling dominos by Kissinger (1994). This 
Domino Theory, caught in the territorial trap of the self-contained state assumption, led 
to another geopolitical characteristic of Western supremacy that justified the US military 
intervention. The ocularcentric map with space separated into a number of Westphalian 
states hinted at the assumption of self-contained states. The separated space of states was 
similar to the domino metaphor. Cold War rhetoric indicated that to prevent the fall of 
Vietnam like a domino meant the containment of communism in Southeast Asia. 
Eisenhower (1990) claimed it was the US duty to prevent the domino from falling.  In the 
1950s and 1960s, the US and Thailand regularly intervened in Lao domestic affairs to 
hinder the communist efforts of North Vietnam and China on the eastern banks of the 
Mekong (Sirikrai, 1979). This thesis argues that the recognition in International Relations 
of such intervention reflected the presupposed Westphalian form of space. The idea of 
non-intervention in terms of territorial borders in the Westphalian sense did not totally 
disappear but, as reflected in International Relations literature, was deviated from until 
the achievement of political stability in Laos.  
 
In 1975, Lao PDR was established and the spatial concept of the Thai-Lao border in 
International Relations changed. The border drawn in the Cartesian maps of Thailand and 
Laos produced by France in the late 19th century was strictly put into practice. The 
justification for military intervention before 1975 was replaced with the statement that the 
territorial integrity of Lao PDR and Thailand should be respected (Ngaosyvathn, 1985). 
However, Viraphol (1985) argued that the border was not well-defined during colonial 
times. If this was the case, the separation of state space of Thailand and Lao PDR could 
not be objective since errors regarding territorial sovereignty could be anticipated. 
Nevertheless, a significant number of displaced peoples who crossed the unclear Thai-
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Lao border from Lao PDR were regarded as refugees. They had to be repatriated or 
resettled in third countries (Viraphol, 1985). Thus, the first and second geopolitical 
characteristics, claims of objectivity and separation of space and people, were more 
prominent in this period. The fourth characteristic, the provision of nationalistic advice, 
was also noted. Though there has been no proof that their comments have been accepted 
by their states, similar nationalistic claims could be found in the state practitioners 
discussed in the chapter. For example, Thai scholars cited pre-colonial claims to support 
Thai nationalism that Laos had been under Thai suzerainty and that the Thai state lost 
Lao territory to France in 1893, while the Lao diplomat and scholar Pheuiphanh 
Ngaosyvathn disagreed, standing for Lao nationalism by presenting a different account of 
historiography (Ngaosyvathn, 1985; Paribatra 1984; Sirikrai 1979). The comments from 
these authors reflected the nationalism of their state. However, such claims were 
examples of anachronistic concepts of space as, before 1893, the territorial perception of 
mandala and zomia mentioned above by Wolters (1999) and Scott (2009) did not adhere 
to the same acquisition of space as emphasised by the Westphalian system.  
 
After the end of the Cold War in 1989, ideological rivalry at global and regional levels 
diminished but two of the four geopolitical characteristics, claims of objectivity and 
separation of space and people, were evident in International Relations literature. The use 
of the ocularcentric maps that provided objective details of the Thai-Lao border remained 
and were taken for granted, the separation of space and people continued, and the 
European concept of Westphalian territorial borders still held high priority. For example, 
in research funded by the Institute of Asian Studies, Theeravit and Semyaem (2002; 100, 
130-135) presented four maps to explain the Thai-Lao border conflicts in Rom Klao 
Village in 1987-88. In addition, Thai and Lao nationalism remained but more toleration 
was required when border issues were considered (Theeravit & Semyaem, 2002).  
 
Literature discussing Southeast Asian politics from 1954 to the present was found in the 
format of academic journals, textbooks, and master and PhD theses in International 
Relations written by Thai and Lao scholars and researchers from outside the region. They 
were acquired from the international library database network provided by Durham 
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University with access in the UK and other English-speaking countries where PhD theses 
from universities in the US at the time indicated above were available. Master theses and 
texts in indigenous languages such as Thai and Lao in International Relations were 
collected from the library database provided by Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat 
University, and Chiang Mai University in Thailand. Academic texts in International 
Relations are a major focus in this thesis because they directly respond to the research 
question concerning the conceptualisation of the Thai-Lao border by International 
Relations theory. Use of a primary source of the rhetoric of state officials is to support a 
claim of similarity between the conceptualisation of the Thai-Lao border of state 
practitioners and scholars.  
 
The chapter adopts four connected themes to support the presentation of the case that 
geopolitical characteristics were passed on and have influenced International Relations 
discussion of the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to the present day – the challenges to the 
Westphalian system of territorial borders by mandala (Wolters, 1999) and zomia (Scott, 
2009), Domino Theory as justification of the US intervention in the area from 1954 to 
1975, the resurrection of colonial legacy from 1975 to 1989, and increased tolerance and 
reduced nationalism from 1989 to the present. 
 
Challenges to the Westphalian system of territorial borders by mandala and zomia 
 
The concept of Westphalian territorial borders was a product of 17th century Europe. 
Ruggie (1998, p. 184) indicated that after the Westphalia Treaty, the principles of cuius 
regio eius religio (the religion of the ruler dictates the religion of the ruled) and rex in 
regno suo est imperator regni sui (the king is the emperor of his own realm) were set as 
social norms termed as “social episteme”.  
 
Soja (1989) explained that the interpretation of space by the use of the Cartesian maps 
was dominant after the Westphalia Treaty and this mapping system was used by 
Europeans to explore the world and colonise different parts of non-European zones 
(Walker, 1993). Soja (1989) further argued that space was regarded as fixed and little 
attention was paid to it by social science in Europe, including geopolitics and its process 
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of colonisation. This spatial conceptualisation in Cartesian maps has been criticised for 
decades for reflecting the European worldview. Said in his famous work Orientalism 
proposed that the colonialist imaginative geography imposed on other parts of the world 
should be questioned. When Europeans went to unknown colonised lands, geographic 
distinction occurred that became their imaginative geography. The European lands were 
civilised while the non-European lands were barbaric and waited to be tamed (Said, 
1977). Indeed, the Westphalian state is one example of Eurocentric imaginative 
geography, especially when geopolitics was imposed on the colonies. 
 
This section thus presents two ways in which space conceptualisation were used to 
describe pre-colonial local peoples’ ways of life that differ from the approach of the 
Eurocentric Westphalian system adopted by mainstream International Relations. 
Mandala of the lowlands proposed by Wolters (1999) and zomia of the highlands 
described by Scott (2009) in Southeast Asia challenge the colonial legacy of space 
conceptualisation experienced by the Thai-Lao border.  
 
Mandala in Southeast Asian lowlands  
 
The colonial powers and the peoples in non-European areas had different ways of 
interpreting space in regard to territorial borders. In the early 19th century, for example, 
the British in India expanded their influence eastward until Southern Burma was 
conquered and became the British Tenasserim Province and negotiations about border 
settlements with Siam2 were planned (Winichakul, 1994). However, these negotiations 
were difficult because, when speaking about borders, the British meant closed and 
definite boundaries in which a sovereign established and enforced law. The Siamese saw 
them as non-definite lines over which subjects of two states could move if they were not 
hostile to each other. The modern political space as “distinct, disjoint, and mutually 
exclusive territorial formation” (Ruggie, 1998, p. 172) was hard to imagine in pre-
colonial Southeast Asia. Thus, requests for border settlements by the British in India were 
interpreted as unfriendly by Siam (Winichakul, 1994).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Siam was the name of Thailand before 1938.	  
39	  	  
 
Southeast Asian peoples had their own interpretations of borders in pre-colonial times 
which differed from those of the Westphalian system. Wolters (1999) used the Sanskrit 
term mandala which referred to the ancient power relations in the region without fixed 
territorial boundaries. In mandala, the strongest king at the centre acted as a suzerain and 
expected tributes and respect from the less powerful vassal kings. Regalia, gifts, 
manpower, and troops were supplied by the vassals to the overlord king. It was very 
common for less powerful kings to send tributes to more than one suzerain at the same 
time, as tiny Lao kingdoms did with Siam and Vietnam (Evans, 1999). Tambiah (2013) 
suggested that the rise and decline of each king’s power depended on the merit made and 
accumulated in previous lives according to Buddhist doctrine.  
 
Modern geography was slowly accepted, as more Siamese elites became accustomed to 
the idea of Westphalian borders when Britain took control of Burma in 1885 
(Winichakul, 1994). In the 1890s, the most widely read geography book among the elites 
was Phumisat Sayam by W.G. Johnson (Winichakul, 1994) and this showed nation-states 
with Westphalian-style boundaries. Siam was entering a new era as indigenous norms of 
space were replaced with modern geography (Winichakul, 1994) but the idea of 
Westphalian borders still confused the Siamese elites and the border peoples in the 
mountain and jungle areas, as their lives were affected by foreign logic of borders. In the 
1890s, Siam faced more colonial expansion from the aggressive French in the East. 
Though misunderstandings of sovereign power over Cambodia and the territorial borders 
detailed in the 1863 treaty were solved peacefully, another border issue over the Eastern 
bank of the Mekong was not settled in the same manner (Winichakul, 1994). By the late 
19th century, Siamese elites accepted European thinking regarding border settlements but 
this acceptance of the European concept of space meant the silencing of the voices of the 
local peoples. For example, various Lao cities along the Mekong attached to the mandala 
system were forced to accept modern administrative reform in 1893 from Bangkok. Siam 
adopted colonial tactics similar to the West resulting in military clashes with the French 
in 1893 and the ‘loss’ of vast areas on the Eastern banks of the Mekong to French 
Indochina (Winichakul, 1994). After the Franco-Siamese conflict, the Siamese-Indochina 
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border was drawn for the first time and became the colonial legacy of post-colonial Thai-
Lao relations.  
 
The juridical and cultural maps of the area were not congruent. After independence, more 
Lao people lived in Thailand on the West bank of the Mekong than on the Lao side 
(Ngaosyvathn & Ngaosyvathn, 1994), and cultural and kinship ties still existed across the 
border. The adoption of the theoretical framework of Westphalian territorial borders 
requires careful examination. This thesis contends that geopolitics as a colonial legacy in 
International Relations should be academically addressed because of the unclear 
territorial borders drawn during the colonial era and the lack of attention given to the 
voices of the local peoples by authorities.  
 
Zomia in Southeast Asian highlands 
 
This thesis agrees that Winichakul’s explanation of the historical background of the Thai-
Lao border in colonial times throws light on present International Relations. However, his 
analysis did not cover the non-state space that existed since the pre-modern era until the 
Cold War. The reasons that mandala state is always the focus of pre-colonial 
historiography is because there are more empirical evidences than in the non-state zones. 
Unfortunately, if peoples from the hill areas as non-state zones, such as the Hmong, are 
ignored, the history of Southeast Asia only reflects the voices of the elites. 
 
Scott (2009) suggested that pre-colonial states in Southeast Asia paid more attention to 
the capture of peoples rather than to land acquisition. As most peoples lived in lowland 
areas because of ease of access to agricultural work, most interest was focused on these 
areas and the workers were also be used for military purposes in times of war (Scott, 
2009). This capture of peoples was a necessary task for statesmen since an increase in 
manpower indicated an increase in the prosperity of the state. Scott (2009, p. 5) called 
this process “enclosure movement.” As a result, a significant number of peoples fled the 
pre-colonial mandala states to freedom in the highlands (Scott, 2009). These highland 
areas, geographically difficult for ancient state agents to access, became what Scott called 
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non-state zones or zomia. Such places occurred in	  North-Eastern India, Bangladesh, 
Southern China,	  Northern Thailand, Lao PDR in the Mekong Valley, Northern and 
Central Vietnam, and Eastern Cambodia (Scott, 2009), an area the same size as Europe 
and today containing eighty to hundred million peoples.  
 
The inclusion of these areas and peoples in the analysis of this region is justified since 
702 of 1108 kilometres of the Thai-Lao border is made up of highlands, much of it being 
zomia non-state space (Mandech, 2001; United States of America, Office of Geography, 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of the State, 1962; Paribatra, 2013; 
Scott, 2009). To ignore these areas and peoples disregarded the locations of Thai-Lao 
border conflicts in three villages, Bane Kang, Bane Savang, and Bane May3, in 1984, in 
Rom Klao Village in 1987-1988, and the Wang Tao4 incident in 2000 (Paribatra, 2013; 
Theeravit & Semyeam, 2002), and the Hmong5 political actors whose movements 
transcended state boundaries as they helped the US fight many battles against the 
communists. After Laos became a communist state, many Hmong became refugees in 
Thai territory. In the contemporary context of fixed borders, peoples from zomia such as 
the Hmong still maintain contact with lowlands peoples. Unfortunately, most 
International Relations after 1989 discussed the roles of peoples from zomia mainly as 
refugees, terrorists, and insurgents, when they crossed the Thai-Lao border (Oldfield, 
1998). 
 
Domino Theory and Western superiority as justification of US intervention in the 
area from 1954 to 1975 
 
Domino Theory: the geopolitical legacy of ocularcentrism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  These names have been transliterated by Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, a Lao political scientist. If they were 
transliterated by the Thai, they would be Ban Klang, Ban Sawang, and Ban Mai as they were in M.L. 
Pinitbhand Paribatra’s PhD thesis in 2013	  4	  This border checkpoint is transliterated by a number of authors as ‘Vang Tao’	  
5 A number of authors in the 1980s called this group of people as Meo. However, this thesis calls them 
Hmong as Meo contains a derogatory connotation. 
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One of the most important discourses that shaped justification for the US intervention in 
Indochina during the Cold War, resulting from the myth of a self-contained state, is 
known as the Domino Theory (O’Sullivan, 1998). This thesis argues that the comparison 
of a state with a domino resulted from the geopolitical legacy of ocularcentric maps that 
ignored the indigenous spatial conceptualisations of mandala and zomia in theory and 
state practices. This discourse can be found in words of the intellectuals of statecraft and 
International Relations theorists. For instance, former US president Eisenhower said that 
“the loss of Vietnam, together with Laos” would threaten “not only Thailand but also 
Burma and Malaya” (1963, p. 333) – the falling domino effect. Eisenhower stated further 
that Laos was a very important “domino” in Southeast Asia because the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail that the Viet Minh used as a route to support military operations in South Vietnam 
was in Lao territory (Kissinger, 1994, p. 641). Two years later, this Domino Theory was 
still observed by Eisenhower, as he said “the fall of Laos to Communism could mean the 
subsequent fall – like a tumbling row of dominoes – of its still-free neighbors” 
(Eisenhower, 1965, p. 607). This theory can be found in the rhetoric of other US 
presidents. For example, Kennedy said that the US had to contain communism in 
Southeast Asia and argued that the loss of Laos to communism would put at risk other 
neighboring states (O’Sullivan 1999; Stevenson, 1970). Additionally, the former US 
Secretary of the State, Henry Kissinger questioned this domino concept but he still 
reproduced the domino metaphors on a number of occasions as if he accepted it. For 
example, the domino discourse appears more than ten times in Diplomacy, suggesting 
that he accepted the theory when discussing correspondence between Truman and 
Churchill (Kissinger, 1994). 
 
Morgenthau (1965) echoed the statements of state practitioners identifying Vietnam as 
the first domino to fall under communism. He supported the words of the then Secretary 
of the State, John Foster Dulles, that North Vietnam was “the first cork of the bottle” 
(Morgenthau, 1965, p. 33). As a result, justification for the US intervention in the region 
was often found with the assumption of a state as a self-contained unit in discourse about 
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the Domino Theory. To contain the communist threat, the US forces needed to be 
stationed in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.  
 
Western superiority in classical realism 
 
The concept of Western superiority on the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to 1975 found in 
International Relations was not only due to academic acceptance of the use of Cartesian 
maps in the Westphalian system that led to the myth of a self-contained state compared 
with a domino but also in the intervention of the West in former Indochinese colonies, a 
violation of the Western norm of space management itself. The work of the classical 
realists, Herz and Morgenthau, and a Thai International Relations scholar, M.L. Bansoon 
Ladavalya6, showed evidence of the geopolitical characteristics of objectivity, separation 
of space and peoples of Thailand and Laos, Western superiority justifying intervention if 
not colonisation, and the provision of nationalistic advice to the US. This colonial legacy 
of geopolitical characteristics theoretically resulted in the territorial traps of the myth of a 
self-contained state, dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside, and the reification 
of territorial borders monopolised by elites.  
 
Justification of the intervention in Cold War politics in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand can 
be noted in classical realism. Herz (1959, p. 40), for example, said that state territory was 
very important and compared it to a “hard-shell” that should be defended. However, with 
more advanced technology, especially after World War Two, Herz (1959) stated that 
territorial borders in the Westphalian sense were obsolete. For example, the US border 
was ‘shifted’ to Indochina to contain the communists. Such a statement, before the 
establishment of Lao PDR as a communist state in 1975, showed that the US statesmen, 
and even some members of academia, wanted to defend their imaginative geography in 
Indochina as right wing groups that supported the Lao monarchy fought with the left 
wing Pathet Lao groups assisted by the communist Vietnamese. Since Thailand provided 
military airbases for the US to intervene in Laos before 1975, the Thai-Lao border in that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 M.L. is the abbreviation of the Thai royal title of ‘Mom Luang’ referring to great grandchildren of the 
king 
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era was academically set aside, meaning the US intervention in Thailand and Laos was 
justified. The US border may have shifted to Indochina as Herz theoretically contended, 
though a decade later, his stance changed and he emphasised the importance of state 
territory in the Westphalian system again (Herz, 1968).  
 
Similarly, the work of Morgenthau showed the geopolitical characteristic of Western 
superiority. Morgenthau (1965) did not agree with the US military operations in Vietnam 
which affected the Thai-Lao border in the 1960s but he did not completely reject the US 
intervention in the region. Morgenthau (1951) said that military tactics alone would not 
successfully contain the communists as the locals saw it as another phase of colonisation 
after the French departure. He still viewed communism as a threat and prioritised the US 
promotion of capitalism and democracy in the region but realised that it had to be done in 
a different way (Morgenthau, 1965). For example, economic support was stressed but this 
went hand in hand with military policy (Morgenthau, 1965). On many occasions 
Morgenthau proposed that the US should have withdrawn its troops from Indochina at the 
same time as recognising states like Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam as “periphery military 
containment” (Morgenthau, 1965, p. 64). The sense of Western superiority was strong, as 
shown by Morgenthau’s description of Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of South Vietnam 
in the late 1950s, as “an Oriental despotic totalitarian” (Morgenthau, 1965, p. 21). It 
implied that because Ngo was ‘Oriental’ and ‘totalitarian’, he was assumed to be less 
rational, and the US should intervene in the region and bring democracy to the people in 
Indochina to counter communism. Accordingly, both Herz and Morgenthau believed that 
because the state was compared with a domino, and the dangerous communist domino 
threatened the non-communist ones, it was possible to subvert the Westphalian system at 
any time to justify the US military intervention. This geopolitical characteristic of 
Western superiority was passed on to International Relations. 
 
Justification of the US intervention in Indochina by Herz and Morgenthau resembled 
suggestions by a Dutch-American geopolitician, Nicholas Spykman, a few decades 
earlier. Spykman (1938) was influenced by Mackinder’s ideas of Heartland Eurasia and 
the Rimland and did not agree with isolationist foreign policy. He said that the power of 
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the Heartland (the Soviet Union and China) could pose a threat to the US and Ó Tuathail 
(1996) argued that this view influenced International Relations during the Cold War and 
could have influenced the US foreign policy at that time. Spykman, Herz, and 
Morgenthau supported the policy of intervention to contain the influence of the Heartland 
and defend the US interests in Indochina.  
 
In the early 1970s, Stevenson (1972), an expert in the US foreign policy analysis, showed 
an awareness of the failure of American foreign policy related to Laos in the previous 
decade. Stevenson (1972) criticised the US intervention, saying that statesmen such as 
Dulles ignored significant factors regarding Laos. For instance, Stevenson (1972, p. 9) 
believed the boundary of Laos in the Cartesian maps was “fictitious” due to different 
tribes and feudal warlords. He was not trapped by either the myth of the dichotomous 
understanding of the inside/outside or the state as a self-contained unit. He recognised the 
fact that in the 1960s there were more Lao people in Thailand than in Laos itself and that 
the movements of peoples from the highlands transcended the Lao state boundary. 
Stevenson believed that American intervention in Laos was agreed to by some groups of 
Lao elites and American statecraft intellectuals that overlooked the plight of peoples on 
the ground. Stevenson’s work was not as recognised as much as that of Morgenthau and 
Herz but was often quoted by Surachai Sirikrai, an expert on Thai-Lao relations in the 
1980s. However, awareness of the territorial trap was not passed on and the assumption 
of the separation of space and people still remained. Unfortunately, this thesis believes 
that Stevenson’s theoretical statements about the US intervention in Laos were not as 
influential as those of more famous classical realists, such as Morgenthau and Herz. 
 
Similarly to classical realism, a Thai International Relations scholar, Ladavalya, accepted 
all four geopolitical characteristics in his text aimed to teach International Relations 
students at Chiang Mai University in the 1970s. Presentation of the Cartesian map of 
Laos with Westphalian-style borders indicated its linear boundary led to the use of the 
first geopolitical characteristic – objectivity. This led to the second geopolitical 
assumption of separation of space and peoples, in this case, those of Lao ethnicity on 
both banks of the Mekong separated by the Westphalian system. It seems that Ladavalya 
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recognised some degree of contestation of the border as the map indicated the areas 
occupied by Pathet Lao. However, he concluded that non-intervention and territorial 
integrity were theoretically expected when Laos became a sovereign state after the 1954 
Geneva Agreements (Ladavalya, 1970). Unfortunately, these theoretical expectations 
were not fully realised. Ladavalya (1970) condemned North Vietnamese military 
intervention that violated the territorial integrity of Laos, but appeared to accept the US 
intervention if it was cloaked in the name of a military collective mechanism such as 
South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), established to contain communism and 
requested by Laos. The third geopolitical characteristic, Western superiority, was evident 
in the work of Ladavalya as the Westphalian territorial system was taken for granted and 
suspension of it was accepted when required by the US.   
 
Ladavalya’s negative attitude towards communism and fear that a communist victory in 
Laos could threaten the Thai-Lao border led to the fourth geopolitical characteristic – the 
provision of Thai nationalistic advice for foreign policy of the Thai state. His claims 
about the Thai loss of Laos to France and comments that the International Agreement on 
Neutrality of Laos after the ceasefire of civil wars in the early 1960s allowed too much 
authority to the communist Pathet Lao in the coalition government were nationalistic 
statements (Ladavalya, 1970).   
 
In sum, influential International Relations theorists between the 1950s and the early 
1970s were heavily influenced by the geopolitical space conceptualisation when 
discussions monopolised by the elites’ interpretations were held about the Thai-Lao 
border. This silenced the voices of the peoples on the Siamese-Indochinese border in 
colonial times that became the Thai-Lao border during the Cold War. 
 
Violence in Cold War Indochina and on the Thai-Lao border 
 
The independence of Vietnam in 1954 did not bring peace to the region. The Cold War 
saw the continuation of violence as the US troops in the South and Soviet Union 
supporting the North Vietnamese tried to replace the French influence after its defeat in 
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1953 in Dien Bien Phu. To support the unpopular regime in South Vietnam and the 
military dictatorship in Thailand, the US formed SEATO, condemned by Said (1977) to 
be a ploy to lure the Third World to join the US, and stationed military forces in the 
region to counter communism. This intervention was only possible with the consent of 
the elite groups in the region who welcomed the eventual 500,000 American military 
personnel (Routledge, 1998).  
 
The non-intervention norm according to Wesphalian borders was subverted then as the 
elites thought it beneficial to the national interest, and the US forces were allowed into 
Thailand, South Vietnam, and even Laos before 1975, and the Vietnamese into Lao PDR 
afterwards. The territorial integrity of Laos was not observed as much as after the US 
withdrawal in 1973. The Thai-Lao border still existed but the US played a significant role 
in influencing the government policy of Thailand and Laos at that time. In fact, the 
presence of American and Thai troops in Laos in 1960s had to be confidential. After 
1975, the border became not only the territorial border of the two states but also of the 
two ideological worlds of capitalist democracy and communist socialism. Thai troops 
could not enter Lao territory anymore while Vietnamese troops were allowed in Lao PDR 
for security reasons. Strict interpretations of Westphalian borders resulted in a number of 
conflicts between Thailand and Lao PDR. 
 
Delimitation of the Thai-Lao border was made by the elites that exploited peoples along 
the border. It affected a significant number of peoples who were killed, injured, and 
displaced. Despite independence being granted for Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and 
North Vietnam from the French in the 1950s, peoples there still suffered wars as they had 
in the First Indochina War with France between the late 1940s and early 1950s.  
 
It is important to recognise the issue of casualties in Indochina during the Cold War, an 
issue played down by influential International Relations literature published between 
1954 and 1975. Stevenson (1972), as a foreign policy analyst, recognised displacements, 
injuries, and deaths of both Americans and locals but he was not as influential as classical 
realists such as Herz and Morgenthau. However, there was a greater focus on this issue 
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after the end of the Cold War. For example, the American neo-realist, Mearsheimer 
(2003), accepted that 13,000 North Vietnamese soldiers and civilians were killed during 
the US military intervention. It can be argued that the number of casualties may be higher 
than that. For example, Hirshman, Preston and Loi (1995) expected that the number was 
more than 1,000,000 deaths. After the US left Indochina, a significant number of stateless 
Hmongs who had helped fight against the communists in Laos and Vietnam were 
massacred (Paribatra, 2013). Two hundred thousand Hmongs were killed by the new 
communist regimes (Evans, 2002). From 1975 to 1995, 320,856 peoples from Laos, 
Hmong, and other groups fled to Thai territory (Leepreecha, 2011). These peoples were 
theoretically silenced and very often state-centrically regarded as refugees since 
influential International Relations literature followed the territorial trap discussed in the 
following chapters.  
 
The resurrection of the colonial legacy on the Thai-Lao border from 1975 to 1989 
 
Objectivity and space on the Thai-Lao border 
 
Between 1954 and 1975, the Wesphalian territorial form of state was taken for granted in 
discussions about the Thai-Lao border. Literature published between 1975 and 1989 
examined the historical background and recognised times of border disputes and military 
intervention. These instances were regarded as deviations to the ideal Westphalian 
territorial form and it was hoped that the territorial integrity of Laos would be respected 
when its domestic politics became more stable (Sirikrai, 1979).  
 
Cartesian maps still influenced explanations of the causes of the Thai-Lao border 
conflicts after the establishment of Lao PDR in 1975. For example, Ruampongpattana 
(1988, p. 82) used six Cartesian maps of the Thai-Lao border to explain spatial details 
between 1975 and 1988. Claiming to be more objective, aerial photography of the three 
border villages of Bane Kang, Bane Savang, and Bane May was used to argue that the 
disputed areas in 1984 were in Thai territory (Ruampongpattana, 1988). However, 
Ngaosyvathn (1985) had a different stance claiming that these villages had already been 
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indicated to be in Lao territory since the colonial era. The two authors had different 
comments because they were attached to different forms of ‘objectivity.’ The Lao side 
was still confident in the map drawn during the French heyday, while the Thai cited the 
newer and technologically more advanced aerial photography. Nevertheless, an error in 
the Thai-Lao border found in the map could be noted. In that period, a number of texts 
reported that the Thai-Lao border was 1,750 kilometres in length (United States of 
America, Office of Geography, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of the 
State, 19627; Kutranon, 1982; Ruampongpattana, 1988). The fact that the distance 
indicated was ‘corrected’ to be 1810 among scholars after the delimitation in the late 
1990s implies that the objectivity of the map should not be taken for granted. 
 
The acceptance of the concept of Westphalian territory and its reification from the 
supposedly objective Cartesian maps led scholars in International Relations to be caught 
in the territorial trap of the myth of the self-contained state. For example, Phuangkasem 
(1980) adopted the Social Field Theories of Rummel to explore the behaviour and 
interaction of Thailand and other states in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
space of the state was a supposedly self-contained unit, when the theoretical framework 
was applied. Phuangkasem’s spatial conceptualisation of Thailand and its neighbouring 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s, including Lao PDR, were like two billiard balls, 
metaphorically speaking, that hit each other on the table of international politics. 
Phuangkasem thus took space for granted and contingency was ignored, and went on to 
predict the behaviour and interaction of the state. When the state was like a unit, it 
supposedly helped International Relations students and policy-makers provide more 
objective predictions in international politics, as the relations and behaviour of states 
could be calculated.  
 
The assumption of the Thai-Lao border as a separation of space and people  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The US Department of the State has used mile as the unit of measurement. It indicates that the Thai-Lao 
border is 1090 miles or 1750 kilometres in length.	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The second geopolitical characteristic, the separation of space and people, can be 
examined in two ways. The first way is to look at texts published after 1975 that analysed 
the politics of the Thai-Lao border between 1954 and 1975. These include PhD theses of 
Thais who later became influential professors in International Relations in Thailand, such 
as Sirikrai and Phuangkasem. Both recognised subversion of the territorial integrity of 
Laos in the 1950s and 1960s by a number of major powers and its neighbors but both saw 
these interventions as temporary. Once Laos became politically stable, Sirikrai (1979) 
believed that the Westphalian system should be recognised and the concept of non-
intervention should be more respected. 
 
The second way is to look at the separation of space and people of Thailand and Laos 
found in texts that discussed the Thai-Lao border after the triumph of Pathet Lao in 1975 
followed by the establishment of Lao PDR. The evidence can be used to support how 
spatial conceptualisation in the theory is similar to the state practice regarding the Thai-
Lao border and peoples in the area. For example, the Thai-Lao border became especially 
meaningful as it not only separated the spaces of two states but also the two worlds of 
democratic capitalism and socialist communism. Phuangkasem (1984) and Sirikrai 
(1984) presupposed that the Thai-Lao border as a separation of spaces of the two states 
must be respected. Sirikrai (1984) advised that Thai officers should be careful with the 
territory demarcation and not violate Lao territory, though there is no evidence if this was 
taken into consideration by policy-makers.  
 
The perception that the Thai-Lao border separated the space of the capitalist democracy 
of the US in Thai territory and the socialist communism of the Soviets in Lao territory 
was even obvious in Justus M. van der Kroef’s article Southeast Asia: new conflicts and 
cooperation (1976). Van der Kroef (1976) said that Thai statesmen at that time were 
worried that communist Vietnam would use Lao territory as its pathway to invade 
Thailand. Moreover, David Morrell (1976), as a non-International Relations scholar, even 
re-asserted this geopolitical characteristic in his article Political conflict in Thailand, 
especially when border conflicts between the two states occurred more regularly and the 
Thai state tried to normalise its relations with the communist states after the US military 
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withdrawal in 1975. The supposed separation of space and peoples that resulted in the 
dichotomous understanding of inside/outside assumption can even be found when the 
Thai-Lao border was discussed in the historical anthropology work of Gunn (1980).  
 
Peoples who had lived on both sides of the Mekong were also theoretically separated by a 
boundary of a state that gave them their citizenship. When discussing the peoples who 
fled Lao PDR after 1975, Phuangkasem used the term ‘refugee’ that suggested that 
peoples needed to be separated according to their state. If they crossed the Thai-Lao 
border, they would be accordingly described. Phuangkasem argued that after their camps 
were set up in several Northeastern provinces in Thailand, these peoples were regarded as 
a problem by both the original state and the receiving state. Lao PDR accused Thailand 
and China of using these peoples, including the Hmong from zomia, as spies that violated 
Lao territory and demanded that the Thai state “return all Laotian refugees” 
(Phuangkasem, 1980, p. 176).  
 
The assumed separation of space and people can be noted in the comments by Thai state 
officials such as Sarasin Virapol and Kajadpai Burutpat. In the late 1970s, a significant 
number of displaced peoples who fled an aggressive regime in Lao PDR entered Thai 
territory and were often labeled as refugees because they were not legally accepted as 
citizens of the Thai state. Viraphol (1985) reported that after March 1975, there were 
more than 250,000 refugees from Lao PDR in Thai territory. Burutpat (1988), in the late 
1980s, argued that the number of refugees from Lao PDR in 1979 may have been as 
many as 320,000 persons. He further indicated the displaced peoples comprised three 
groups; the well-to-do middle class Laos who did not want their property to be 
confiscated by the new communist government, the former right wing militants, and the 
peoples from the highlands such as the Hmong (Burutpat, 1988). Two solutions were 
proposed to settle this problem, repatriation or resettlement in a third country (Viraphol, 
1985). The state-centric solution, a return to Lao PDR, for peoples such as the Hmong, 
meant persecution. The voices of the Hmong were completely silenced in Viraphol’s 
work. 
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In sum, this separation of space and people led to the territorial trap of the dichotomous 
understanding of the inside/outside of the state. In practice, it affected the lives of peoples 
along the Thai-Lao border. In theory, it strengthened the voices of the elites of Thailand 
and Lao PDR who defined the Thai-Lao border and silenced the voices of the peoples 
along the Mekong. 
 
Western superiority and presentation of unequal space as justification for colonisation  
 
Sirikrai’s (1979) analysis of Lao people with Thai citizenship living in North-East 
Thailand (Isan) from the 1940s to the 1960s recognised political connections with Laos. 
The Isan region is geographically separated from the Bangkok region by the Phetchabun 
Mountains (Sirikrai, 1979). Between the 1940s and 1960s, transport was difficult and 
there was little incentive to access Isan, the driest area of the country, creating a 
geographical and cultural divide between the central administration in Bangkok and the 
region. The central administration, in the form of a military junta, felt that the communist 
threat could easily affect the Thai-Lao border (Sirikrai, 1979), and accepted financial 
support from the US for basic infrastructure in Isan such as roads to provide better access 
to the area to contain communism (Sirikrai, 1979). Local politicians in Isan were, in 
addition, closely connected with activists in Laos who later formed the communist Pathet 
Lao. It was not surprising, after the stationing of the US troops in Isan, that there were 
numerous attacks on Thai government buildings in the region by the Communist Party of 
Thailand (CPT). This thesis argues that the provision of basic transport infrastructure and 
the suppression of communist insurgents in Isan reconfirmed Thai state authority within 
its borders.  
 
The analysis by Phuangkasem (1984) of Thai foreign policy regarding Indochinese states 
revealed another geopolitical characteristic, the unequal presentation of space. 
Phuangkasem (1984) regarded Laos as economically less developed in comparison with 
Thailand and, being a land-locked state, had to rely on Thailand for access to seaports. 
No longer was there justification for colonisation from 1975 to 1989 but the inequality of 
space still provided reasons for Western intervention in the 1950s and 1960s, as Laos was 
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seen as a key area to Southeast Asia (Phuangkasem, 1980). Phuangkasem (1980) further 
defined different spaces according to traditional geopolitics and explained the great 
powers’ interest in Southeast Asia, especially Thailand and Laos. She saw this area as a 
“land ridge” providing a route from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and a source of 
cheap labor, raw materials, and a means of transporting oil (Phuangkasem, 1980, p. 27). 
This explanation was similar to Spykman’s description of Indochina as strategically 
important as the route to the continental landmass of Eurasia. Spykman (2008) believed 
that control of this region meant great power. In short, the geopolitical characteristic of 
the presentation of unequal space as justification of Western intervention still remained in 
International Relations. 
 
Thai and Lao nationalism in International Relations 
 
The fourth geopolitical characteristic, the provision of nationalistic advice, is found in 
International Relations publications relevant to this time and should be analysed in two 
ways. Firstly, whether or not International Relations texts were used for policy advice in 
Thailand and Lao PDR should be examined. Little evidence of this is available, though 
some authors later became intellectuals in the area of statecraft and their texts criticised 
foreign policy. For example, M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra8 analysed the foreign policies 
of Thailand and its Indochinese neighbors after the US military withdrawal in 1975. Two 
decades later, Paribatra became Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs under the administration 
of Prime Minister Chuan Leakpai.  
 
Secondly, evidence of nationalistic feeling can be found in both Thai and Lao authors, 
citing historical narratives from pre-colonial times to support claims that the territorial 
integrity of Thailand and Lao PDR should be respected. For example, the view of 
Paribatra (1984) that Thailand lost Lao territory to France as Laos had been its vassal 
state since the pre-colonial era was not shared by the Lao author Ngaosyvathn who 
believed that Laos was invaded by the Thais even before the arrival of the French. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  M.R. is the abbreviation of the Thai royal title of ‘Mom Rajawongse’ referring to grandchildren of the 
king.	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Thai chauvinism emerged again during World War Two when Thailand tried to annex 
parts of Lao territory while France was busy fighting against Nazi Germany in Europe 
(Ngaosyvathn, 1985). As an intellectual of statecraft, Burutpat (1988) not only repeated 
the traditional chauvinism regarding the territorial loss of Thailand to France in 1893 but 
also accused the Pathet Lao Party of planning to annex the then sixteen North-East 
provinces of Thailand, where a significant number of Thai-Lao people live, on the same 
mandala grounds. Though this accusation has never been proved, this thesis insists that 
claims to territory based on historical accounts from the pre-colonial era were 
anachronistic as, under mandala, territorial borders were not absolute. Such claims were 
simply made to arouse nationalistic feeling. However, this Thai and Lao nationalism was 
absent, it must be noted, in other academic texts by western authors though they still 
insisted that Thai and Lao territorial integrity should be respected (Gunn 1980; Morrell 
1976; Van der Kroef, 1976).  
 
Increased tolerance and reduced nationalism from 1989 to the present 
 
Chatichai Choonhavan was elected as the 17th Prime Minister of Thailand in 1988 and 
launched a very influential policy aimed at turning the battlefields of Indochina into 
thriving marketplaces. Therefore, this thesis considers 1989 (the year of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall) as the end of the Cold War and as the starting point to examine concepts of 
the Thai-Lao border by International Relations literature in the most recent period.  
 
There have been no major border conflicts between the national armies of the two states 
since the 1990s, but border issues have occurred on occasions. In 2000, a group of Thai-
Lao citizens accused of being in an anti-Lao government movement attacked an official 
building on the Lao side and quickly returned to Ubon Ratchathani, part of Thai territory, 
via the Chong Mek-Wang Tao border checkpoint. Twenty eight persons were arrested by 
Thai police. This incident was recognised as reasonably serious by International 
Relations scholars in Thailand because the Lao government regarded it as a major 
obstacle to developing Thai-Lao economic relations, though no military clashes were 
reported (Theeravit & Semyaem, 2002). 
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Objectivity and space on the Thai-Lao border 
 
The faith in the objectivity of the ocularcentric maps still remained in master theses in 
International Relations submitted to Chulalongkorn University after 1989. For example, 
Daomas Imsomeranrach (1992) presented the ocularcentric map in her thesis 
Bureaucratic politics in Thai foreign relations: A case study of Thai-Lao disputes over 
the three villages to objectively explain the border conflicts in 1984. Chan-orn 
Bongsebandhu-phubhakdi (2000) similarly presented the map to indicate “the loss of 
Thai territory to France” in the colonial era in her thesis Land border settlement between 
Thailand and Laos. Though it could be argued that such a claim was anachronistic, the 
belief in the objectivity of the map to support one’s argument about the Thai-Lao border 
was still present. A map of Thai and Lao territory was furthermore found in Thirty years 
of the Friendship Bridge: The reflection of Laotian-Thai relations, 1965-1995 by a Lao 
author Bouavone Souklasaeng (2006). 
 
In research funded by the Institute of Asian Studies, Theeravit and Semyaem (2002; p. 
100, p. 130-135) presented four maps to explain the Thai-Lao border conflicts in Rom 
Klao Village in 1987-88. Nevertheless, doubts about ocularcentric maps were noticed in 
the early 1990s, and the inaccuracy of the maps drawn during colonial times was blamed 
for conflicts in the 1980s. For example, it was stated that the military clash in Rom Klao 
Village resulted from interpretations of different maps. Lao PDR used the L708 version 
of the map claiming that the village was under its sovereignty. This version, however, 
was seen as outdated and full of errors by the Thai government who used another version, 
L7017, arguing that the three villages were in Thai territory. The military clash resulted 
in 479 deaths (Mandech, 2001). Such an incident questions the objectivity of the maps. 
Thailand and Lao PDR, nevertheless, attempted to fix this problem (Ngaosyvathn & 
Ngaosyvathn, 1994).  
 
Re-examination of the Thai-Lao border conflicts in the past, such as in the three villages 
in 1984 and the Rom Klao Village between 1987 and 1988, revealed two assumptions 
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regarding border issues among academia; that states must still follow the Westphalian 
idea of territory, and that ocularcentrism provided the most objective truth regarding 
space in international politics. Accordingly, the territorial trap of an assumed self-
contained state never disappeared from the theory, even in the new millennium. 
 
The assumption of the Thai-Lao border as a separation of space and people 
 
Similar to the first geopolitical characteristic, the second has remained in the literature 
since 1954. It was assumed by all texts that the Thai-Lao boundary line separated the 
territorial spaces of two sovereign states, and separation of space and people was noted 
when border disputes were discussed, especially when territorial integrity was threatened. 
Jiwalai (1994, iv) indicated in her PhD thesis submitted to the University of Hawaii that 
the border conflicts in the three villages in 1984 and in Rom Klao Village in 1987-1988 
were “the lowest point of Thai-Lao relations since 1975.” This quotation suggested the 
separation of space and people because it only reflected the relations between state 
officials of Thailand and Lao PDR. It is doubtful that the clashes in Rom Klao Village 
occurred because of illegal logging by Thai businesspersons who crossed the border to 
fell trees in Lao territory. It was suggested that problems arose as local military officers 
from Thailand and Lao PDR were unable to agree about division of the profits of the tree-
felling. The incident then developed into a state-level problem (Stuart-Fox, 1997).  
 
Since 1989, this characteristic has been less prominent and very often subverted by 
transnational trade and co-operation between the two states, other Southeast Asian states, 
and even Western ones (Ngaosyvathn & Ngaosyvathn, 1994). Construction of roads and 
bridges that cut across the Thai-Lao border was promoted for multilateral corporations 
under the Great Mekong Sub-region (GMS) for the first time in 1993 (Sirikrai, 2003). 
Also, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposed to solve conflicts 
in the past that undermined the security of Thailand and Lao PDR, including the “Thai-
Lao border” and “Lao refugees” (Amer, 1999, p. 1042). The use of such phrases meant 
that the geopolitical assumption of the separation of space and people still remained and 
was taken for granted, even though the regional institution with a mechanism called 
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“constructive engagement” was proposed to deal with political conflicts (Amer, 1999, p. 
1031).  
 
In the new millennium, the issue of groups of people who did not have a territorial state 
also existed. For example, the trans-state movements of the Hmong were always 
perceived as problems that undermined the security of the Thai-Lao border by experts in 
Thai-Lao relations, such as Sirikrai (2007). Similarly, younger scholars such as M.L. 
Pinitbhand Paribatra9 (2013) in his PhD thesis, persisted that the lack of this territorial 
state meant that the Hmong can only be refugees and/or displaced people in the theory. 
Without their own state, the movements of the Hmong were not recognised 
internationally and theoretically. Very often, they were defined as “insurgents” if they 
were involved with insurgency in Lao PDR (Oldfield, 1998, p. 174). Paribatra (2013) 
said that the displaced Hmong in Thai territory were linked with the insurgents in Lao 
PDR in the 2000s that worsened state relations. After resettlement schemes programmed 
to accommodate the Hmong by Thailand and the US in 2003 and 2009, Thailand had 
better relations with Lao PDR (Paribatra, 2013).  
 
In 2000, at the time of the Wang Tao incident, discourse about territorial integrity was 
resurrected at the state level as the government of Lao PDR treated the issue as an 
obstruction to good relations with Thailand, even though there was no military clash 
(Theeravit & Semyeam, 2002). Despite these researchers’ efforts to be “stateless” 
(Theeravit & Semyea, 2002, p. 2), wording used in their study indicated that they adhered 
to the second geopolitical characteristic that separation of space and people cannot be 
avoided, while at the same time they recognised the cultural and ethnic ties of Lao 
peoples in North-East Thailand and Lao PDR. For example, the separation of peoples and 
space as a geopolitical legacy was reproduced by the use of a question such as “How do 
Lao people perceive Thai people?” and a response such as “People from this side and that 
side” was provided (Theeravit & Semyeam, 2002, p. 2). In conclusion, scholars in 
International Relations were still attached to the territorial trap of dichotomous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  M.L. Pinitbhand Paribatra is M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra’s son. 	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understanding of inside/outside, despite efforts to escape. This thesis argues that the 
effort to play down the separation of space in the Thai-Lao border resulted from the 
triumph of economic liberalisation after the end of the Cold War. The Thai-Lao border 
was no longer the ideological fence that divided the zones of capitalist democracy 
supported by the US and socialist communism supported by the Soviet Union anymore. 
 
Western superiority and presentation of unequal space justifying colonisation 
 
Western superiority regarding the knowledge of space management on the Thai-Lao 
border can be noted in International Relations after 1989. For example, Paribatra (2013) 
still explained the development of the Thai-Lao borders that have been reified by four 
colonial treaties between Siam and France. Though he recognised that border conflicts, 
very often, resulted from the inaccuracy of the ocularcentric maps drawn during the 
French heydays, the problems were argued to be merely technical. European imaginative 
geography of Westphalian states was still prioritised as the Thai-Lao Joint Boundary 
Commission was set up in 1996 to solve the inaccuracy that resulted from the colonial 
treaties. In 2012, 96% of the Thai-Lao border delimitation was completed (Paribatra, 
2013).    
 
In the post-Cold War era, military conflicts on the Thai-Lao border reduced and 
International Relations literature focused on two aspects of economic opportunity. The 
first focus was on the valuable natural resources of Lao PDR, especially its potential to 
export electricity (Ngaosyvathn & Ngaosyvathn, 1994). Its natural resources and 
increased openness to foreign investment provided great opportunities for transnational 
business compared to North-East Thailand. Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn (1994) 
reported that 40% of the area of Laos was still covered by jungle. The second focus was 
the transport infrastructure planned to connect the two banks of the Mekong. The Thai-
Lao border gained a new meaning as a bridge rather than as a fence in the Cold War. 
Still, Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn (1994), in the early 1990s, used negative terms like 
“exploitation” to describe their suspicious interpretation that foreigners may take 
advantage of porous borders. In short, the third characteristic of presentation of unequal 
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space still remained, even after 1989.  
 
It became clear that the interpretation of the Thai-Lao territorial border, echoed in 
International Relations, was no longer monopolised by military juntas but expanded to 
include businesspersons and citizens along the border. The end of the Cold War marked 
the victory of neo-liberalism and democracy and the voices of the peoples who benefited 
from transnational liberalism became more prominent in the theory. The territorial trap of 
the reification of the border from the maps by a group of elites was still there but the 
group wishing to turn battlefields in marketplaces became larger. However, peoples 
without a state, such as the Hmong, have not had a chance to academically present their 
border interpretation. 
 
Thai and Lao nationalism in International Relations 
 
Despite a decline in nationalism in post-Cold War International Relations, Lao 
nationalism and suspicion of Thai foreign policy was still evident in the work of 
Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn (1994). For instance, the fact that former Lao rightists 
were still actively crossing the Thai-Lao border to conduct military operations in Lao 
PDR in the early 1990s was raised to question the sincerity of the economic liberalism 
policy launched by Thai Prime Minister Choonhavan (Ngaosyvathn & Ngaosyvathn, 
1994). These authors not only emphasised Lao nationalism but also the separation of 
space and people, as the violation of territorial integrity of Lao PDR was not expected. 
Thus, the first, second and fourth characteristics of geopolitics can be noted. 
 
Chinnawat Mandech (2001), a Thai military officer, presented a history of the national 
Lao version in his master thesis in International Relations at Chulalongkorn University. 
Ironically, the work of Mandech was more open and different to that of scholars educated 
in the West, such as Ladavalya, Sirikrai, Phuangkasem, and Paribatra, as it did not simply 
present the one-sided and nationalistic account that Thailand gave Lao territory to France. 
Mandech (2001) presented the Lao historiography account that Thailand should have 
been blamed for allowing French Indochina to annex the East bank of the Mekong to 
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guarantee the independence of Bangkok. This annexation resulted in the abrupt 
separation of Lao people who lived in both banks of the Mekong. One would not have 
expected a Thai military officer to make comments like this if the thesis had been written 
between 1975 and 1989 when the ideological rivalry and Thai nationalism were strong. 
Although this interpretation of the Thai-Lao border revealed a toleration of different 
versions of history, the voices of the elites continued to be heard and those of the peoples 
along the border were typically downgraded. For example, Mandech (2001) still 
concluded that Thailand should not have supported the transnational movements of the 
Hmong because it worsened Thai-Lao relations. 
 
Theeravit and Semyeam (2002) explored Lao peoples’ views of Thailand’s use of a 
number of events, such as the border conflicts in the three villages in 1984, Rom Klao 
Village in 1987 and 1988, and the Wang Tao incident in 2000. The outcome of the 
research, most importantly, was that not only the voices of the elites were echoed but also 
those of the peoples that daily crossed the Thai-Lao border were heard. Evidence of Lao 
nationalism was shown by the general tone of the respondents’ answers. Lao responses 
indicated that the Lao people did not agree with Thai historical narratives that Lao 
territory used to belong to Thailand (Theeravit & Semyeam, 2002). However, at the end, 
the researchers suggested that toleration in Thai-Lao relations should be promoted 
(Theeravit & Semyeam, 2002). This trend of toleration was observed at a more junior 
level, in addition. For example, Polvichien Pookongchi (2003) examined how the Wang 
Tao incident affected Thai-Lao relations in his master thesis at Chiang Mai University. 
Adopting the concept of ‘perception and misperception’ by Robert Jervis, Pookongchi 
made a recommendation that the Thai media should have been more careful in reporting 
the events as Lao people were able to watch television program from Thailand. Thai 
nationalistic historiography on Thai-Lao relations should have been promoted less in both 
in the media and school texts so that peoples along the Mekong were able to live 
peacefully (Pookongchi, 2003). 
 
Conclusion 
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This chapter answered the first and the second research questions exploring the extent to 
which the colonial legacy of geopolitics remained in International Relations in relation to 
the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to the present. It divided the sixty years since the Lao 
state became independent into three phases, from 1954 to 1975 when the Royal Lao 
Government was in power, from 1975 to 1989 when Lao PDR was established and the 
Thai-Lao border separated the two ideological worlds of capitalist democracy and 
socialist communism, and from 1989 to the present when the Cold War was over.  
 
The chapter maintained that all four characteristics of geopolitics – objectivity based on 
the use of ocularcentric maps, the separation of space and people, Western superiority 
and the presentation of unequal space justifying intervention if not colonisation, and the 
provision of nationalistic advice – were passed on to International Relations regarding 
Thai-Lao border issues. Each of the characteristics was theoretically presented to 
different extents depending on global politics in the region at the particular time under 
discussion. For example, in the first period, the Domino Theory as a result of the myth of 
the self-contained state from Cartesian maps was dominant in theory and in the minds of 
intellectuals of statecraft. Western superiority and the unequal presentation of space 
justifying intervention were evident as a result. States in Indochina had not yet achieved 
the full form of territorial state and Western intervention was needed. 
 
Thus, in classical realist texts by Morgenthau and Herz, the justification for the US 
intervention in Vietnam, which affected the Thai-Lao border, was presented. The colonial 
legacy of Westphalian borders was still in existence but had to be subverted because the 
containment of communism in the region was more urgent. Even the Thai scholar 
Ladavalya reconfirmed this opinion that intervention in Laos by the US should have 
taken place to contain communism. Though Stevenson, an expert in foreign policy 
analysis, disagreed with the US policy at the time indicated, he was not as famous as 
Herz and Morgenthau. Between 1975 and 1989, after the US military withdrawal, the 
Thai-Lao border became again meaningful and theoretical justification for violations of it 
reduced. Nationalism on both sides of the border was used to support territorial integrity 
by Thai and Lao authors. After the end of the Cold War, the characteristic of unequal 
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space was promoted more. The separation of space of the Thai-Lao border recognised the 
development of neo-liberal transnational interaction and the importance of the abundant 
natural resources and raw materials in Lao PDR. Nationalism was reduced but some 
events occurred that aroused nationalistic feelings, such as the Wang Tao incident in 
2000. Academia promoted more tolerance but still groups without states who had played 
significant roles in the Thai-Lao border, such as the Hmong, remained as refugees and 
displaced peoples (Paribatra, 2013). 
 
The fact that the four geopolitical characteristics have remained in International Relations 
for the last sixty years of the political narrative of the Thai-Lao border blinded the 
theorist and resulted in the theoretical attachment of the territorial trap. The first two 
characteristics of objectivity and separation of space and people constantly remained in 
the discipline and led to the myth of the self-contained state and the dichotomous 
understanding of inside/outside. The representation of unequal space justifying Western 
colonisation or intervention and the provision of nationalistic advice for the state policy 
led to the trap of reification of territorial borders monopolised by the elites that silenced 
the voices of the peoples on the ground. Agnew and Corbridge (1995) proposed ways to 
avoid the traps, and this thesis discusses them in regard to the Thai-Lao border in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The inescapable territorial trap in International Relations: The Thai-Lao border 
from 1954 to the present  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter answers the third research question of the thesis that addresses the use of the 
concept of the territorial trap (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995) to criticise existing literature in 
International Relations, with particular reference to political realism, regarding Thai-Lao 
border issues from when Laos became Lao PDR in 1975 to the present. To support the 
analysis of this period, the territorial trap in literature from 1954 to 1975, from 1975 to 
1989, and from 1989 (the end of the Cold War) to the present day is examined. The 
chapter argues that International Relations scholars, influenced by the geopolitical legacy, 
have been subjected to the territorial trap for the past 60 years.  
 
Despite International Relations’ literature often not being aware of the trap, the solutions 
to escape from it as proposed by Agnew and Corbridge – the historical awareness of the 
states involved, broader social and economic structure of a hegemon, and changes in 
geopolitical order – were taken into theoretical consideration by a number of scholars. 
However, the traps of the myth of a self-contained state, dichotomous understanding of 
the inside/outside, and the reification of borders monopolised by the elites remained. This 
was because, as discussed in the previous chapters, the geopolitical characteristics of self-
claim for objectivity, separation of space and peoples, representation of unequal space 
with Western superiority justifying intervention, and provision for nationalistic advice to 
the state still remained in the discipline. This thesis argues that the solutions proposed by 
Agnew and Corbridge were insufficient to theoretically escape from the territorial trap. 
Discussions of the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to the present day showed the lack of 
success of International Relations scholars to avoid the trap.  
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The 60 years of the independent Lao state are divided into three phases to show that 
recognition of the territorial trap proposed by Agnew and Corbridge was already 
achieved by International Relations theorists without the awareness of the work of these 
two researchers. Each phase had unique characteristics that resulted in distinctive spatial 
conceptualisation of the Thai-Lao border. For example, the first phase was from 1954 to 
1975 when a number of major powers, such as France, the US, the Soviet Union, China, 
and neighbouring countries such as North Vietnam and Thailand, intervened in Laos. In 
this phase, the Domino Theory was very influential as a justification for the US 
superiority and intervention in Indochina (Kissinger, 1994; Ó Tuathail, 1998; Stevenson, 
1972). This Domino Theory justified the US intervention in Indochina in academic texts 
because, according to Herz, the Westphalian-based territorial border logic gave way to 
the structure of global politics at that time as the US extended its influence to Southeast 
Asia, including Thailand and Laos (Herz, 1959). The second phase was between 1975 
and 1989 when Laos became the communist state known as Lao PDR and the US 
withdrew from Indochina. In this phase, the Thai-Lao border gained a new meaning as it 
became not only the border between the states of Thailand and Lao PDR but also the 
boundary between the two ideological worlds of democratic capitalism and communist 
socialism. The third phase commenced at the end of the Cold War with the triumph of 
democratic capitalism. The Thai-Lao border was again re-interpreted by neo-liberal 
transnationalism very often justified in International Relations. In the three periods, the 
myth of a self-contained state, the dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside, and 
the reification of the map monopolised by certain groups of people remained in theory, 
although the degrees varied according to global political changes that affected local 
issues. Ways to escape from the trap were inadequate because the concept of space 
imposed by the Westphalian idea of state was embedded in the three solutions mentioned 
above and taken for granted. This concept was subverted at the command of the elites. 
The voices of the non-elites regarding this spatial conceptualisation was ignored and 
insufficiently considered in the theory. The human dimension was neglected.  
 
This thesis argues that Agnew and Corbridge’s proposal to escape from the territorial trap 
is a good springboard to achieve a more human dimension in border issues in 
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International Relations that can be enriched by the incorporation of critical perspectives 
from other political geographers briefly introduced in chapter 1. These perspectives 
included the re-conceptualisation of geopolitics during the Cold War that focused on the 
geopolitical rhetoric by the US (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1998) applied to Thai and Lao 
statecraft intellectuals, the analysis of the geopolitical legacy in the post-Cold War period 
that analysed the colonial legacy of ocularcentric territorial borders (Dalby, 1998), the 
anthropological approach of cultural analysis of borderlands and transnational nature of 
peoples on the ground (Donnan & Wilson, 1999), and anti-geopolitics that stated that the 
voices of the peoples on the ground could be used to analyse the 60 years of the Thai-Lao 
border (Routledge, 1998).  
 
This chapter presents four connected themes to support the argument that the solutions 
including the awareness of historical background, broader social and economic structure 
of a hegemon, and changes in geopolitical order proposed by Agnew and Corbridge are 
insufficient. These themes are the setting aside of the Westphalian border concept in the 
theory from 1954 to 1975, the Thai-Lao border as an ideological boundary from 1975 to 
1989, the triumph of economic liberalisation and the Thai-Lao border from 1989 to the 
present, and the enrichment of the solutions to the territorial trap by the incorporation of 
the perspectives of critical political geographers. 
 
The setting aside of the Westphalian concept in the theory from 1954 to 1975 
 
Scholars in International Relations, especially in political realism, were influenced by 
traditional geopolitics and trapped in their approaches to the Thai-Lao border from 1954 
to 1975 by the spatial conceptualisation of their assumptions of a self-contained state, 
dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside, and reification of borders from maps. 
Agnew and Corbridge’s proposed solutions to the trap included consideration of 
historical relations among the states involved, broader social and economic structures, 
and changes in geopolitical order, but this thesis argues that International Relations to a 
certain extent already took these into theoretical consideration without awareness of the 
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work of Agnew and Corbridge. The proposals were still insufficient as, despite the 
theoretical consideration, they failed to escape. 
 
Historical relations among the states involved in the analysis of Thai-Lao border 
 
Agnew and Corbridge (1995, p. 100) stated that “The historical relations among the 
territorial states…” could not be overlooked if the territorial trap was to be avoided. This 
argument may be countered by the claim that when Herz, the classical realist, wrote about 
territorial borders, he also paid attention to history.  
 
The work of Herz was important as he said that because of the new technology of 
weapons after World War Two, the Westphalian hard-shell territory should be 
theoretically extended from one single state to include others across Europe that covered 
allies in the democratic and capitalist camps led by the US (Herz, 1959). To contain 
communism led by the Soviets, he even said that the US territory could be theoretically 
shifted to Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam (Herz, 1959). However, Herz did not 
totally reject the importance of traditional Westphalian-based states since this concept 
provided the basic structure of international politics. Without Westphalian states, the 
international structure, such as different camps led by the US and the Soviet Union, was 
impossible.  
 
Nevertheless, when the history of territorial borders was discussed, Herz (1959) cited the 
European experience of Westphalian borders. In discussions of the development of 
territorial borders from feudal states to Westphalian states, European thinkers from the 
17th and 18th centuries were mentioned. Leibniz, for instance, was cited as he 
distinguished the roles of sovereigns as supreme rulers of territorial states with complete 
control of their subjects (Herz, 1957). Clausewitz was cited to support the argument that 
that if a state wanted to force another state to do something, then territory needed be 
conquered first (Herz, 1959). Pufendorf was mentioned to indicate that safety was 
guaranteed in the international system of territorial sovereigns and smaller states hoped to 
be safe within their impermeable Westphalian borders (Herz, 1959). Thus, the historical 
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narrative of Herz was a European perspective that privileged the spatial conceptualisation 
of the European and the author adopted it to discuss the foreign policy of the US during 
the Cold War. The importance of Westphalian-based territory was imposed on Indochina, 
including the Thai-Lao border, and this allowed no voices of the peoples in Indochina to 
be heard regarding spatial conceptualisation at the times indicated.  
 
The Thai version of historical narrative was paid attention to by indigenous International 
Relations scholars but the idea of Herz that the Thai-Lao border should be set aside in the 
late 1950s was still echoed, though the justification was not always the same. While Herz 
implied that the Thai-Lao border had to give way to the US and Thai military operations 
to contain communism, the Thai version indicated that Lao territory had belonged to 
Bangkok polity since the pre-colonial era. For example, historical accounts recognised by 
Ladavalya regarding the issue of the Thai-Lao border showed signs of Thai nationalism. 
The clichéd discourse of territorial losses on the Eastern bank of the Mekong to France in 
1893 was repeated all over again (Ladavalya, 1970). This was the claim attached to the 
pre-colonial spatial conceptualisation that represented the voice of the Court of Bangkok 
for its suzerainty over Laos which was anachronistic because Westphalian logic had not 
been accepted in these areas before the establishment of modern state boundaries in 1893. 
As the east bank of the Mekong territory was not de jure possessed by either Siam or 
France, it could not be lost according to international law unless the claim was based on 
the replaced mandala norms. In addition, at the time when the US policy began to support 
the coalition in Laos (which legally included the communist Pathet Lao in the 
government in the early 1960s) Ladavalya (1970) strongly objected to the change in the 
policy. He emphasised the meaning of territorial integrity that the Thai border needed to 
be defended, in the same Westphalian style that Herz described as “a hard-shell” 
(Ladavalya, 1970, p. 182). 
 
This thesis contends that the territorial trap remained evident, despite attention paid to 
historiography by Herz (1959) and Ladavalya (1970). Cited historical narratives used by 
these two authors to support their theories were dominated by spatial conceptualisation 
based on the concept of Westphalian borders (Herz, 1959; Ladavalya, 1970), interpreted 
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from the state-centric paradigm monopolised by the elites that originated in 17th century 
Europe and the Bangkok elite in the colonial era. This approach silenced the pre-colonial 
Indochinese peoples’ history of the spatial concepts of mandala described by Wolters 
(1999) and zomia described by Scott (2009). Even when mandala was heeded by 
Ladavalya, it was to benefit the Thai nationalist claim that Lao territory belonged to 
Thailand. Meanwhile, zomia was totally absent, though the Hmong from the highlands 
took part in regional politics. Spatial conceptualisation in theory never echoed the 
historical accounts of peoples on the ground. This argument does not suggest that the 
Hmong never wanted or will never want their Westphalian state, but their way of life of 
movements along the highlands, a non-Westphalian spatial conceptualisation, was hardly 
mentioned in International Relations. Texts by Herz and Ladavalya were aimed to present 
the voices of statesmen to solve the state’s problems, including the border. For instance, 
in the Rise and Demise of the Territorial State, the intellectuals of statecraft and students 
in International Relations were Herz’s target audience (Herz, 1957). Similarly, these 
voices of the elites, such as statesmen and diplomats, on spatial conceptualisation 
dominated Ladavalya’s text regarding the Thai-Lao border (Ladavalya, 1970).  
 
Broader social and economic structures 
 
The economic and social influences of world hegemony that transcended state boundaries 
require examination. Consideration of the 1945-1989 Cold War demanded more than a 
focus on the military capabilities of a hegemony that forced other states beyond their 
territorial boundaries (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995). To compete with the Soviet Union, 
the US promoted neo-liberal institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Bank (Agnew & 
Corbridge, 1995). The number of non-state actors from the US, its allies, and 
transnational corporations with overseas branches rose significantly from 1945 to 1962 
(Agnew & Corbridge, 1995). However, those in less economically successful states who 
participated in transnationalism were the elites and the voices of peoples along the 
territorial borders were excluded. 
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Literature in International Relations from 1954 to 1975 was aware of the broader social 
and economic structures. Though the international economic institutions and 
transnational corporations mentioned were rarely found in the literature, with particular 
reference to political realism, the role of an economic hegemon, such as the US, that 
financially supported its allies in Indochina was recognised. For example, Morgenthau 
(1965) said that he did not agree with the US military intervention in Indochina but other 
economic means were used to encourage South Vietnamese statesmen and citizens. To 
contain communism, economic intervention was proposed by President Lyndon Johnson 
in 1965 to show the Vietnamese the benefits of the capitalist system compared to 
socialism. This meant that strict observation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam 
was played down.  
 
Morgenthau (1965) did not always fall prey to the territorial trap of the dichotomous 
understanding of inside/outside of South Vietnam when he justified economic support. 
However, suggestions of military intervention in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand 
when ‘necessary’ indicated the trap of the myth of the self-contained state. Morgenthau 
(1965) saw North Vietnam as the first domino that had fallen to communism and, if 
others followed, all the Southeast Asian states would become communist. Consideration 
of the broader economic structure of capitalism helped Morgenthau escape from the 
territorial trap of inside/outside dichotomy but he was still caught by the myth of the self-
contained state. 
 
Stevenson (1972), an American foreign policy analyst, stated that the American efforts to 
replace the influence of France, as a former hegemon, were an attempt to court Laos. The 
economic structure of the US affected not only Laos but also Thailand as a significant 
number of aid programmes were provided to both countries. For example, from 1962 to 
1972, the US spent $945 million to support the Lao economy and military (Stevenson, 
1972). American economic and military support of Thailand provided a pathway to Laos. 
A number of transport construction projects were financially supported near the Thai-Lao 
border (Stevenson, 1972). This recognition of such economic relations under the 
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hegemonic influence of the US helped escape from the territorial trap to a certain extent 
but the kind of economic trans-state ties discussed were monopolised by and benefitted 
the elites, not the 95% of Lao people who were farmers. Media, such as the Wall Street 
Journal, questioned the transparency of the budget distribution and Lao officials were 
accused of corruption (Stevenson, 1972). Stevenson was aware that trans-state economic 
ties and interpretations of the Thai-Lao border were monopolised by American, Thai, and 
Lao elites, and changes in the geopolitical order were also in their hands.  
 
Changes in the geopolitical order  
 
Agnew and Corbridge (1995) suggested that the world geopolitical order was divided into 
three periods, the combination of the European Concert and British Domination from 
1815 to 1875, the Inter-Imperial Rivalry from 1875 to 1945, and the Cold War 
Geopolitical Order from 1945 to 1989. Understanding of Westphalian borders was 
challenged depending on the interpretation of borders according to geopolitical 
presentation and discourse (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995). The political elites, under a 
particular geopolitical order, monopolised the meaning of geopolitics and hence borders. 
In the Cold War Geopolitical Order, the rules of international relations were regulated by 
the US elites (Ó Tuathail, 1996). The US, as the first world, and the Soviet Union, as the 
second, both tried to economically, ideologically, and militarily influence the less 
developed third world countries – the former colonies. The US also extended its military 
operations that transcended state boundaries as military alliances, and NATO was formed 
in Europe to counter the Eastern European communist states led by the Soviet Union. 
Without the consent of the elites in the Third World countries, the success of military 
alliances in the forms of collective security mechanisms was impossible.  
 
Herz (1959) paid attention to changes in the geopolitical order and his proposal for 
international structure was based on the existence of territorial states. To guarantee safety 
to the group, the collective security mechanism was to defend the territorial integrity of 
the members (Herz, 1957). However, Herz’s meaning of territory as the basis of the 
structure changed according to the condition of world politics and its geopolitical order. 
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During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the US deployed their troops to defend the 
territorial integrity of the satellite states in their bloc. To oppose the communist-socialism 
bloc led by the Soviet Union, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) was cited that this protection shifted from a single unit to others in the same 
capitalist-democracy bloc. The Westphalian hard-shell territory of the US thus was 
expected to extend across Europe (Herz, 1959). In Southeast Asia, Herz (1959) said that 
the US border could theoretically be shifted to Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam.  
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The idea of the US shifting its border to Indochina was explained further. With the 
awareness of the Cold War geopolitical order, Herz (1975) recognised that the raison 
d’etre of North and South Vietnam was the product of the Cold War mentality. He said 
that while partition occurred in a number of states, such as Ireland and India, the states 
that emerged afterwards were not titled as North and South Ireland, or West and East 
India, unlike, Vietnam, Korea, and Germany that became North and South Vietnam, 
North and South Korea, and East and West Germany. The common phenomenon was that 
they all were divided by the “Iron Curtain” (Herz, 1975, p. 957) which suggested a line 
that separated the ideological worlds. This Iron Curtain suggested the awareness of Herz 
of the geopolitical order of the Cold War to specify which parts belonged to socialism-
communism and liberalism-democracy. North and South Vietnam were products of the 
“bipolar world” (Herz, 1975, p. 958). The divide was “less result of the policies than the 
world power relations” after World War Two (Herz, 1975, p. 958) when the Domino 
Theory emerged. American state practitioners used the Domino Theory as a justification 
to intervene in South Vietnam to contain communism in the North. For example, 
Eisenhower said that “the loss of Vietnam, together with Laos” would threaten “not only 
Thailand but also Burma and Malaya” (1963, p. 333). This supposed loss was compared 
to falling dominos. In sum, though the dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside 
of Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam had to give way to American influence in Herz’s 
work in the late 1950s, a decade later the territorial border was revisited (Herz, 1968). 
This dichotomous understanding of inside/outside of South Vietnam resulted further in 
the myth of a self-contained state that was found in the spatial perception of the former 
American president, Eisenhower. Hence, the territorial trap remained.  
 
The awareness of changes in the geopolitical order was noted in the work of Ladavalya. 
The 1950s was a time of transition. France tried to re-assert its power over Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos while the new superpowers, the Soviet Union and the US, were not 
yet fully active in the region. Ladavalya (1970) mentioned that before 1954, Laos was 
still under the supervision of France, meaning that Lao territorial integrity was not 
recognised by the colonialist French but that integrity was expected when Laos became 
fully independent.  
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The ways in which space was “practiced, read and written by the elites” (Agnew & 
Corbridge, 1995, p. 47) under the Cold War Geopolitical Order are worth examination. 
The US and Soviet conflicts extended into Southeast Asia and affected the borders in the 
region as both tried to persuade third world states to conform to their political and 
economic norms. In the democratic and capitalist bloc, the US exerted its influence by 
military and capital (Ruggie, 1986). The interpretation of territorial borders, especially 
the Thai-Lao border, varied. Sometimes, when statesmen thought it in the national 
interests, foreign troops from the same ideological bloc were allowed within the territory. 
Ladavalya (1970) recognised that to contain the communists from North Vietnam, the US 
forces would de jure be stationed in Thailand and Laos under the South East Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO). However, Stevenson (1972) showed that when the US foreign 
policy in Laos changed, the interpretation of the Thai-Lao border changed too. For 
example, in the civil war in Laos between 1960 and 1962, the Lao right wing hoped that 
SEATO military operations would be launched and function more effectively as 
communist Laos grew more influential (Stevenson, 1972). This occurred because the US 
under the Kennedy administration in the 1960s was less aggressive than that of 
Eisenhower in the late 1950s (Stevenson, 1972). A Lao coalition government, which 
included the three factions of right wing, neutral, and left wing, was supported by the US 
but, to avoid “the violation of the territorial integrity of Laos,” covert operations by 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) together with Thai mercenaries in Laos were noted 
without any SEATO authorisation (Stevenson, 1972, p. 187). Stevenson also pointed out 
that SEATO military intervention needed consensus and objections by the US, France, 
and the UK meant that military intervention in civil wars in Laos was impossible. The 
Lao territorial border was sacrosanct and no military intervention was to be allowed. The 
territorial trap was again revealed. 
 
Nationalism in International Relations: The Thai-Lao border as an ideological 
boundary between 1975 and 1989 
 
Historical relations among the states involved in the analysis of the Thai-Lao border 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, historical accounts of issues regarding the Thai-Lao 
border from 1975 to 1989 not only reproduced the established spatial knowledge of a 
state being Eurocentrically Westphalian but also mixed anachronistic accounts of 
mandala with it. Thai authors cited the historical accounts in defence of Thai territory, 
arguing that Laos used to belong to Thailand, and Lao authors disagreed. Very often, 
Thai authors claim that Lao territory used to belong to the Thai state based on the pre-
colonial fact that Vientiane was the vassal state to Bangkok, on the mandala grounds. As 
a result, the feeling that the present Lao territory should belong to Thailand could be 
strongly sensed. However, non-Thai authors rarely cited historical narratives to support 
nationalism but only the fact that the territorial integrity be observed. The historical 
backgrounds of Thailand and Laos were taken into theoretical consideration but 
International Relations scholars could not escape the territorial trap, especially the 
dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside of the state. 
 
Doctoral theses by Sirikrai and Phuangkasem reflected the ex-post facto claim that the 
Thai state had owned the territory of Laos. Sirikrai (1979) did not take history for 
granted, as he recognised the predated interactions of Lao peoples on both banks of the 
Mekong that became the modern boundary in 1893 after the Franco-Siamese conflicts. In 
pre-colonial days, the Vietnamese were viewed by Bangkok as a threat of invasion from 
the eastern bank of the Mekong. After the arrival of the French, the Vietnamese were 
colonised and France instead became the threat to Bangkok. The historical narrative 
echoed the mainstream education campaign during the time of state building in Thailand 
as Sirikrai (1979) cited Prince Damrong, famous for his nationalistic texts. This thesis 
argues that such a narrative suggested that pre-colonial rivalry existed when Vietnam was 
influential in Lao PDR and, despite recognising the historical element, Sirikrai still 
revealed an attachment to the dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside of the 
Thai state. Sirikrai’s awareness of the porous border of the Mekong which peoples 
crossed everyday was not sufficient to escape from the trap.  
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Similar nationalistic historiography can be observed in other authors’ texts, such as 
Paribatra (1984) who restated that the perception of Vietnam as a threat to Siam in pre-
colonial days was resurrected during the Cold War. This was due to Vietnamese 
influence on the east bank of the Mekong, perceived to belong to Thailand but lost to 
France in 1893. Again, though the historical narrative was recognised, the territorial trap 
was revealed as Paribatra (1984) said that Vietnam could have violated the territorial 
integrity of the Thai state on the Mekong border. 
 
Such historical accounts of Thai nationalism were countered by Ngaosyvathn. In the 
analysis of Thai-Lao border conflicts in three villages, Bane Kang, Bane Savang, and 
Bane May, in 1984, Ngaosyvathn (1985) stated that King Chulalongkorn of Siam handed 
map no. 200 to the King of Luang Prabang which indicated that Bane May belonged to 
the latter in 1891, making Thai claims that the disputed areas were in Thai territory 
unacceptable. Ngaosyvathn (1985) claimed that Thais had regularly invaded Laos since 
pre-colonial times and argued that the conflicts in the three villages were a continuation 
of pan-Thaism that failed during World War Two. This revealed that Thai nationalism 
and Lao nationalism were trapped in the myth of the dichotomous understanding of 
inside/outside.  
 
Phuangkasem (1980) did not ignore history in discussions of the Thai-Lao border but was 
still exposed to the territorial trap of the dichotomous understanding of inside/outside of 
the state. For example, domestic politics affected the foreign policy of Thailand in the 
1960s and 1970s when the military juntas pursued hawkish policies towards communist 
Indochinese states (Phuangkasem, 1980). Significantly influenced by neo-realism, 
Phuangkasem (1980) recognised the fact that before 1975, there were more people with 
Lao ethnicity in North-Eastern Thailand than in the Lao state itself. Phuangkasem (1980) 
took history into theoretical consideration and considered the border as a colonial legacy 
of Western origin that caused conflicts in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. This 
historical recognition was not enough to say whether internal or external factors had more 
impact on Thailand foreign policy at that time but awareness of the border as a colonial 
legacy was mentioned. Still, it was not seriously taken into theoretical consideration 
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because her research question regarding the foreign policy of the Thai state led in a 
different direction. As a result, the territorial trap remained throughout the work of 
Phuangkasem. 
 
Broader social and economic structures 
 
Agnew and Corbridge commented that “since 1789 only about sixty out of over 200 years 
can be associated with ‘a definitive’ hegemon: 1845-75 with Britain, and 1945-73, with 
the United States” (1995, p. 103). International Relations literature on the Thai-Lao 
border from 1975 to 1989 rarely indicated the social and economic structures of a 
hegemon. Sirikrai (1979) examined the US and Thai intervention in the Lao civil wars in 
the early 1960s and mentioned economic issues but the dichotomous nature of the 
inside/outside trap still prevailed.  
 
Sirikrai (1979) said that before the civil wars in Laos broke out between 1960 and 1962, 
the US had played a significant role in financially supporting the Royal Lao Government. 
Influenced by Stevenson (1972), Sirikrai reported that the US financial support to Laos 
was “the highest per capita aid anywhere in the world” until US assumed full control over 
the government in Vientiane (1979, p. 72). Large sums of money were spent on funding 
the national army of Laos in the 1950s (Sirikrai, 1979) and there was US financial and 
military support to the Hmong from highland Laos. As the primary source, Sirikrai was 
aware of broader economic structure of global politics that affected Thai and Lao 
government at that time. He was aware that a large sum of money was spent on 
supporting the Thai government. This financial support was so significant that sometimes 
the Thai junta had to yield to the US policy in Laos, despite disagreeing with it (Sirikrai, 
1979). Still, Sirikrai could not escape from the territorial trap of the self-contained state 
assumption and border reification monopolised by the elite. 
 
Other evidence of economic activity at more local levels in the 1970s and 1980s was 
presented in International Relations literature. Viraphol (1985) argued that as a land-
locked state, Lao PDR relied on Thailand to provide a route to the sea. Consequently, 
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goods needed to be transported via Thailand to and from Lao PDR and the Thai-Lao 
border became the gateway of economic interdependence. Lao people thus had to rely on 
Thailand despite ideological differences. Phuangkasem (1984) recognised the economic 
ties of the two states and stated that at times of conflict, closing the Thai-Lao border was 
one tactic that Thailand used to gain the upper hand. For example, Thailand closed its 
border after its naval units were ambushed in the Mekong in 1975 (Kutranon, 1982). 
Burutpat (1988), who served as a technocrat to the Thai state regarding foreign policy 
during the Cold War, confirmed that whenever the Thai border was closed, Lao PDR’s 
foreign policy towards Thailand was expected to be less aggressive. Kutranon (1982), 
however, stated that the foreign policy of Lao PDR towards Thailand was often still 
aggressive, even when borders were closed, as there were other sea ports available, 
especially in Vietnam. Examination of these incidents revealed attachment to the 
dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside, though this very attachment sometimes 
gave way to economic interdependence. Kutranon, Phuangkasem, Viraphol, and Burutpat 
were still trapped by the assumption that the state was a self-contained unit when they 
accepted that borders could be closed and movement across them was not allowed.  
 
The fact that economic activities transcended the Thai-Lao border was not only 
recognised in transport matters but also peoples’ status. Burutpat (1988) and 
Ruampongpattana (1988) shared the assumption that a significant number of displaced 
peoples fled Lao PDR because of economic reasons. Burutpat categorised these displaced 
peoples from the communist regime into three groups. One group fled because they were 
middle class who favored capitalism and were afraid that their property may be 
confiscated. The other two groups were right wing militants and highland peoples who 
were supported by the US (Burutpat, 1988). The number of refugees in 1979 was 126,357 
and the total number was 320,000 (Burutapat, 1988).  Ruampongpattana said that the 
sudden change of a regime from one financially supported by the US to a communist one 
resulted in economic bankruptcy for many people. During the two decades of 
independence, the US spent more than 4,610 million US dollars to pay the salaries of Lao 
civil servants but in 1975 financial aid finished and salaries paid to state officers 
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decreased ten times (Ruampongpattana, 1988). This resulted in a significant number of 
people fleeing to Thai territory.  
 
Changes in the geopolitical order 
 
Among neo-realists, Waltz’s discussion on the international structures of bipolarity 
between the US and the Soviet Union showed that he was concerned with the issue of 
geopolitical order. His bipolarity lasted between 1945 and 1989. However, the bipolar 
structure of the two superpowers only represented the voices of the elites. Evidence of 
privileged political elites’ voices can be noted in the words of Waltz regarding the 
damage caused by US in Southeast Asia after the Vietnam War, stating “… America’s 
failure in Vietnam was tolerable because neither success nor failure mattered much in the 
international system” (1979, p. 191). The term ‘tolerable’ was used in reference to 
hundreds of thousands of lives lost due to the US military operations in the Southeast 
Asian states. Waltz focused on international structure and the theoretical explanation only 
reflected the voices of the US statecraft intellectuals following the bipolar structure and 
ignored the voices of the Indochinese border peoples. The territorial trap of the 
assumption of a self-contained state and the reification of the border monopolised by the 
elite continued. 
 
Sirikrai (1979) focused on two aspects of global politics that affected the locals, 
especially along the Thai-Lao border but he was still caught in the territorial trap of self-
contained state assumption and border reification monopolised by the elite. First, as a 
development from statements made by Stevenson in 1975, the bilateral relations between 
Thailand and the US and Laos and the US should be noted. Thailand and the right wing 
faction in Laos had to follow the US policy to counter the communists. The US military 
operations were overt in Thailand and covert in Laos at first. In Thailand from 1962 to 
1969, 50,000 US forces were stationed in North-Eastern Thailand and the US planes flew 
from there to drop 75,000 tons of bombs (Sirikrai, 1979). Joint ground military co-
operation in Laos between Thailand and the US was secret but later declassified. Second, 
the geopolitical order imposed by the US came in the form of the multilateral mechanism 
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of SEATO but the organisation could not authorise military intervention. The US favored 
a neutral government in Laos but this was not liked by the Thai junta. As shown by the 
Rusk-Thanat Joint Communiqué, the US persuaded Thailand to agree by assuring US 
defence of Thai territory in the case of invasion by communists (Sirikrai, 1979).  
 
Viraphol (1985) suggested that after 1954, the geopolitical order dominated by the US 
ensured that both Thailand and the US played a significant role in Laos and the Thai-Lao 
border was not a problem. However, after the US left and Lao PDR was established in 
1975, the Thai-Lao border became the space of confluence of two geopolitical orders, the 
capitalist democracy led by the US on the Thai side and socialist communism led by the 
Soviets in Lao PDR. However, socialist communism in the 1970s could not be viewed as 
monolithic. The Sino-Soviet conflict, another geopolitical change within the socialist 
communist camp, was an example recognised by Viraphol (1985) and Paribatra (1984). 
Herz (1975, p. 964) called this situation the structure of global politics with “two 
superpowers and a half,” the Soviet Union versus the US, with China as an important 
variable, and global politics after 1975 was not simply friction between two ideological 
camps. Thailand, normally, would be supposed to belong to the US camp but, after the 
US withdrawal in 1975, Thai statesmen chose to run a campaign of normalisation with 
China, despite different ideologies. A Sino-Thai alliance made sense to exploit the 
conflicts in the socialist communism camp to counter a seemingly unified Indochina of 
Vietnam and Lao PDR supervised by the Soviets. China was perceived by Lao and 
Vietnamese statesmen as working with Thailand to undermine Lao territorial integrity. 
The case of the three villages of Bane Kang, Bane Savang, and Bane May was an 
example of the Sino-Thai alliance viewed as a threat by Vientiane (Viraphol, 1985). 
Paribatra (1984) even made a policy recommendation that the Thai state might urge 
Beijing to support the trans-state movement of the Hmong, supported by the US before 
1975, to counter Hanoi. The Thai-Lao border between 1975 and 1989 needed to be 
carefully analysed as it did not separate the democratic capitalist world from that of 
communist socialism as a whole, just the bloc led by the Soviet Union. 
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Though Viraphol, and Paribatra were aware of this geopolitical order change within the 
socialist communist bloc, they could not escape from the trap of the state as a self-
contained unit and the dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside. This was 
because Paribatra (1984) still perceived the threat at the Thai-Cambodian and Thai-Lao 
borders where Vietnam’s military influence was prominent. Thailand was thus described 
as “a frontline state” (Paribatra, 1984, p. 30) in the democratic capitalist bloc, as it 
borders Lao PDR and Kampuchea10 under the socialist-communist sphere of Vietnam and 
the Soviet Union. Also, Viraphol raised the case of displaced peoples who fled the 
communist regime after 1975 as “security problems” (1985, p. 1273). This perception 
revealed the geopolitical characteristic that expected separation of peoples that should be 
attached to a single territorial state. If that group failed to belong to one territorial state, 
they became a threat to others. The solutions proposed by Viraphol (1985) that the 
peoples be repatriated and persuaded to join resettlement schemes further reinforced the 
attachment of separation of space and people aforementioned.  
 
The triumph of economic liberalisation over the Thai-Lao border in International 
Relations from 1989 to the present day 
 
Historical relations among the states involved in the analysis of Thai-Lao border 
 
Similar to the two earlier phases, historical narratives featured in International Relations 
literature published after the end of the Cold War in 1989. The sense of nationalism 
embedded in historiography was still evident in the early 1990s. Ngaosyvathn and 
Ngaosyvathn (1994) discussed common pre-colonial, cultural, and ethnic issues 
involving the two nation-states but there was a strong sense of Lao nationalism. Very 
often, Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn rebutted Thai historiography that claimed to be 
superior to Laos, saying that “historically, the Siamese positioned their kingdom at the 
center of the world” and looked down upon other peoples, especially Lao (1994, p. 2). 
Prince Damrong, the historian cited by Sirikrai (1979), was also accused by Ngaosyvathn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Kampuchea was the name used under Pol Pot’s regime. The country was renamed as Cambodia after the 
1991 Peace Agreements.	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and Ngaosyvathn as his Thai traditional version of history was full of half-truths, such as 
Thailand’s victimisation by France when the eastern bank of the Mekong was annexed to 
French Indochina. According to Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn (1994), Prince Damrong 
overlooked the fact that various tiny Lao kingdoms on both banks of the Mekong had 
been invaded by Bangkok in the early 19th century. When King Chulalongkorn of 
Thailand expressed a sense of belonging among Thai and Lao people and said that they 
should unite against France, Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn (1994, p. 10) disagreed, 
saying “Lao had been a nation and a state” long before the arrival of France. 
Nevertheless, this thesis maintains that the claim of a modern nation and state existing 
before Westphalian borders were established in 1893 is anachronistic. Any author who 
makes such claims simply reproduces nationalistic discourse for his/her own state. Thus, 
the territorial trap of the Cold War conflict remained with Ngaosyvathn and 
Ngaosyvathn. 
 
Though less intensive nationalism was evident in Thai historical accounts, the same 
clichéd narratives were still reproduced. Jiwalai (1994, p. 29) maintained that Thai and 
Lao people were from “the same stock” and thus shared a cultural affinity, but the 
territorial trap never disappeared. This was because the historiography retold took the 
Westphalian state for granted and that this territory form should have been universally 
accepted. Indeed, this modern Westphalian territory was accepted by the Court of Siam in 
the late 19th century (Winichakul, 1994). 
 
Interviews of Lao people about their perceptions of Thailand by Theeravit and Semyeam 
(2002) revealed feelings of Lao nationalism. The interviewees tended to disagree with 
mainstream Thai historiography, arguing that Thailand invaded Laos even before colonial 
times, and pointed out that Thailand provided space for the US air bases to provide easy 
access to the bombing of Lao territory (Theeravit & Semyeam, 2002).  
 
In a PhD thesis by a non-indigenous author, David Oldfield, submitted to Northern 
Illinois University, neither Thai nor Lao nationalism was noted, but the expectation of 
respect for territorial integrity was sensed. Oldfield devoted one chapter to historical 
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narratives of the two states as background to what happened before discussion of post-
Cold War Thai-Lao politics, but the territorial trap was not erased. This was because 
Oldfield, heavily influenced by Stuart-Fox and Dommen, two experts on Lao history, 
wrote the chapter from the state-centric point of view. For example, Oldfield said that 
Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea affected Thai-Lao relations in that Thailand saw the 
Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea as a threat to its border. Lao PDR was blamed for its 
support for Vietnam. Hence, the then Prime Minister, Tinnasulanonda, was quoted as 
saying that the Thai state would support right wing militants in Lao PDR and block trade 
transport as “punishment of Laos” (Oldfield, 1998, p. 101). Therefore, this chapter did 
not help escape from the territorial trap. The elites who reified the border and myth of 
self-contained state were still recognised by the author. 
 
Broader social and economic structures  
 
In 1989, the Thai Prime Minister Choonhavan announced his policy of turning the 
battlefields of Indochina into marketplaces and there was a new interpretation of the 
Thai-Lao border by International Relations theorists. However, there were still 
suspicions. Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn (1994) looked for a hidden agenda as the 
same issues, such as Thai military activity and Lao right wing movements in the 
provinces bordering Lao PDR, were noted. Another suspicion was that, because the Thai-
Lao border was perceived as a bridge rather than a fence by Thai and Lao state 
practitioners, Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn considered the exploitation of rich natural 
resources in Lao PDR by transnational corporations. In addition, the territorial trap 
remained, though the Thai-Lao border was described as ‘a bridge’, because the 
Westphalian state was still presupposed. It was impossible ‘to bridge’ the two states, 
without the imagination of separated two pieces of land. Similarly, the Thai Theeravit 
and Semyeam (2002), and Paribatra (2013), explained that the economic integration 
proposed by the former Thai prime minister was to legalise illegal activities by Thai 
businessmen in Lao PDR, such as logging. Hence, even Thai scholars were aware of 
doubts that the slogan of ‘turning the battlefields to marketplaces’ might only benefit 
certain classes of the Thai-Lao elites at that time.   
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This thesis argues that, even though Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn were aware of the 
introduction of post-Cold War transnational movements, as the economic structure of the 
world changed, they continued to be trapped by the dichotomous understanding of the 
inside/outside and the myth of the self-contained state of Lao PDR. That they doubted the 
motivation of any external exploiters flooding into Lao PDR under the new economic 
structure reconfirmed this chapter’s argument. Theeravit and Semyeam (2002) and 
Paribatra (2013) did a better job in recognising that the economic liberalisation rhetoric 
represented the voices of the elites and ignored peoples on the ground. Though Paribatra 
was not able to completely escape from the trap, awareness of it was the first step to 
introduce the human dimension to the discipline that is yet to be developed. 
 
Sirikrai also recognised the broader economic trend at the end of the Cold War, as the 
triumph of neo-liberalism became more obvious. To facilitate multilateral co-operation 
and the mechanism of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) supported by World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank, Sirikrai indicated that transport should be constructed to 
connect all the states through which the Mekong flowed. Of course, the Thai-Lao border 
became the highway of neo-liberal transnationalism (Sirikrai, 2003). The Mekong was 
perceived as a corridor rather than a fence. Paribatra (2013, p. 132) said that since 
Thailand was viewed as “the center of the regional development,” schemes of 
supranational aid to states in Indochina were planned and named as ASEAN’s Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation. 
 
The argument by Amer (1999) that mutual economic achievement brought about the 
security of the region – the objective of ASEAN since 1967 – was further evidence that 
economic structure at the regional level affected the conceptualisation of the Thai-Lao 
border after the Cold War in 1989. Amer said that it was difficult to separate economics, 
politics, and security as they were interrelated. To achieve the goal of security, the non-
communist members of ASEAN had to expand the membership to include Lao PDR. 
Security and political stability were expected to be achieved by means of economic 
cooperation of ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). Thailand, the former frontline to 
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communism during the Cold War, was the major trade partner of Lao PDR in the 1990s 
(Amer, 1999).  
 
Businesspersons in private sectors were encouraged to expand their trade and investment 
in Lao PDR because of its rich natural resources. Sirikrai (2007) said that the Thai and 
Lao governments planned to construct roads and bridges to connect the two states and 
Paribatra (2013) discussed a multilateral plan that played down the Westphalian border of 
Thailand and Lao PDR, but the language used by the two scholars still re-confirmed the 
separated territorial units. The plan to connect Thailand and Lao PDR reflected the voices 
of the states, businesspersons, and the triumph of economic liberalisation, and these were 
echoed in International Relations literature. For example, Jiwalai’s doctoral thesis, 
devoting one chapter to global economic concerns, said that the border reification after 
1989 was extended from the military and bureaucrats to “middle class” that comprised 
“business interests, academicians, and non-governmental organizations” (Jiwalai, 1994, 
p. 245). Especially, businesspersons were not limited to those in Bangkok but also in the 
provinces along the Thai-Lao border such as Ubon Ratchathani, Mukdahane, Nakhon 
Panom and Nong Khai. Jiwalai said that in the future foreign policy should be “more 
democratic and more responsive to the interests of the majority of the population” 
(Jiwalai, 1994, p. 251). This thesis expected that this ‘more democratic and more 
responsive’ analysis would include the voices of the peoples of the margin (see chapter 4) 
as observations of peoples living along the border showed that they crossed, cross, and 
will continue to cross the border everyday. Establishment of stricter and firmer check-
points and more bureaucratic rituals to cross the border were new to the local people in 
the post-Cold War era but became part of their daily lives. International Relations 
literature very often recognised this from a state-centric point of view. 
 
Changes in the geopolitical order 
 
The triumph of the neo-liberal economy in global politics affected the geopolitics of the 
Thai-Lao border but despite examination by a number of International Relations scholars, 
the territorial trap never disappeared. This thesis considers the geopolitical order in two 
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ways, firstly through literature related to Thai-Lao border issues between 1975 and 1989 
published after the end of the Cold War, and secondly via a scrutiny of Thai-Lao border 
issues from 1989 to the present day. 
 
The territorial trap still remains, though it is less intense than in the Cold War era. Jiwalai 
(1994) stated that Thailand’s foreign policy could be compared with the bamboo that 
bends with the wind, implying that the changes in geopolitical order were taken into 
theoretical consideration. This was especially true as Thai foreign policy was pro-
American when the US troops were stationed in Thai territory to wage war with the 
communists in Laos and Vietnam during the Cold War. When the US troops were 
withdrawn in 1975, Thailand’s foreign policy changed as it normalised with the 
communist states in Indochina.  
 
Paribatra (2013, p. 55) referred to the geopolitical order as “macro variable,” and still the 
dichotomous inside/outside reappeared. He was aware that before the 1970s, Thailand’s 
foreign policy followed the direction of the US. Between the 1970s and 1980s, however, 
there was a shift to China and Indochinese states due to changes in the geopolitical order. 
He further explained that as the US under the Nixon administration changed its policy in 
dealing with communism in Southeast Asia; the US only provided material support to its 
allies (Paribatra, 2013). The territorial trap thus remained since Paribatra showed the 
dichotomous understanding of inside/outside by stating that, as Thailand’s policy shifted 
from pro-American to omni-directional in an attempt to normalise relations with Lao 
PDR, mutual respect had to be observed so that the territorial integrity was not violated.  
 
Similarly, Amer (1999) recognised the impacts of the changes in geopolitical order at the 
global level. Even before 1989, there was an attempt by ASEAN, led by Thailand, to 
establish good relations with communist states. States outside ASEAN could be included 
in the supranational body of conflict management on the condition that their inclusion 
must have been approved by members. In the 1976 Bali Treaty, for example, attended by 
the ASEAN members, the mechanism of conflict settlement was open to non-members 
involved in the conflicts. ASEAN included communist states such as Lao PDR and 
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Vietnam, as the supranational body aimed to achieve the settlement of disputes among 
states with “mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity and national identity of all nations” and “effective co-operation among 
themselves” (Amer, 1999, p. 1034). The myth of self-contained states was evident. 
Discussions about the inclusion of Lao PDR involved Thailand since it had the longest 
border with that nation-state. The territorial trap of dichotomous understanding of the 
inside/outside continued in Amer’s analysis of ASEAN even at the end of the Cold War 
when Lao PDR became an ASEAN member in 1997, though Amer saw changes in global 
politics in the region.  
 
From 1989 to the present, as the ideological clashes of democratic liberalism and 
communist socialism were over, the old conflicts on the Thai-Lao border needed to be 
settled to co-exist peacefully. At a multilateral level, the international mechanism that 
served the Cold War purposes of communist containment, such as SEATO, no longer 
existed. Views of ASEAN as a possible threat by Indochinese states were reinterpreted 
and the organisation was accepted by them. Lao PDR changed its policy and accepted 
more contact with other states regardless of ideological differences (Sirikrai, 2003). 
Though ASEAN transcended state boundaries, the “norm of non-intervention” as the 
justification of Lao statesmen for Lao PDR to enter ASEAN revealed the territorial trap 
(Sirikrai, 2003, p. 290). Even when the norm of non- intervention was replaced with the 
new idea of constructive engagement, under which ASEAN members helped one another 
regardless of territorial borders, the territorial integrity according to Westphalian logic 
was still retained by the Indochina states (Sirikrai, 2007). The idea of “flexible 
engagement” was also proposed by the Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, in the 
1990s, to replace the attachment of non-intervention. Pitsuwan said that “… perhaps it is 
time that ASEAN’s cherished principle of non-intervention is modified to allow ASEAN 
to play a constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic issues with regional 
implications.” However, this idea was not welcomed by Hanoi (Pitsuwan in Tan, 2005, p. 
376). This thesis expects that the stance of Lao PDR must be similar to that of Vietnam.	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New kinds of threats to state security were recognised by Paribatra, such as “illegal 
migration, illegal activities, illicit drug, intrusion of small armed groups, crime and 
terrorism” (Paribatra, 2013, p. 100). Any group moving beyond its borders was 
theoretically defined as a threat. For example, displaced Hmong had to be handled by a 
bilateral mechanism involving Thailand and Lao PDR, and this was theoretically 
recognised as a normal activity to maintain peace and order between the two states. Five 
thousand Hmong were reported to join the repatriation and resettlement campaign as the 
refugee camp in Thailand was closed down in 2009 (Paribatra, 2013). 
 
Enrichment of solutions to the territorial trap by the incorporation of the 
perspectives of critical political geographers 
 
Though similar ways out of the territorial trap were noted in a number of International 
Relations theorists, problems still remained. This was because, first of all, the spatial 
conceptualisation of a territorial border in the history, social and economic structures, and 
changing geopolitical order were state-centric and the voices of peoples on the ground 
regarding their version of history were excluded. Second, the state-centric spatial 
conceptualisation was taken for granted as fixed and of a Westphalian territorial form. To 
avoid the territorial trap, this thesis proposes that a number of approaches be applied to 
the Thai-Lao border. These approaches include the geopolitical discourse analysis by Ó 
Tuathail and Agnew, the examination of the remaining traditional geopolitics in 
International Relations by Dalby, the cultural analysis of the borderlands and 
transnationalism of peoples on the ground by Donnan and Wilson, and the anti-
geopolitics by Routledge. This allows the silenced voices of the peoples theoretically 
missing since 1954 to be heard more easily. In addition, this eclectic approach suggests 
that spatial conceptualisation should not be theoretically limited to only the Westphalian 
style of territorial borders but should include other forms, such as mandala described by 
Wolters (1999) and zomia described by Scott (2009). 
 
Inspired by the framework used by Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1998), the rhetoric that 
shaped the understanding of the Thai-Lao border needs to be critically examined, as it is 
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not only words uttered by state practitioners echoed by theorists in International Relations 
but also the possible understanding of state practitioners. While Ó Tuathail and Agnew 
(1998, p. 81), examined the geopolitical discourse of US foreign policy during the Cold 
War by American “intellectuals of statecraft”, this thesis has added, in the previous 
chapters and will add an examination of the intellectuals of statecraft of American allies, 
such as Thai and Lao statesmen, especially from the right-wing faction. The rhetoric of 
statesmen is compared and contrasted with the Thai-Lao border conceptualised by 
scholars in International Relations. 
 
In International Relations literature from 1954 to 1975, only the voices of intellectuals of 
statecraft of the US, the military junta and diplomats of the Thai state, and the leaders of 
political factions in Laos were heard (Jiwalai, 1994; Stevenson, 1972). They thus 
monopolised the interpretation of space and the Thai-Lao border was interpreted 
according to national interest at that time. It was doubtful that the interpretation of the 
Thai-Lao border was to their benefit (Stevenson, 1972). For example, during the civil 
wars in Laos, though President Kennedy officially stated that he was against the policy of 
‘overt intervention’ in Laos, covert military operation with the assistance of CIA 
continued (Oldfield, 1998). The Lao right wing and Thai military junta were not pleased 
with Kennedy’s policy. The reluctance of the US to intervene militarily in Laos meant 
more influence of communism that threatened the influence of the right wing on the Lao 
government and the Thai-Lao border (Sirikrai, 1979). Between 1975 and 1989, the voices 
of the same group of elites remained in the literature. However, more voices from 
academia and technocrats from Thailand, Lao PDR, and other western countries were 
heard (Burutpat, 1988; Paribatra, 1984; Viraphol 1985). After 1989, the voices that spoke 
for the benefit of transnational corporation were included (Sirikrai, 2007). This was as a 
result of the triumph of neo-liberalism in global politics that could not be ignored by 
International Relations. After 2000, even citizens who lived along the border took part in 
research conducted about the region (Theeravit & Semyeam, 2002). Though more 
peoples with views of the Thai-Lao border were included in International Relations, the 
rhetoric echoed in the text was state-centric and the Westphalian form of territorial 
borders was still prioritised.  
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The colonial legacy of geopolitics remained in International Relations theory. The 
approach of Dalby (1998) to the Thai-Lao border questioned traditional geopolitics 
elements, even though International Relations had paid more attention to transnationalism 
since the end of the Cold War. The year 1989 marked the victory of democracy and 
economic liberalisation that transcended state boundaries. However, the transnationalism 
recognised in International Relations included only the voices of some people who 
benefited from neo-liberal economy. The territorial border conceptualisation of Thailand 
and Lao PDR expanded from the intellectuals of statecraft during the Cold War to 
businesspersons in private sectors (Paribatra, 2013). This thesis agrees with Dalby’s 
suggestion that transnational economic arrangements, such as the World Trade 
Organization and North America Free Trade Area, were set up as a part of the elites’ 
exploitation of subaltern peoples (Dalby, 1998), and argues that ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement merely echoed the voice of the elite and business sectors of the country 
members. Though the Thai-Lao border was perceived as a bridge rather than fence, the 
voices of the peoples were not fully taken into consideration. Transnationalism included 
in International Relations was that of the rich while the peoples on the ground played 
little or no role (see chapter 4). This resulted in the theoretical definition of the peoples 
who cross the border that did not conform to Westphalian logic in a state-centric manner 
as refugees, displaced persons, illegal immigrants, and terrorists. Dalby’s suggestion 
represented the starting point for the addition of the human dimension to the discipline.  
 
The application to the Thai-Lao border of the transnationalism of the peoples and cultural 
analysis in the borderlands of Donnan and Wilson (1999) would result in the enrichment 
of the proposed solutions that paves the way for the examination of the human dimension 
to International Relations. This thesis proposes an anthropological approach to escape 
from the territorial trap; Donnan and Wilson’s proposal was very useful as 
transnationalism of the peoples allowed theoretical space for the everyday dynamics at 
the border. It meant the addition of peoples on the ground at the border to the state 
relations monopolised by the statesmen and diplomats prominent during the Cold War 
and the business people in private sectors after 1989. Challenges emerged to fixed state 
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territorial borders termed as “twin threats” (Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 1) from above 
and below. From above, transnationalism was dominated by multinational corporations’ 
movements that cut across state boundaries, and from below, there were threatening 
movements of peoples termed by state-centric terminology as “illegal immigrants, 
terrorists and displaced persons” (Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 1).  
 
High (2009) said millions of peoples along the Mekong were of Lao ethnicity and had 
family ties across the region before the establishment of Westphalian state borders in 
1893 after the Franco-Siamese conflicts. High said that they crossed the Thai-Lao border 
everyday and thus violated the territorial integrity. Additionally, Scott (2009) suggested 
that political theorists should pay attention to marginalised peoples in the highland zones. 
The inclusion of these peoples challenged the imaginative geography of the West that 
remained after the end of the Cold War as the Thai-Lao border contained zomia non-state 
space and, according to the ocularcentric map in International Relations, 702 of 1108 
kilometres of the Thai-Lao land border is highland terrain (Mandech, 2001: Scott, 2009). 
Technically speaking, the Thai-Lao border exists but it is not always enforced in the area 
indicated. Although the movements of Lao and Hmong along the Mekong and the fact 
that the Thai-Lao border is porous were no longer ignored by the existing literature in 
International Relations, state-centric terms, such as refugees, were still used to describe 
them.  
 
This thesis argues that the state-centric spatial conceptualisation of Westphalian borders 
is a colonial legacy. Terms that describe peoples that do not conform to the modern state 
form, such as illegal immigrants and refugees, are products of colonial times that are now 
theoretically accepted and supported by the elites. The concept of the anti-geopolitics of 
Routledge (1998) is an appropriate approach to examine the colonial legacy that has 
remained on the Thai-Lao border and the silenced voices of the peoples in International 
Relations. To follow the approach of anti-geopolitics critically questions the European 
imaginative geography, especially the territorial border in the Westphalian form and the 
Cartesian maps embedded in the historical accounts, economic and social structures, and 
the geopolitical order changes in International Relations. First of all, an examination of 
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historiography without asking whose history is being told is insufficient. The privileged 
status in historiography of the form of state space that has always been supposed to be 
Westphalian is also analysed. Also, there needs to be questions about the economic 
structure of a hegemon that reinforced the Westphalian norm and subverted it to benefit 
transnationalism, as the subversion benefited certain groups and excluded others. Thirdly, 
the geopolitical order changes should also be scrutinised to discover which groups of 
peoples monopolised the meanings of the changes in spatial conceptualisation and whose 
voices were more theoretically echoed. For example, questions are required of parties 
who lost and who gained from the changes in meaning on the Thai-Lao border from 1954 
to 1975, 1975 to 1989, and 1989 to the present.  
 
Nevertheless, both dominant European imaginative geography and the less dominant 
ones are important. It must be stressed that this thesis does not argue that the absence of 
spatial conceptualisation in Southeast Asia of mandala and zomia should replace the 
Wesphalian-based one as that would result in the establishment of a hierarchical reversal. 
To reveal how the colonial legacy of Westphalian territory was established in 
International Relations and to look for equal presentation of other voices of peoples are 
the main objectives of this thesis. Historiography thus must be questioned about its 
representation of state-centric spatial conceptualisation. Anthropology also needs to be 
incorporated into International Relations so that other forms of spatial conceptualisation 
are heeded. For example, the discussions of transnational movements by Appadurai 
(1996) and Tangseefa (2007) were less state-centric and the voices of the peoples were 
more expressed. Appadurai (1996, p. 33) coined the term “ethnoscape” to describe the 
transnational movements of peoples away from their homes, such as Indian workers in 
the US, and Tangseefa described the plights of the Karens displaced because of the civil 
wars in Burma in the late 1990s. This thesis also recognises the nuanced motives of 
peoples’ movements that cut across state boundaries. The transnational framework of the 
scholars mentioned ranged from the ordinary diaspora. In Appadurai’s work, 
transnational peoples were those who worked in different nation-states voluntarily. In 
Tanseefa’s work, transnational peoples were those displaced peoples whose lives were 
threatened and forced to leave their homelands. Such considerations open opportunities 
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for debate to allow other silenced concepts of space to be theoretically heard that are 
discussed more in the following chapter in application to the Thai-Lao border after the 
Cold War. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter answered the third research question of the thesis that focused on the use of 
the concept of the territorial trap proposed by Agnew and Corbridge to criticise the 
existing literature in International Relations, with particular reference to political realism, 
regarding Thai-Lao border issues from when Laos became Lao PDR in 1975 to the end of 
the Cold War in 1989. To consider how the territorial trap in International Relations 
varied, International Relation literature was examined from 1954 to 1989 when the US 
and the Soviet Union competed ideologically in the region, and from 1989 to the present 
when economic liberalisation penetrated the communist states in Indochina. This 
examination was used to support the argument that the reification of the map 
monopolised by the elites, the dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside, and the 
myth of the self-contained state never disappeared. This was because the geopolitical 
characteristics of self-claim for objectivity, separation of space and peoples, Western 
superiority justifying intervention, and provision for nationalistic advice to the state 
remained in the discipline during the past sixty years. Even theoretical consideration of 
historical relations, the broader social and economic structures of a hegemon, and 
changes in geopolitical order by a number of theorists did not erase the territorial trap.  
 
This chapter sought solutions to enrich the ways out of the territorial trap proposed by 
Agnew and Corbridge to include a human dimension in theoretical discussions of the 
Thai-Lao border. It proposed that Ó Tuathail and Agnew’s (1998) re-conceptualisation of 
geopolitics during the Cold War be taken into account to counter the monopoly of the 
border by the elites. Dalby’s analysis of geopolitical legacy in the post-Cold War (1998) 
was proposed to be applied to the Thai-Lao border. This chapter argued that the Thai-Lao 
border was a colonial legacy of geopolitics that is still alive, even in the post-Cold War 
era. This resulted in the theoretical definition of the peoples who crossed the border who 
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did not conform to the Westphalian logic in a state-centric manner as refugees and 
terrorists. This contrasted with the transnational movements of those who belonged to the 
world neo-liberalism, such as businesspersons. Although the meaning of borders 
incorporated more voices of peoples, those on the ground are still missing. 
 
This chapter proposed that an anthropological point of view provided a useful approach 
to border studies and should be included in International Relations. This allows an escape 
from the territorial trap and an inclusion of a human dimension in theoretical 
considerations. The anti-geopolitics concept of Routledge (1998) should be used to 
question the fact that historiography, the economic and social structures, and the 
geopolitical order of the Thai-Lao border have always been perceived according to the 
imaginative geography of the Europeans – Westphalian borders on Cartesian maps. It is 
thus the task of the following chapter to incorporate the analysis of more historical and 
anthropological literature into the Thai-Lao border discussion. 	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Chapter 4 
Challenges from historiography and anthropology to International Relations: Anti-
geopolitics and a human dimension  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter answers the fourth research question of the thesis about the need to 
introduce a human dimension to the discipline to cope with the territorial trap in 
International Relations. It argues that overcoming the colonial legacy of spatial 
conceptualisation of geopolitics passed on to International Relations requires an approach 
from the anti-geopolitics of Routledge (1998).  
 
Two steps similar to ideas of Jones (2006) are proposed to examine the neglect of the 
human dimension by International Relations regarding the Thai-Lao border after 1975. 
The first involves an analysis of anti-geopolitics scholars such as Said, Ó Tuathail, 
Agnew, Wilson and Donnan and Routledge in regard to spatial conceptualisation of the 
area. Said (1977) suggested that the colonial bias among academia should be examined 
critically as the European imaginative geography of Westphalian territorial borders was 
taken for granted and the voices of the peoples on the ground had been downgraded since 
1954. Four sets of ideas from anti-geopolitics are used to criticise the conceptualisation 
by International Relations and historiography of the Thai-Lao border. Firstly, 
ocularcentrism that facilitated colonisation and influenced International Relations 
significantly needs to be more deeply examined as an extension of chapter 2.  
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Ó Tuathail’s criticism of the geopolitical characteristics of white man supremacy, 
justification of colonisation in the past, and intervention of superpowers during the Cold 
War, is supported by Said’s Orientalism. This Orientalism includes the white man 
superiority, the perception of a monolithic threat to the West, and the prioritised benefit 
of superpowers, especially the US. Orientalism was prominent especially between 1954 
and 1975 when foreign intervention was academically justified. Though Laos became and 
independent state in 1954, the importance of the Thai-Lao border was not as emphasised 
as it was after 1975. Secondly, Orientalism became the second order when indigenous 
intellectuals of statecraft and scholars echoed it. For example, a number of Thai scholars 
reproduced the US discourse of anti-communism during the Cold War and this showed 
when the Thai-Lao border was conceptualised. This second order of Orientalism was 
especially evident when the Thai-Lao border was academically reified, especially by Thai 
scholars, as the line to separate the two ideological worlds of socialism-communism and 
liberalism-democracy. Thirdly, the geopolitical discourse analysis of Ó Tuathail and 
Agnew (1998) is used to examine important metaphors that were significantly influenced 
by the elites and theoretically constituted changes in the meaning of the Thai-Lao border 
as a result of the second order of Orientalism. The metaphors and discourse, such as the 
Domino Theory, Thailand as a frontline state of the non-communist world, border 
closures, the territorial loss of Thailand, the Mekong as a river of friendship, and the 
changing of the battlefields to marketplaces, revealed the prioritised voices of the elites. 
Fourthly, the narrative of the silenced in the borderlands and transnationalism from below 
(Routledge, 1998; Wilson & Donnan, 1999) to provide space for geopolitics of the 
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peoples on the Thai-Lao border is discussed. Transnationalism from below, in history, in 
the area was comprised of Lao and Thai peoples along the border, the displaced peoples 
from Laos after 1975 who were attached to the previous regime, and the Hmong and 
others who did not have their own Westphalian state but had played a significant role 
since 1954. The post-geopolitics of Ó Tuathail (1997) is additionally used to examine the 
Thai-Lao border, showing that, despite more advanced telecommunication technology, 
more fluid political actors, and the de-territorialisation of political space resulting in 
changes to geopolitics in the post-Cold War era, the voices of the elites have still been 
theoretically prioritised. These four criticisms support and facilitate the projection of the 
voices of the marginalised peoples as anti-geopolitics in the next step. 
 
The second step is to look for ways in which anti-geopolitics can promote a human 
dimension by the incorporation of literature from other related disciplines. Territorial 
borders in the Westphalian form influenced by geopolitics are still privileged and the 
centre of focus in traditional historiography. Consequently, historians have been caught 
in the territorial trap, similar to International Relations theorists. This section then 
presents the history of the borderlands and non-state space in anthropology that presents 
the voices of the peoples on the ground. It argues that Wesphalian-based borders are not 
the only means of spatial conceptualisation in international politics. Various forms of 
spatial conceptualisation, such as twin cities along the Thai-Lao border in pre-colonial 
mandala times, are discussed as alternatives to a focus on the centres of Bangkok and 
Vientiane. The relations of state space and non-state space, such as the roles played by 
displaced peoples from lowland and highland Laos during the Cold War and post-Cold 
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War eras, are considered, and the ways in which the transnational movements of the 
peoples on the ground during the same periods in anthropology have bypassed, subverted, 
and avoided the border are presented. The chapter also examines transnationalism from 
below in historiography despite it being state-centric, and a more people-centric form in 
anthropology. Transnationalism in economic liberalisation was expected to benefit the 
peoples of the two states but only the elite few benefitted from it, and border crossings of 
marginalised peoples on the ground were poorly facilitated. The anthropologists’ 
analyses of problems of human trafficking and illegal migrants from the peoples’ points 
of view satisfactorily tackle the territorial trap. The voices of the peoples are not rejected, 
while those of the state are still theoretically presented, an unavoidable but also desirable 
situation.  
 
This chapter outlines two connected themes to present the neglect of the human 
dimension by International Relations and overcomes it from historiography and 
anthropology perspectives. These themes are anti-geopolitics as a challenge to European 
imaginative geography of the Thai-Lao border in International Relations and 
historiography from 1954 to the present, and the human dimension in anthropology as 
anti-geopolitics. 
 
Anti-geopolitics as a challenge to European imaginative geography of the Thai-Lao 
border in International Relations and historiography  
 
Historiography from 1954 to 2014 is embedded with a Westphalian spatial 
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conceptualisation. Ashley’s attack on realist International Relations was critical of this as 
state-centric historical accounts merely re-confirmed the territorial trap of the 
dichotomous understanding of inside/outside. Ashley called this trap “double effects” of 
“ritual of realism” in International Relations (1987, p. 421). That very trap theoretically 
led to other traps, such as the myth of the self-contained state and reification of the map 
monopolised by the elites. Thus historians have similar problems regarding these traps as 
mainstream International Relations scholars. 
 
Spatial conceptualisation should be open to different voices so this section weaves four 
sets of criticism shared by anti-geopolitics scholars. The Orientalism of Said (1977) is 
used to criticise geopolitics that facilitated colonisation in the 19th century that in turn 
influenced the US after World War Two and its legacy in the discussion of the Thai-Lao 
border in International Relations and historiography. This Orientalism, called the second 
order of Orientalism by Said, influenced indigenous scholars and state practitioners. 
Next, the discourse analysis of Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1998) follows to criticise the 
academic metaphors and rhetoric concerning the Thai-Lao border. Then, the post-Cold 
War geopolitics of Ó Tuathail (1997) that includes the transnationalism from below of 
Wilson and Donnan (1999) and the narrative of the silenced of Said (1998) and 
Routledge (1998) are discussed. 
 
Orientalism on the Thai-Lao border 
 
The first characteristic of Orientalism used to examine the Thai-Lao border is the white 
man superiority. As an extension of the analysis in chapter 2, this western supremacy was 
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often found in International Relations, especially political realism, when the peoples of 
Indochina were perceived as less developed, less rational, and less human. For example, 
Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of South Vietnam in the late 1950s was described as “an 
Oriental despotic totalitarian” (Morgenthau, 1965, p. 21). Even the Indochinese elites 
were viewed as less rational because they were oriental. Another example was the 
dehumanising statement that “we could deprive the Viet Cong by herding peasants into 
strategic hamlets” (Morgenthau, 1965, p. 15). The word ‘herding’ had connotations of 
cattle and suggested the sense of ‘we’ being superior to the ‘Viet Cong.’ If one follows 
Said’s critique, Morgenthau’s bias was influenced by Orientalism that originated in 
Europe in the 19th century passed on to the US educational institutions after World War 
Two. This feeling justified the US intervention, even though Morgenthau (1965) said he 
was against the military tactic of communist containment.  
 
Second, monolithic communism perceived by the US statesmen was recognised in 
International Relations. For instance, Morgenthau (1965) warned the US president not to 
view communism as monolithic but the US intellectuals of statecraft in the 1950s who 
advised the president were inclined to view global communists as one single unit, despite 
Chinese and Soviet communists being different (Rystad, 1990). Morgenthau’s warning 
can be supported by Kissinger’s remarks. As the state officer himself, Kissinger (2011) 
blamed Eisenhower and Dulles for viewing communist in monolithic entity. The 1947 
Truman Doctrine and Dulles’ position in 1954 to oppose communism were successfully 
implemented in Europe but not in Southeast Asia (Morgenthau, 1965; Kissinger, 2011) 
because the threat in Europe from the Soviet was mainly military. The threat in Southeast 
Asia, from China, however, was not only military but also political. China had 
significantly influenced Southeast Asia for centuries. It was therefore difficult for the US 
to contain China simply using the mechanism of SEATO with its troops in Thailand and 
South Vietnam (Morgenthau, 1965). Morgenthau suggested that the US intellectuals of 
statecraft be aware of difference among communist states that were satellites of the 
Soviet Union. This awareness would help the US win the hearts and minds of some 
moderate/smaller communist states and to compete with the Soviet Union and China 
(Morgenthau, 1965). 
100	  	  
 
Third, American national interest was prioritised and the failure to contain communism in 
Indochina was regarded as a threat to the US. Morgenthau said that the US foreign policy 
should be to contain communism and “territorial loss to communism” was unacceptable 
(1965, p. 33). In line with Herz (1959), Morgenthau’s words can be interpreted as if 
Southeast Asian states were already under the US sphere. Thus Thailand, Laos, and South 
Vietnam needed to be defended, as these states were “periphery military containment” 
(Morgenthau, 1965, p. 77). Nevertheless, it is worth asking if containment of communism 
in Indochina really benefitted the US. Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1998) questioned if world 
geopolitics during the Cold War was dominated by a few people. Those few were the 
intellectuals of statecraft such as Kennan and Kissinger who dominated American foreign 
policy. A significant number of American soldiers were then sent to die in Southeast 
Asia, and it was not only the voices of the peoples in Indochina that were silenced, but 
the American subalterns were also muted.   
 
Among non-Thai and non-Lao historians, Orientalism is not as strong as in International 
Relations scholars, especially those in political realism. The sense of monolithic others 
and concern for the superpowers’ benefits, both the US and the Soviet Union, can hardly 
be found. For example, though Kissinger (2011), similar to Morgenthau (1965), criticised 
the Eisenhower administration for viewing the Soviet and Chinese communists as 
monolithic, similar criticisms, ironically, could be applied to Kissinger himself. Dommen 
(1985) criticised Kissinger’s perception of monolithic communism that he viewed the 
Soviets and Vietnamese as one single unit. Moscow could not always control Hanoi’s 
policy and Kissinger hoped that his diplomatic skills in lobbying the Soviet and 
Indochinese statesmen in the 1973 Vientiane Agreement would guarantee a neutral Laos 
after the withdrawal of US troops. However, Hanoi was more ambitious than just having 
Laos as a neutral state. What happened in 1975 could be called the second order of 
Orientalism, because Vietnamese and Lao elites applied spatial conceptualisation of 
Westphalian territory with their states. Laos became Lao PDR after the US withdrawal 
while Vietnamese troops remained in Lao territory. 
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Historians were aware of the fact that the US personnel working in Laos during the Cold 
War were imbued with the idea of western supremacy. For example, in reference to the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), whose work was to 
support refugees in terms of medical and basic needs, Stuart-Fox said that the 
organisation treated “ the Lao much as the French had done, as incompetent, lazy and 
childlike” (1997, p. 154). Whether Stuart-Fox’s accusation was true or not is hard to 
prove, but it was a sign that Western historians critically questioned the colonial bias that 
remained in the 1960s. 
 
Stuart-Fox further recognised that peoples on the ground had to suffer, though Laos was 
not “directly involved” in the Vietnam War (1997, p. 135). The US intervention was 
possibly a result of American and Lao elites’ decision, and peoples had to bear the 
consequence. Stuart-Fox (1997) said that 30,000 were killed, injured, and displaced and 
casualties were 200,000 in total. Historical accounts were neutrally reported but the tone 
was sympathetic to the plight of the Hmong, marking the beginning of an awareness of 
the human dimension in historiography that could be incorporated into International 
Relations. 
 
However, when it came to the issue of spatial management, Westphalian borders are 
frequently presupposed when some historians tell history. They were aware that before 
the arrival of France in the late 19th century mandala was a more prominent form of 
spatial conceptualisation in the region (Evans, 2002). Indeed, maps in the Cartesian style 
were still used to support the fact that the space presented was objective, as found in the 
work of Le Bar and Suddard (1960, p. 27-37), Dommen (1985, p.vii), and Evans (2002, 
vii, p. 230).  Ocularcentrism was additionally anachronistically employed by Stuart-Fox 
to explain the pre-colonial space in Indochina. The Lan Xang kingdom – the ancient state 
of Laos – covered the area of the North-East Thailand nowadays (1997, p. 17). Even 
though Stuart-Fox neutrally explained history, this ocularcentric map implying the 
imagination of Lao national space in the past was capable of igniting Lao nationalism. 
There is no evidence that this kind of map was used by the policy-makers of Lao PDR 
during the Cold War. However, the information in the map used by Stuart-Fox was in 
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accord with the accusation by Burutpat (1988) that the Lao government planned to annex 
North-East Thailand in the early 1980s. This map could be exploited as a second order of 
Orientalism, similar to the French map drawn in 1907 used by Lao PDR, and American 
aerial maps drawn in 1978 used by Thailand to ‘objectively claim sovereignty’ over 
disputed areas of Rom Klao Village in 1987. 
 
The second order of Orientalism 
 
The second order of Orientalism was found in what Said called “intellectual, political, 
and cultural satellite of the United States” (1977, p. 322). This happened among the 
policy-makers in Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam in the 1950s. For example, the US 
had its chosen men, such as General Phoumi Nosavan, to promote an anti-communism 
campaign in Laos (Stuart-Fox, 1997). The Thai scholar Ladavalya was also a good 
example of this characteristic among academia, though he was not educated in the US but 
Canada. Ladavalya (1970) spoke the language of communism containment similar to the 
US Secretary of State in the 1950s. Ladavalya even maintained the conservative 
characteristic of anti-communism in the time of Dulles as he disagreed with the change in 
the US foreign policy in the early 1960s. He was against the stance of the Kennedy 
administration that favored a coalition government in Laos that allowed space for a 
communist faction, fearing that it would later threaten Thailand (Ladavalya, 1970).  
 
Similarly, spatial conceptualisation in historiography reflected the voices of the elites, 
especially when it was sponsored by the Thai and Lao states. As a result, the second order 
of Orientalism was very strong, and was supported by Winichakul’s account of critical 
historiography (Winichakul, 1994). For example, he criticised mainstream historians who 
took territorial borders for granted. Firstly, the ocularcentric map was used as a tactic to 
boost Thai nationalism and repeated by both historians and International Relations 
scholars. To assume that Siam lost territories to France meant that Thailand de jure had 
possessed Lao territory before colonisation. This logic cannot be applied as the 
Westphalian borders were established by the time France explored the Mekong. The 
discourse of lost territories can be found in the works of Thai historians such as Tej 
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Bunnag, Kachorn Sukhabhanij and Rong Sayamanonda (Winichakul, 1994), and was 
passed on from the work of Prince Damrong, the father of Thai historiography (Damrong 
in Sirikrai, 1979), and Luang Vichit, the pioneer of Thai chauvinism during World War 
Two (Winichakul, 1994). They took for granted the shift from mandala spatial 
conceptualisation to Westphalian and hence were trapped in the dichotomous 
understanding of the inside/outside of the Thai state. Secondly, the accounts of the 1893 
boundary drawing were told by the authors mentioned as if Thailand was the only party 
exploited by the French colonialists. In those narratives, Siam was a lamb and France was 
painted as a wolf. However, the tiny kingdoms along the Mekong viewed France as a 
wolf and “Siam as a lesser wolf” (Winichakul, 1994, p. 148). This view in Thai 
historiography was not accepted by the Lao Ngaosyvathn (1985). Winichakul (1994) 
argued that the success of administrative reform was told as a process of emancipation of 
Siam that silenced other tiny kingdoms. This can be further investigated as it was not 
only those other tiny kingdoms that were silenced but also other peoples from the 
highland non-state spaces called by Scott as zomia  (2009) who never had a chance to 
present their spatial conceptualisation in historiography and International Relations.  
 
The transition of the historical focus from lowland Lao to other highland peoples 
happened in Lao historiography in 1975. The version dominated by Lao ethnicity during 
the Royal Lao Government between 1954 and 1975 was replaced with the Marxist-
Leninist version after 1975 that allowed more space for peoples from the highlands 
(Pholsena, 2006). The former version was influenced by traditional Lao historians, such 
as Maha Sila Viravong (1964), and was similar to Thai traditional historiography that 
emphasised the common movement of Thai-Lao ethnicity southward from China. 
Undoubtedly, Lao greatness in the past was more emphasised than in the Thai version. 
Nevertheless, such historiography speaks for the voices of the lowland Lao that 
completely silenced those from the highlands. The Marxist-Leninist version of 
historiography after 1975, on the other hand, emphasised more ‘national space’ of Lao 
PDR. Its promotion of equality in line with Marxist-Leninist doctrine included other 
groups of ethnic minorities (Pholsena, 2006). This thesis argues that even though the 
Marxist historiography included the voices of peoples from highlands, the prioritised 
104	  	  
form of ‘national space’ was still the Westphalia one promoted by the elites from the 
Pathet Lao Party. Such historiography said that between the 7th and 8th centuries the Mon-
Khmer lived in the area that is Lao PDR today. Lao from the north then moved in and 
lived with the Mon-Khmers. Others ethnic groups followed afterwards. In the present 
day, the peoples from different groups of Lao, Hmong, Mon-Khmer, Tibeto-Burman, and 
Yao are citizens of Lao PDR and co-exist in the state of Laos (Ministry of Information 
and Culture 1996 in Pholsena). This was in line with the geopolitical characteristic of 
separation of peoples and space of Westphalia. No matter what ethnicity one was, once a 
Lao citizen, one should be loyal to the state. The loyalty to the state was in line with the 
loyalty to the national space of the Wesphalian state. The logic of this national space 
repeats the traditional geopolitical characteristics of separation of space and people. It 
was the second order of Orientalism, as the elites from the party reified the form of space 
in Marxist-Leninist doctrine to promote equality among citizens.  
 
Geopolitics discourse on the Thai-Lao border  
 
There were a number of metaphors that described the Thai-Lao border, producing 
feelings of ‘Selves versus Others’ or ‘Goods versus Bads.’ The most important metaphor 
found in International Relations literature is the domino metaphor, caught within the 
territorial trap of self-contained state myth, common in the 1960s and 1970s when the US 
intervened in the region. The historian Arthur J. Dommen (1985) also employed the 
domino metaphor to explain the US intervention in Indochina. The state perceived as a 
domino led to another important metaphor that suggested the territorial trap of 
dichotomous understanding of inside/outside when Thailand was described as “the 
frontline state” (Paribatra, 1984, p. 30). Stuart-Fox’s historiography (1997) did not use 
this term but he explained that after the withdrawal of the US troops, Thailand directly 
faced Indochina under Vietnam’s hegemony.	  The ASEAN bloc, together with Thailand, 
strongly disagreed with Vietnam’s military presence, under the Soviet supervision, in Lao 
PDR and Kampuchea. This metaphor hinted that Thailand might be the next domino to 
fall after the fall of Laos to communism. If anything bad originated from the communist 
states, the Thai state would be the first to bear the consequences. Indeed, Thailand faced 
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displaced peoples from Indochina and border clashes with Lao PDR from time to time. 
The metaphor ‘frontline’ gave a clear picture that presented the voice of liberalism-
democracy that detested socialism-communism. Such rhetoric only represented the voices 
of the elites but affected a significant number of the marginalised peoples. To defend the 
‘frontline’ of the non-communist world, Thailand’s territorial integrity was important and 
revealed the territorial trap.  
 
Cultural discourse can be similarly found as a number of scholars, especially from 
Thailand, stated that Laos used to be Thai territory but was lost to France in 1893. This 
loss to foreigners in the colonial days was enough and more losses to the communists 
were intolerable. Hence, the present territorial integrity of the Thai state had to be 
preserved. Chapter 2 indicated that this discourse was very influential in Thai society and 
was examined in the section on the second order of Orientalism. For example, Burutpat 
(1988) not only repeated the traditional chauvinism regarding the territorial loss of 
Thailand to France in 1893 but also accused the Lao government after 1975 of planning 
to annex the then sixteen North-East provinces of Thailand, where a significant number 
of Thai-Lao people lived. This discourse was totally rejected by Ngaosyvathn (1985) who 
represented the voice of Lao ethnicity, accusing Thai traditional historiography of being a 
half-truth. Furthermore, discourse about border closures was often found when military 
clashes occurred (Ngaosyvathn, 1985). These closures suggested a more liberal land 
versus a totalitarian land, hence more civilised against barbaric, because of Lao PDR 
being a land-locked state needing a sea-route for transport (Viraphol, 1985). It was often 
contested among academia that if the Thai-Lao border was closed, the Thai state would 
gain the upper hand at the negotiating table (Burutapat, 1988; Kutranon, 1982). Again, 
the decision to close the Thai-Lao border relied on the elites of the two states (Stuart-Fox, 
1997). Such decisions affected not only the economic ties of the peoples along the Thai-
Lao border (Ngaosyvathan & Ngaosyvathan, 1994) but also displaced peoples in the 
zone. This thesis argues that some people benefitted from the border closures. For 
example, closed borders provided a safe haven for displaced peoples who stayed on the 
Thai side waiting to cross to conduct military operations in Lao territory. Also, when the 
transportation of 393 strategic goods to Lao PDR, including medicines and fuel, was 
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banned by the Thai state, some people may have sold banned goods at high prices on the 
black market. This did not pressure statesmen who decided foreign policy but the 
marginalised peoples faced continued economic hardship.  
 
During times of less tension, the discourse of the Mekong as the river of friendship arose. 
The policy of normalisation with Lao PDR after the appointment of moderate right-wing 
Thai Prime Minister Kriengsak Chomanan led to the 1979 Kaysone-Kriengsak Joint 
Communiqué. The Mekong, which comprises 1108 kilometres of the Thai-Lao border, 
was proposed to be the river of friendship (Jiwalai, 1994). The discourse was agreed 
between the statesmen of the two states for two reasons (Stuart-Fox, 1997). The first was 
the resettlement in third countries of a number of former right wing Lao militants which 
eliminated the Lao right-wing from Thai territory and the CPT from Lao territory was no 
longer supported by the Lao government (Jiwalai, 1994). The second was a more benign 
policy of the Thai state towards communism (Stuart-Fox, 1997). Such discourse, in 
International Relations and historiography, still repeated the dichotomous understanding 
of the inside/outside when each state’s internal affairs needed be respected, downgrading 
the voices of the marginalised.  
 
In the late 1980s, the Cold War discourse ended as the intellectuals of statecraft of the 
Thai state no longer viewed communists from Indochina as a threat. The discourse of 
“turning the battlefields into marketplaces” commonly reflected in International Relations 
marked the end of the Cold War. Instead of being perceived as a fence during the Cold 
War, the Thai-Lao border became the gateway to communist Indochina (Sirikrai, 2007, p. 
359). This thesis argues that such discourse, despite the doubts of Stuart-Fox (1997) and 
Kislenko (2002) about benefits to the logging businesses of certain elite classes, 
introduced the new geopolitics seen as the triumph of economic liberalism. 
 
Transnational from below during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era 
 
Historians recognised transnationalism of the peoples along the Thai-Lao border during 
the Cold War. However, the territorial trap still remained because there was too much 
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focus on the history of the centre of the state (Donnan & Wilson, 1999). Similar to 
International Relations literature, the transnational movements of history were state-
centrically categorised into two groups, political and economic.  
 
The first group is the network of operation of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) 
that cut across the Thai-Lao border. Originally, CPT was supported by communism from 
Beijing, while Pathet Lao was supervised by Hanoi. Undoubtedly, the Sino-Soviet 
conflicts heavily influenced the transnational role of CPT, especially the plan for Lao 
irredentism, an ambition of establishing the Lao state that covers the area of Lao PDR 
and the North-East Thailand. At first, when Sino-Soviet conflicts were not tense, and 
before the Chinese ‘teaching a lesson’ to Vietnam in 197911, CPT militants were trained 
in Lao territory and North Vietnam. Military supports were sent from Lao PDR along the 
Mekong River to Thailand (Stuart-Fox, 1979). The Thai-Lao border was crucial as it was 
the route along which Vietnam asserted its influence. North-East Thailand was the area in 
which the communist Laos planned to establish “the greater Lao state” (Stuart-Fox, 1979, 
p. 348). This plan was supported by Communist ideology pronounced by CPT based on a 
‘right of autonomy’ to ‘various nationalities’. The narrative that Lao people in the pre-
colonial days were herded to the West bank of the Mekong by the Siamese was cited to 
support the Lao irredentism and the establishment of the greater Lao state (Stuart-Fox, 
1979). Even though Stuart-Fox was aware of the lack of evidence to prove this claim for 
Lao irredentism, repeating this kind of autonomy implied the presupposition of 
Westphalian state. Thus historiography as such did not erase the territorial trap. Stuart-
Fox recognised the ties between CPT and Pathet Lao Party as transnationalism, but the 
aim of such transnationalism was to establish their own state. It meant a dismemberment 
of the Thai state and the annexation of the West bank of Mekong to Lao PDR. Stuart-
Fox’s awareness of Lao irredentism confirmed that Burutpat’s claim, mentioned in the 
previous sections, was also recognised in academia. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  In order to retaliate for Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea, China’s major ally in Southeast Asia, in 
1979, the then leader of China Deng Xiaoping said “…it may be necessary to teach Vietnam a lesson”. 
After that Chinese forces invaded Northern Vietnam.	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In turn, after 1975, people moving from Lao PDR to Thailand comprised the lowland Lao 
who served as civil servants in the previous regime and fled to Thai territory waiting re-
settlement in third countries. This group followed the military officers who fled earlier, as 
they could not stand the socialist regime’s ideological policy. Some civil servants tried to 
live under the new regime but they were forced to enter re-education camps that 
brainwashed people with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, little different to prison. These 
people formed another wave of displaced peoples that hit Thai territory in the late 1970s 
(Stuart-Fox, 1997). Dommen (1985) said that military resistance in the 1980s from Thai 
territory was supported by Thailand and sometimes China which was against Vietnamese 
troops in Lao PDR. According to Dommen (1985, p. 118), “the most effective” resistance 
group was the Lao People’s National Liberation Front, as they had transnational contacts 
with Lao in Cambodia and Thailand. There was also political resistance from the Hmong 
who either stayed in Laos or fled to Thai territory. They remained in contact and fought 
the Lao government. Even in the late 1980s, the Hmong militants were reported by 
Stuart-Fox to be actively fighting in the north of Lao PDR. They maintained the 
transnational ties with displaced Hmong in Thailand though Bangkok later closed two 
Hmong refugee camps to improve inter-state relations with Vientiane (Stuart-Fox, 1997).  
 
Secondly, transnationalism from below described the farmers who opposed the economic 
policy of socialism launched by the Lao government in 1978 and escaped to Thai 
territory (Evans, 2002; Stuart-Fox, 1997). The Thai-Lao border became a space for 
resistance (Scott, 2009). During times of hardship such as war and food shortages, 
different classes had different ways of using this space for resistance. While the elites 
moved to the centre of the state, the peoples on the ground moved to the margins. This 
occurred when the defeated Chinese Kuo Min Tang fled the Chinese communists to 
highlands in Southeast Asia (Scott, 2009). In Laos, the farmers likewise fled to the Thai-
Lao border where displaced people camps were set up. Stuart-Fox (1997) realised that the 
farmers did not just flee but, as a protest against the government’s plan that required them 
to hand in agricultural product, killed their animals and destroyed their crops. Such 
destruction of agricultural production did not help relieve the food shortages in Lao PDR 
but allowed space for illegal rice imports from Thailand (Stuart-Fox, 1997).  
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In the post-Cold War era, Ó Tuathail (1997) identified three characteristics of post-Cold 
war geopolitics, the rapidity, extensiveness, and intensity of communication, more fluid 
political actors, and de-territorialisation of political space. These three characteristics 
allowed more space for transnationalism from below as anti-geopolitics. Peoples along 
the Thai-Lao border played more significant roles in interstate politics and became more 
theoretically heard because of the following reasons. First, the flow of communication 
increased because of the development of technology. In the past, the Cartesian map was 
always manually presented but this ocularcentrism was transformed on to an electronic 
screen, providing rapid, intensive, and extensive information, especially among the 
Hmong who lived in the US and Thailand. Also, geopolitical discussion was no longer 
confined to state officers but extended to mass media and consumers. For example, the 
Wang Tao incident on the Thai-Lao border in 2000 was aired live by Thai television 
news reports. Because TV was so ready to report the attack real time, Lao state officers 
condemned Thai TV for conspiring with the anti-Lao government (Theeravit & 
Semyeam, 2002). This use of advanced technology caused deterioration in Thai-Lao 
relations at that time. The second characteristic of post-Cold War geopolitics was the 
increased fluidity of the political actors. The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in 
more nation-states in Europe and Asia, and global politics became more uncertain 
compared with Cold War geopolitics. Reductions in what was once the Soviet military, 
financial, and economic support were reflected in Indochina. Lao PDR turned to ASEAN 
and Thailand for support, resulting in increased economic activity along the Thai-Lao 
border (Paribatra, 2013). Despite the increase in trade and investment across the border 
being welcomed, the trans-state insurgents and refugee movements were still 
downgraded. Paribatra (2013, p. 100) said these were defined as “transnational threats” to 
the Thai state in the “new international context.” The third characteristic of post-Cold 
War geopolitics was the increase in non-state actors in interstate politics that led to de-
territorialisation of political space. Ó Tuathail (1997) believed that transnationalism 
should not be limited to neo-liberals but national resistance. For example, the connections 
of the Hmong, as an anti-Lao government group, were not only based in Lao PDR but 
also in Thailand, the US, France, and Australia (Evans, 2002). Their movements cut 
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across state boundaries as attacks on Lao official places often occurred in between 1999 
and 2000 (Pookongchi, 2003). Various bombs in 1999 in Vientiane were blame on the 
Hmong transnational networks. The Wang Tao incident was an example; other attacks 
are the insurgency in Northern Lao PDR that Vietnam had to intervene militarily 
(Pookongchi, 2003). Additionally, the marginalised peoples’ movements along the border 
were still obstructed by the state mechanism in the era of economic liberalisation (High, 
2009). This thesis argued that they could be called the transnationalism from below. After 
1989, economic relations between Thailand and Lao PDR was expected to blossom. The 
Thai-Lao border became the line that separated the economically rapid Thailand and the 
economically slow Lao PDR (Rigg, 2005). Doubts whether economic liberalisation really 
benefitted marginalised peoples should be academically noted. Border movements of 
peoples on the ground were downgraded in historiography sponsored by the state, similar 
to mainstream International Relations, but their voices were heard more in anthropology. 
 
Thai-Lao border in anthropology 
 
Though a less state-centric interpretation is expected in a more people-focused discipline 
such as anthropology, some anthropologists are still caught within a state-centric 
framework and risk being caught within the territorial trap. This is true when state policy 
advice is generated from anthropological research funded by the state. This thesis, 
however, argues that to totally reject state-centric spatial conceptualisation and replace it 
with other forms results in being caught in a hierarchical reversal. It means that to be 
critical of the Westphalian spatial conceptualisation and replace it with other forms would 
ironically be the repetition of the state-centrism; other forms of spatial conceptualisation 
would be similar as ‘the new prioritised Westphalia space’ and this thesis is trying to 
avoid that. To add the human dimension means to allow more voices of the peoples to be 
theoretically heard and that is the objective of this thesis. This section thus presents how 
effectively anthropological literature can deal with the territorial trap resulting from the 
spatial conceptualisation of the Orientalist geopolitics discussed in the previous sections. 
It argues that anthropology related to the Thai-Lao border, despite the inability to 
completely escape from the trap, is anti-geopolitical in itself as the voices of peoples are 
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heard. This section adds the human dimension from anthropology to International 
Relations by presenting the historiography of the borderlands and its relations with non-
state space, Cold War transnationalism, and post-Cold War transnationalism. 
 
Historiography in anthropology 
 
Historiography of the borderlands 
 
When the history of the Thai-Lao border was discussed in anthropology, the territorial 
trap was dealt with effectively, as found in work by Pholsena and Banomyong (2006). 
This was because the history of the borderlands, such as the Thai province of Nan and the 
Lao province of Luang Prabang, were examined, instead of a focus on Bangkok and 
Vientiane characteristic of mainstream historiography. The two provinces are 
strategically located on the Mekong, a major common transport route from Southern 
China to Laos and Siam before the colonial era. The French Indochinese administration 
however, tried to block this route by setting the Siamese-Indochinese border, but peoples’ 
movements in the area still occurred. The second example of the history of borderlands is 
that of Thai Mukdahane and Lao Savannakhet (Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006). This 
historical account explained that peoples crossed the Mekong as the boundary everyday 
because of kinship and cultural ties, as Lao-Thai people were the majority of the 
Mukdahane population. Economic incentives, especially in post-Cold War geopolitics, 
further added to the cultural affinity that attracted Lao people to cross the border from 
Savannakhet to Mukdahane, movements that are elaborated more in the following 
sections. 
 
The history of the borderlands of Ubon Ratchathani and Champassak was further outlined 
by Ian Baird (2015), a geographer whose research methodology resembles anthropology 
and anti-geopolitics. Through an examination of the colonial connection of the twin 
cities, and their relations with the Mon-Khmer peoples from the Boloven Plateau that 
resisted both Siam and French imaginative geography of Westphalian state in 1893, this 
thesis argues that Baird (2013) was successful in dealing with the territorial trap. Even 
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though the geopolitical characteristics such as the Cartesian map that presented the 
separation of space and peoples and the self-claim for objectivity was found in his work, 
it did not prioritise the Westphalian national space but presented this space as a form of 
mandala “city state” of Champassak that covered both banks of the Mekong (Baird, 2013, 
p. 258). Similarly, High (2009) told the history of the borderlands in Thai Ubon 
Rachathani and Lao Champassak. She said that Champassak had different concepts of the 
border with different ancient states in the pre-colonial era. To the West, the border of Lao 
Champassak and Bangkok Court was determined by mandala rules. The king of 
Champassak had hierarchical relations with the king of Bangkok. To the south, the 
Cambodian community was separated from Champassak by “no-man’s land” (High, 
2009, p. 82). High did not mention that it could be described as zomia in which the Mon-
Khmer lived as interpreted by Scott (2009), as her research question led in other 
directions. However, her work was developed in the studies of other anthropologists. 
 
Surprisingly, even though High (2009) recognised the borderlands history of Ubon 
Ratchathani and Champassak, the dichotomous understanding of the inside/outside of the 
state was revealed as she repeated the discourse of the territorial loss of the Thai state. 
She said that Champassak used to belong to Siam but was lost to France in 1893. 
However, this thesis insists that such a claim is ex-post facto because, before the 1893 
Franco-Siamese Treaty, there was no modern legal border demarcation. This claim of 
territory loss was rejected by Ngaosyvathn (1985), labeling it as a product of Thai 
chauvinism in the early 19th century. Winichakul (1994, p. 7) added that because of the 
lack of criticality in Thai “Orientalism” in historiography that was passed on to Western 
scholarship, this discourse of territorial loss remained even in the work of a critical 
anthropologist such as High. This thesis argues that, to apply Said’s term, this second 
order of Orientalism in Thai traditional historians significantly influenced Western 
scholars. Similarly, the second order of Orientalism of the Thai state for the claim of 
territorial loss was reflected in Solomon (1969). No one can be critical all the time, 
especially with discourse that was repeated for more than one hundred years. 
Nevertheless, it is a surprise that, while Solomon (1969) recognised the transition from 
mandala to Westphalia and even the non-state zone in the highlands, and while High 
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(2009) recognised the criticality of the work of Ngaosyvathn and Winichakul, both still 
repeated such an ex-post facto claim.  
 
Non-state space as a space for resistance 
	  
Peoples from highlands regularly had contact with peoples from the lowlands. In the 
meantime, peoples from the lowlands used the highlands s the space for political refuge 
and resistance (Scott, 2009). Scott called this “political symbiosis” (2009, p. 31). This 
differed from most International Relations literature that prioritised peoples from state-
space. For example, during the Cold War, the Hmong people had contact with lowland 
peoples and they helped American CIA fight a number of battles with communists. 
Leepreecha (2011) was aware of the fact that the Hmong had no choice about their 
involvement in military operations as, despite being stateless, the province of Xieng 
Khouang where most of them lived was strategically important. Viet Minh from North 
Vietnam wanted to use the Hmong area as the beginning of the Ho Chi Minh Trail as a 
highway to transport military and weaponry to attack the Vietnamese pro-American 
regime in the South. Therefore, the US chose the Hmong in Xieng Khouang to fight 
against Viet Minh (Leepreecha, 2011). There were attempts by the US to persuade hill 
peoples in the South such as the Kha to join the anti-communist campaign. However, it 
was not successful, if compared with the campaign with the Hmong and the Yao in the 
north, as a number of Kha people, instead, joined Pathet Lao Party to fight with the Royal 
Lao Government and the covert military operation of the US and Thailand (Gunn, 1990).  
 
A reverse situation occurred in times of hardship such as civil wars and economic 
depression (Scott, 2009). Marginalised peoples from the lowlands made use of the non-
state space as means of resistance from the pre-colonial days to the Cold War era. For 
example, Rom Klao Village, during the Cold War, was an area once controlled by the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) to maintain contact with communist China and Lao 
PDR from 1968 to 1982 (Theravit & Semyeam, 2002). After the collapse of CPT, due to 
the policy of national amnesty offered to former communist members, a lot of them 
settled in Rom Klao Village. At the same time, however, the Hmong fled Lao PDR to the 
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same area. This made the Lao government more suspicious because the Hmong once 
helped the US fight against Pathet Lao (Theeravit & Semyearm, 2002). This was the 
reason why the mountainous zomia of the Thai-Lao border was very sensitive and led to 
border conflict in the late 1980s.  
 
Cold War transnationalism 
 
This thesis proposes to use the terms separation, marginalisation, assimilation, and 
integration adopted from Neuliep (2003) to describe the nature of transnationalism from 
below in Lao PDR during the Cold War. ‘Separation’ as a description of displaced 
peoples meant that the government in the host state maintains contact with that group in 
the home state. This is a complicated issue as this situation in the Thai-Lao border 
context no longer exists. For example, at the peak of the Cold War conflict, the CPT 
contained a significant number of Lao people with Thai citizenship who called 
themselves Lao, and Lao PDR was perceived as their host state. Because a number of 
them were granted amnesty by the Thai state in the early 1980s, this description could not 
be applied with them. ‘Marginalisation’ was used to describe Lao, Hmong and possibly 
Yao people who fled Lao PDR after 1975 and stayed in camps in Thailand. A number of 
anthropologists examined the fact that both groups of peoples who fled Lao PDR were 
marginalised. For example, the anthropology of High (2009) emphasised the movement 
of the marginalised during the Cold War. Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn (1994, p. 71) 
said that the Thai state entrenched the dichotomous understanding of the Thai-Lao border 
after 1975 by presenting it as the line that separated the two ideological worlds. The Thai-
state imposed “blockade, embargo, closed frontiers, abusive taxes, unfair transport fees” 
and 393 items including consumer goods and fuel were not allowed to be legally 
transported to land-locked Lao PDR. Yet High said that to enforce control over the 
border meant to connect peoples. The closed border was exploited by right wing militants 
displaced from Lao PDR, as the Thai territory became their safe haven. At times, they 
crossed the border to attack the communist government. High termed it as “the movement 
of the marginal” (High, 2009, p. 28). 
 
115	  	  
Additionally, Leepreecha (2011) said that the involvement and withdrawal of the US 
forces in Indochina was not the only cause for the Hmong displacement. The Yao from 
highlands suffered similar situations that they helped the US fight a number of battles 
against communists, but had to be displaced after the US withdrawal (Gunn, 1990). In 
1980s, there were 8,000 Yaos in refugee camps in Thai territory. However, their 
transnational ties were not obvious if compared with the Hmong. To turn the clock back, 
colonisation that led to the emergence of modern states in Southeast Asia should also be 
blamed. Leepreecha argued the displacement resulted from the map in an ocularcentric 
style in the colonial era. The Cartesian map was drawn so that state space was separated 
by sovereigns to exercise their power over subjects and it adhered to the rules of 
watersheds and thalwegs regardless of cultural maps (Leepreecha, 2011). Those cultural 
maps were the indigenous ways of life such as the lowlands attached to mandala spatial 
logic and those outside mandala in highlands replaced by the Westphalian form of space 
after 1893 on the Thai-Lao border. Its length of 1810 kilometres is separated by thalwegs 
for 1108 kilometers, and watersheds for 702. When peoples crossed the border, they had 
to ask for permission according to international law, otherwise they were considered as 
illegal immigrants (Leepreecha, 2011). Afterwards, they were described as refugees. The 
Hmong who did not have their own state, and some who did were later stripped of their 
citizenship, were always regarded as illegal immigrants and refugees. Information from 
United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicated that from 1975 to 
1995, there were 320,865 displaced peoples from lowland and highland Lao PDR. The 
transnationalism of the Hmong can be explained in that they had ties with their Hmong 
fellows in a number nation-states. For example, Ban Vinai, a village in Thai territory, was 
one of the base that connected with Hmong in Long Cheng, Lao PDR in 1978 (Gunn, 
1990). Moreover, there were other Hmong networks such as in France, the US and 
Yunnan China. Gunn stressed that attention must be paid to the Yunnan base as it became 
the support area for the Hmong during the time of the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict. As China turned to support the Hmong to undermine the Soviet bloc in 
Indochina, the Hmong as anti-Lao government was an important factor in the early 
1980s. There were then 2.9 million Hmong living within an autonomous area in China 
perceived as a threat to Lao PDR (Gunn, 1990). In the mean time, in Thailand, Hmong 
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contributed to the formation of the United Lao National Liberation Front, together with 
other lowland Laos as an opposition in exile to the communist regime in Vientiane. 
However, the death of Phoumi Nosavan in 1985 weakened the movement significantly 
(Gunn, 1990). 
 
When the Hmong people interacted with other state actors during the Cold War, the norm 
of state was often privileged as they tended to be termed as refugees and terrorists. Even 
in anthropology, state-centrism was found when Chanthavanich (2011) reported 
comments from the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 1980s, Siddhi Savetsila, that 
refugees from Indochina, including the Hmong, were a burden on the Thai state. Because 
displaced peoples were perceived as a threat (Chanthanvanich, 2011), once they crossed 
the Thai-Lao border, three steps of state practice were taken. First, humane deterrence 
was applied as displaced peoples were detained, then later forced/requested to return to 
their supposedly home state. Second, a resettlement program in third countries was 
offered to the displaced peoples. Thirdly, voluntary repatriation was offered to them. The 
state, theoretically, did not listen if the place where the peoples had escaped from 
threatened their lives. As a result, peoples on the ground tended to be completely 
silenced. Meanwhile, the second and the third methods allowed peoples’ voices to be 
heard as they were able to choose whether they wanted to resettle in a third country or go 
back to where they were from (Chathavanich, 2011). This thesis argues that the first 
method privileged the security of the state that people viewed as illegal immigrants 
needed to be deported. Statesmen defined the clear-cut line of the two states, Thailand 
and Lao PDR.  
 
The anthropology of Chanthavanich recorded the voices of the Hmong through 
interviews. Those who fled Lao PDR after 1975 did not want to go back as to return 
possibly meant death and/or persecution (Chanthavanich, 2011). Many of them were 
reluctant to join the resettlement in third countries program. In 1986, though the majority 
of displaced peoples from Indochina wanted to resettle in third countries, only 47% of the 
Hmong people wanted to join the programme (Chanthavanich, 2011). They said they 
wanted to stay as displaced people in the temporary shelter area in Thai territory for 
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political reasons. Those political reasons were related to the Hmong militants who fought 
a significant number of battles with the army of Lao PDR in Lao territory in the 1980s 
and 1990s. In anthropology, the voice of the state is still there while the voices of the 
peoples, the Hmong, are not ignored. Nevertheless, the mechanism of states, such as 
Thailand and Lao PDR, as well as the international mechanism of UN, to decide who 
should be returned to their home state, who is qualified to be granted the status of 
refugees, and who should join resettlement programmes appeared to be privileged in 
Chanthavanich’s work.  
 
Third, the term ‘assimilation’ described the Hmong and Lao who fled after 1975 and later 
joined resettlement programmes to third countries such as the US, New Zealand, France, 
Australia, and French Guyana (Chanthavanich, 2011). For example, 44,561 Lao fled to 
France and 225,000 went to the US (Souvannavong, 1999). Souvannavong (1999) 
explored displaced Lao people who were former civil servants, military officers, and 
businesspersons, and found that, at first, they did not apply for French citizenship as they 
expected their exile to be temporary. However, after two decades, most of them were 
granted French citizenship. Since some still kept their Lao citizenship, the next definition 
of ‘integration’ could also be used to describe them. Similarly, integration could be 
applied to those who have dual citizenship, such as some of the Lao-Thai people who 
participated in the Wang Tao incident in 2000. These groups, in Thailand, France and the 
US, maintain transnational contact among themselves (Theeravit & Semyeam, 2002). 
Their political movements existed, though they did not threaten the stability of Lao PDR. 
For instance, in 1977, a Lao association existed to help newcomers who had fled Lao 
PDR to France and wished to maintain a Lao culture there (Souvannavong, 1999). A 
political objective was also indicated. The association was comprised of civil servants 
and military officers in the former regime with the hope to overthrow the communist 
government back home but Lao PDR has still been stable until the present day. Some of 
these four terms of transnational from below remained even after the Cold War and are 
discussed in the post-Cold War transnationalism section. 
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Since colonial times, spatial conceptualisation has been monopolised by the elites and an 
awareness of this is the first step in tackling the spatial conceptualisation of the peoples 
that cut across state boundaries. For example, France was the first colonial country that 
drew the map of Laos, in modern geography style, during its colonial heyday 
(Leepreecha, 2011). Such a colonial legacy remained in both state practice mainstream 
International Relations during the Cold War. For the case of displaced Hmong, 
Leepreecha and Chanthavanich emphasised the voices of peoples on the ground. Both 
spoke for the voices of the peoples, whether or not they wanted to join the state 
mechanism of dealing with displaced peoples, such as repatriation and/or resettlement in 
third countries. High further indicated that the Thai-Lao border as the fence that 
obstructed the movements of marginalised peoples was common during the Cold War. At 
the end of the Cold War, more liberal economic developments turned the border into a 
bridge, improving the hopes of the peoples on the ground to have louder voices. 
However, for the poor, the border was still a fence but this fact was often played down in 
International Relations as the elites were the discipline’s only focus.  
 
Post-Cold War transnationalism 
 
Subversion of the elites in transnational trade on the Thai-Lao border 
 
The 1987 Rom Klao military dispute was thought to have occurred because of the illegal 
logging financed by Thai businesspersons who asked local Thai military officers for 
protection while the trees were felled. The logging may have infringed the unclear Thai-
Lao border, depending on the version of the map being used. However, the Thai military 
officers’ presence in the area led to border clashes at interstate level (Stuart-Fox, 1997). 
When such illegal activities were authorised by statesmen, claims of the defence of 
territorial integrity were made and the use of force was regarded as legitimate by state 
officers. 
 
The discourse about turning the battlefield into marketplaces was similarly suspected by 
political science and International Relations scholars like Theeravit and Semyeam (2002), 
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and Paribatra (2013) if it benefitted illegal logging by the elites. Stuart-Fox (1997) 
suggested that the border disputes at Rom Klao Village were but one trigger for the Thai 
prime minister to launch such discourse. The conflict was easily settled after exchanges 
of gunfire in 1987 and 1988 that resulted in several hundred casualties on both sides by a 
military officer, General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, using personal connections, followed 
by a visit by the Prime Minister Choonhavan to Vientiane a few months later. Again, the 
voices of the dead and injured were downgraded. 
 
Illegal logging in Lao PDR then became common for Thai businesspersons (Pholsena & 
Banomyong, 2006). In the 1940s, 70% of Laos was covered by jungle but this dropped to 
40% in 1989 (Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006). Often, ethnic minorities were blamed for 
this destruction due to a habit of swidden in the highlands (Pholsena & Banomyong, 
2006). However, peoples from highlands were not the only the parties responsible. Thai 
businesspersons and Lao authorities should also be blamed for allowing uncontrolled 
numbers of trees to be felled. The volume of timber allowed by the Lao government to be 
cut down in 1998-1999 was 714 thousand cubic metres but Pholsena and Banomyong 
(2006) estimated that the actual volume felled was six times higher. 
 
The distinction between illegal and legal logging in Lao PDR was problematic (Pholsena 
and Banomyong, 2006). The national government of Lao PDR had no practical policy 
about the volume of timber to be cut, so Lao military officers were the ones who decided 
on the volume of trees to be felled and who had the right to cut them. Most of the time, 
these procedures were conducted arbitrarily. Even the World Bank, Swedish non-
government organisations, and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of 
these procedures (Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006). This thesis argues that, therefore, 
those who benefitted from legal and illegal inter-state business activities as a result of the 
Thai-Lao border being perceived as an economic gateway in the post-Cold War era were 
Thai businesspersons and Lao military officers.  
 
High (2010, p. 156) described this situation in which the Lao elites traded off the natural 
resources, allowing foreign investment, as a claim for national development termed 
120	  	  
“resourcification.” Lao PDR became the target for Thai business sectors because of its 
natural resources such as timber. Hydro-electricity was also purchased by the Thai state, 
while different areas in Lao PDR still had to rely on household electricity generators in 
1999 (Jerndal & Rigg, 1999). Moreover, human resources from Lao PDR were perceived 
as cheap labor attractive to Thai business entrepreneurs.  
 
Movement of the marginalised: A Cold War legacy 
 
Leepreecha (2011) mentioned two post-Cold War features of transnational contact among 
displaced Hmong and Lao, those who joined resettlement schemes to Western societies 
and those who were scattered in Thai territory. This thesis argues that these two features 
of transnationalism such as those who are in the third countries and those in Thai territory 
are the Cold War legacy. Firstly, ideological conflict was over in global politics but the 
ideology for the Lao National Liberation Movement, founded during the Cold War, 
survived this change in geopolitical order in Thailand, the US, and France, inspired by 
former right wing militants and displaced governors. According to the previous section, 
their transnational movements should be defined as ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration.’ 
Financial aid from the Hmong and Laos in Western societies was transferred to support 
the movement in the Thai and Lao states (Leepreecha, 2011). Secondly, the 
‘marginalisation’ of transnationalism should be noted as state policy to deal with people 
displacements and was not satisfactory in Leepreecha’s opinion. Though the Thai and 
Lao states agreed to close the refugee camps to tackle the problems of displaced people, a 
significant number of them refused to join the schemes provided. As refugee camps were 
closed down in Thai territory, a number of Hmong still remained and went to Tham 
Krabok Monastery in Saraburi, some 500 kilometres from the Thai-Lao border. 
Anthropologists recognised that they maintained contact with their relatives in third 
countries such as the US and France. It can be argued that Sirikrai (2007), an expert in 
Thai-Lao relations in International Relations, was also aware of this fact. However, 
Leepreecha supported the voices of the peoples more by taking the historical narrative of 
the Hmong and their spatial conceptualisation silenced by the Westphalian form during 
the colonial era and following up with the result of the state policy. He looked whether 
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the policy implemented was successful in facilitating the resettlement and repatriation 
scheme or not. This careful analysis that sounds the voice of the displaced Hmong indeed 
reveals the human dimension.  
 
Leepreecha’s awareness of peoples’ movements across the Thai-Lao border was able to 
escape from the territorial trap of dichotomous understanding of inside/outside and self-
contained state myth. Although reification of the border monopolised by the elites cannot 
be totally eliminated, as the state mechanism was present in Leepreecha’s research to 
propose policy to the state, it was merely a facilitator to deal with the flow of the peoples 
– the displaced Lao and Hmong. Thus, state-centric space was not theoretically 
eliminated and the voices of the people were not rejected. This may be called a toleration 
of space interpretation when the peoples along borders needed to use the borders at times 
for their survival.  
 
Movement of the marginalised: Economic migration 
 
A land with more economic opportunities attracts peoples from a land with less. For 
example, the rapid economic space of Thailand post-1989 attracted a significant number 
of peoples from Lao PDR. Some searched for jobs, but not all were legally registered. In 
2001, the number of illegal migrations from Lao PDR to Thailand was 58,411 (Pholsena 
& Banomyong, 2006). Thai entrepreneurs targeted Lao people as cheap labor but Lao 
workers did not object as they preferred a job that did not pay much to no job in their 
homeland. Also, some Lao people were motivated by a spirit of adventure rather than 
economic incentive (Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006). Young Lao, consumers of Thai TV, 
accepted the challenge of crossing the border to see life on the other side of the Mekong 
(Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006). Because of these two factors – economic and adventure 
– the daily flow of Lao people between twin cities of borderlands, such as Mukdahane 
and Savannakhet, was regarded as normal (Pholsena & Banomyong 2006).  
 
Consequently, the problem of human trafficking developed. Many Lao females became 
prostitutes once they crossed the border (Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006) and males were 
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sold as slaves far away from the border. Pholsena and Banomyong related the case of a 
Lao boy who crossed the border in Ubon Ratchathani province but had to work fishing in 
Patani, more than one thousand kilometres away. He received no salary but managed to 
run away and returned to Lao PDR (Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006). The human 
trafficking problem led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 
2002 to control illegal migrants (Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006).  
 
High explained border crossing in the post-Cold War era by demythologising the 
assumption that the Thai-Lao border was a bridge rather than a fence. She spoke for the 
voices of the marginalised peoples, arguing that a supposedly borderless world often 
claimed by policy-makers and International Relations scholars after 1989 was for the 
rich, and discourse about turning the battlefields into marketplaces was not for the poor 
(High, 2009). Even the expectation of ASEAN to connect non-communist with 
communist states only benefitted the elites (High, 2009). Similarly, the Great Mekong 
Sub-region (GMS) project, mentioned in the previous chapters, that was expected to 
transform Lao PDR from a land-locked to a land-linked state was suspected of providing 
increased economic activity in the border regions only for statesmen and businesspersons 
(Jerndal & Rigg, 1999). Poor peoples still struggled for some benefit and found it hard to 
cross the border because of immigration laws of the Thai state, especially when the MOU 
between the Thai and Lao states was signed. Also, more friendly relations between 
Thailand and Lao PDR reduced the chances of exploitation by former right wing 
militants to close borders as they did during the Cold War. If they were caught while 
conducting military operations across the Thai-Lao border, they no longer gained the 
support of the Thai state. For example, those who took part in the Wang Tao Incident in 
2000 were extradited to Lao PDR. In addition, more border checkpoints were constructed 
along the Thai-Lao border. At the Chong Mek border checkpoint between Ubon 
Ratchathani and Champassak, for example, peoples used to cross the border freely during 
the Cold War. Now, there is a formal checkpoint that makes crossing more complicated 
for peoples to pass through immigration procedures. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has answered the fourth research question concerning the neglect of the 
human dimension by International Relations and historiography on the Thai-Lao border 
after 1975 and the ways in which Routledge's proposal for anti-geopolitics can be used to 
enrich the human dimension in the theories. It argues that spatial conceptualisation has 
been monopolised by the elites. This chapter supports this argument by the application of 
anti-geopolitics in two steps, by a critical examination of the theoretical privilege of 
spatial conceptualisation of the Westphalian form, and an investigation of the challenges 
of other forms of spatial conceptualisation to the established one. 
 
Firstly, this chapter argued that the monopolisation of spatial conceptualisation by the 
elites in the theory was constituted by the colonial legacy of territorial borders in 
traditional geopolitics. Thus, to back up the claim, Ó Tuathail’s criticism of the 
geopolitical characteristics of white man supremacy, justification of colonisation in the 
past, and intervention of superpowers during the Cold War was re-examined as an 
extension of chapter 2. This re-examination was also critical through the consideration of 
the Orientalism of Said. The silence of the peoples on the Thai-Lao border both in 
International Relations and historiography from three Orientalism characteristics were 
discussed highlighting: the perception of being less developed, less rational, and less 
human; the perception of a monolithic socialism-communism versus liberalism-
democracy; and the prioritisation of the national interest of the US as the Cold War 
hegemon. 
 
Orientalism regarding spatial conceptualisation that always prioritised Westphalian 
borders was passed on to indigenous intellectuals of statecraft and scholars in 
International Relations and history. This resulted in the territorial trap as important 
metaphors and discourses academically found in both disciplines were examined. A 
number of metaphors, such as Thailand as a frontline state and the potential next domino, 
were produced by and benefitted the elites. Similarly, the voices of the elites still 
prevailed in important discourses, such as Lao PDR as Thai territory lost to France in 
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1893; closures of the Thai-Lao border as a means of punishment to land-locked Lao 
PDR; and the turning of battlefields into marketplaces at the end of the period. In 
practice, the peoples along the border tended to be sacrificed and theoretically 
downgraded. Even after the end of the Cold War, the legacy of geopolitics remained 
regarding the spatial conceptualisation of the Thai-Lao border, despite the advances in 
technology that enabled more actors to make themselves heard along the Thai-Lao 
border, and increased de-territorialisation as those actors negated the spatial interpretation 
of the state. State actors were still prioritised and only those non-state actors who 
followed the logic of economic liberalisation were theoretically welcomed, while those 
who did not fit were downgraded and referred to as illegal immigrants, refugees, 
terrorists, and insurgents. Thus the voices of peoples on the ground as transnationalism 
from below were marginalised during the past sixty years. 
 
Secondly, this chapter incorporated literature from anthropology that focused on the 
Thai-Lao border as part of the application of Routledge’s anti-geopolitics. Analyses of 
Orientalism and discourses of academic metaphors unveiled the colonial legacy of 
mainstream historiography and anthropological analysis enriched the voices of peoples 
on the ground by the presentation of other forms of spatial conceptualisation. For 
example, the history of borderlands and their relations with the non-state space of 
highlands were examined. Furthermore, the state-centric version of transnationalism was 
the springboard for the chapter to move forward to a more people-centric 
transnationalism in anthropology regarding the Thai-Lao border. For example, the 
chapter presented the four terms of Cold War transnationalism, separation, 
marginalisation, assimilation, and integration of those who fled Lao PDR after 1975. It 
discussed the subversion of the elites’ transnational activities of illegal logging that was 
argued to be the trigger of the famous discourse of turning the battlefields into 
marketplaces.  
 
While the Cold War legacy of transnationalism still remains to the present day in the 
cases of displaced peoples and transnational movements of the Lao and Hmong, new 
transnational phenomena such as illegal immigrants and human trafficking have emerged. 
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This chapter argued that anthropology on the Thai-Lao border is indeed anti-geopolitics. 
Though it has been found impossible to reject the spatial conceptualisation of the state, 
anthropologists cited in this chapter tackled the territorial trap successfully by speaking 
for the voices of peoples on the ground. Incorporation of this framework in International 
Relations will lead to the enrichment of the human dimension on the Thai-Lao border in 
the future.  	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Chapter 5 
Summary, theoretical considerations, possibilities for future research, and 
limitations 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter concludes the thesis titled Re-thinking the Thai-Lao border in International 
Relations: Can anti-geopolitics reveal a human dimension? and summarises the answers 
to the four research questions posted in chapter 1. It further discusses how the findings 
could impact theoretical consideration of border issues in International Relations. The 
traditional geopolitics characteristics of self-claim for objectivity, separation of space and 
peoples, white man supremacy, and provision of nationalistic policy were passed on to 
International Relations in discussions about the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to the present 
day. These four geopolitics characteristics resulted in the territorial trap of the myth of 
the self-contained state, the dichotomous understanding of inside/outside, and border 
reification monopolised by the elites. Though the ways to escape from the trap proposed 
by Agnew and Corbridge, such as historical awareness, broader social and economic 
structures of a hegemon, and changes in geopolitical order, were taken into theoretical 
consideration by International Relations to some extent, the territorial trap remained.  
 
This thesis thus proposed that an anti-geopolitics approach consisting of two steps be 
taken to deal with the territorial trap so that the voices of the peoples on the ground were 
heard. The first step, as an alternative to the analysis of the geopolitical characteristic of 
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white man supremacy passed on to International Relations, was an examination of the 
Orientalism of Said that helped unveil the colonial legacy of spatial management 
according to the European imaginative geography based on Westphalian concepts. 
Orientalism that influenced indigenous scholars was also critically examined to determine 
the importance of discourses and metaphors along the Thai-Lao border in the theoretical 
reproduction of the territorial trap. Transnationalism recognised in mainstream 
historiography represented the spatial shift from the pre-colonial to the modern nation 
state in the 19th century. However, it only echoed the voices of the elites and played down 
those on the ground whose movements cut across state boundaries because the 
Westphalian spatial conceptualisation was still presupposed. The second step was the 
presentation of the argument that anthropology on the Thai-Lao border was anti-
geopolitics. Three anthropological frameworks, an analysis of historiography along the 
borderlands, transnationalism from below during the Cold War, and in the post-Cold War 
era, successfully dealt with the territorial trap. The voices of peoples on the ground were 
heard and the state was not rejected. This thesis argues that the mainstream 
historiography of the centre of the state recognised in mainstream International Relations, 
discussed in chapter 3 cannot be rejected. Also, the three anthropological methods are 
equally important. The historiography of the borderlands should not be ignored, and at 
the same time, the personal historical narratives during the Cold War and in the post-Cold 
War era proposed by anthropology are important as these methods support the voices of 
the peoples. To emphasise only one method and ignore others results in being caught 
within a hierarchical reversal of the theory that this thesis tries to avoid. To apply the 
128	  	  
three approaches thus should effectively bring the human dimension to International 
Relations. 
 
Additionally, the possible limitations of this thesis are discussed. These include the 
restricted rhetoric of statesmen regarding the Thai-Lao border compared to academic 
texts, the number of indigenous texts in International Relations and historiography in the 
Thai language compared to the absence of such in the Lao language, the small number of 
primary historiographic sources related to twin cities, and the neglect of a full 
documentation of peoples’ experiences in crossing the border in the Cold War and post-
Cold War eras. Attention to these limitations may allow the voices of the peoples on the 
ground to be heard more, thus addressing a major aim of the thesis to add a human 
dimension to International Relations in the future. The chapter presents a summary and 
theoretical reconsiderations, possible directions for future research, and limitations of the 
thesis. 
 
Summary and theoretical reconsiderations 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis rethought the conceptualisation of the Thai-Lao border in International 
Relations and proposed that anti-geopolitics was able to reveal a human dimension in the 
discipline. The spatial conceptualisation of traditional geopolitics which facilitated 
colonisation in the past influenced mainstream International Relations, especially 
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political realism. The four geopolitical characteristics of the self-claim for objectivity, 
separation of space and peoples, white man supremacy, and provision for nationalistic 
policy found in Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman were still to be found in Morgenthau, 
Herz, Mearsheimer, and Waltz. The space management presupposed to be Westphalian-
based in the discipline, despite criticism from dissident International Relations scholars 
such as Ruggie, Walker, and Ashley, remained Eurocentric because European 
imaginative geography was insufficiently examined. Peoples on the ground whose 
movements did not conform to the Westphalian presupposition have been downgraded in 
the theory from the Cold War to the present day.  
 
The Thai-Lao border was a good example of the continuation of colonial legacy 
regarding spatial conceptualisation in International Relations and raised these questions. 
Firstly, it questioned the extent to which the concept of territorial borders in traditional 
geopolitics influenced discussion of the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to 1975 in 
International Relations theory.  
 
Secondly, it asked the ways in which geopolitics as a colonial legacy was represented in 
International Relations theories, with particular reference to political realism, on the issue 
of the Thai-Lao border after 1975. Chapter 2 answered the first and the second research 
questions. It found that the four characteristics of traditional geopolitics influenced 
International Relations in the discussion of the Thai-Lao border differently, depending on 
the global politics at particular times. For example, between 1954 when Laos gained 
independence from France and 1975 when it became a communist state, intervention by 
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Thailand, the US, the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam was common. Therefore, 
the ocularcentric map constituted the myth of a self-contained state and resulted in the 
perception of the Domino Theory in both intellectuals of statecraft and scholars. Also, 
white man supremacy as justification for communist containment was reflected more in 
this period. Geopolitical analysis representing nationalistic policy of the US was 
furthermore found among political realists such as Morgenthau, Herz, and Waltz. Similar 
geopolitical characteristics were found in the works of the Thai scholar Ladavalya. From 
1975 to 1989, the Thai-Lao border became the line that separated the two ideological 
worlds of socialist-communism and liberalism-democracy. The border drawn on the 
Cartesian maps of Thailand and Laos produced by France in the late 19th century was 
strictly put into practice and more theoretically recognised. The fourth characteristic, the 
provision of nationalistic criticism if not advice for the Thai state, was also evident as 
Thai scholars cited pre-colonial claims that Laos had been under Thai suzerainty and that 
the Thai state lost Lao territory to France in 1893. Such claims were examples of 
anachronistic concepts of space as, before 1893, the peoples then did not emphasise the 
acquisition of space as the Westphalian system did. The spatial perception lowland 
peoples could be described by Wolters (1999) as mandala. Those from highlands were 
described, additionally, by Scott (2009) as zomia. Since 1989, the Thai-Lao border has 
become the line that separates the space of rapid economic development of Thai territory 
and the economically slow space of Lao PDR. Even so, this thesis found that geopolitical 
characteristics were passed on to and influenced International Relations. Though 
ideological rivalry at global and regional levels diminished, the geopolitical 
characteristics, claims of objectivity and separation of space and people, were prominent. 
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The separation of space and power according to the Westphalian norm remained. Some 
research such as that of Theeravit and Semyeam (2002) suggested that Thai and Lao 
nationalism was present but more toleration was required when border issues were 
considered. However, the separation of space in terms of different indications of natural 
resources was also noted. The Thai-Lao border was no longer the ideological boundary 
but an economic one. Lao PDR became a space of natural resources that was attractive to 
businesspersons for investment in such areas as logging and hydro-electric power. The 
fact that the four geopolitical characteristics have remained in International Relations 
over the past sixty years of the political narrative of the Thai-Lao border blinded the 
theorists and resulted in the theoretical attachment of the territorial trap of Agnew and 
Corbridge. The first two characteristics led to the myth of the self-contained state and the 
dichotomous understanding of inside/outside. The third and the fourth led to the trap of 
reification of territorial borders monopolised by the elites that silenced the voices of 
peoples.  
 
Thirdly, this thesis questioned the ways in which the concept of the territorial trap was 
used to criticise existing literature in International Relations regarding Thai-Lao border 
issues after 1975 and how such a critical point of view can be enriched further. Chapter 3 
discovered that the concept of the territorial trap was used to criticise the existing 
literature in International Relations, with particular reference to political realism. 
However, the proposal from Agnew and Corbridge with the theoretical considerations of 
historical relations, the broader social and economic structures of a hegemon, and 
changes in the geopolitical order had already been accepted by International Relations 
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theorists to some extent -- though the scholars might or might not have been aware that 
these theoretical considerations were proposed by Agnew and Corbridge. Yet, the three 
solutions were insufficient to erase the territorial trap because history embedded in the 
theory focused on the centre of the state that presupposed the Westphalian space. For 
example, the common historical claim recognised among Thai International Relations 
scholars, especially from 1975 to 1989, such as Sirikrai (1979) and Phuangkasem (1980), 
was that the Thai state lost territory that belonged to the present state of Laos to France in 
1893. The discourse of the Thai state having lost the Lao territory to France was rejected 
by the Lao International Relations scholar Ngaosyvathn (1985) and criticised by the Thai 
historian Winichakul (1994) that it not only prioritised the voice of the Bangkok Court 
but also silenced other tiny kingdoms along the Mekong. International Relations analysis 
that recognised transnational actors in broader social and economic structures similarly 
prioritised Westphalian states as major actors. For instance, in 1989, the Thai Prime 
Minister Choonhavan announced his policy of turning the battlefields of Indochina into 
marketplaces and there was a new interpretation of the Thai-Lao border by International 
Relations scholars. To facilitate multilateral co-operation and the mechanism of the 
Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) supported by the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank, Sirikrai indicated that transport infrastructure should be constructed 
to connect all the states through which the Mekong flows. Of course, the Thai-Lao border 
became the highway of neo-liberal transnationalism. When the terms ‘corridor’ and 
‘fence’ were used to describe the Thai-Lao border, the presupposition of the existing 
borderline, the territorial trap that separated space and people in a Westphalian style, was 
evident. Moreover, when changes in geopolitics were recognised, only the voices of the 
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states and businesspersons were heard. While International Relations literature discussed 
plans to bridge the Thai-Lao border, peoples living along the border crossed the border 
every day. Establishment of stricter check-points and more bureaucratic rituals to cross 
the border were new to these people in the post-Cold War era but now have become part 
of their daily lives. International Relations literature has failed to recognise this. Instead, 
Chapter 3 proposed that the anti-geopolitics of Ó Tuathail’s criticism of white man 
supremacy of the spatial conceptualisation and Ó Tuathail and Agnew’s (1998) re-
conceptualisation of geopolitics during the Cold War be taken into account to counter the 
monopoly of the border by the American, Thai, Lao, and Soviet elites. The analysis of the 
geopolitical legacy in the post-Cold War by Dalby (1998) and the transnationalism from 
below of Donnan and Wilson (1999) should also be applied to the Thai-Lao border which 
was a colonial legacy of geopolitics. These criticisms examined the theoretical definitions 
of the peoples who crossed the border that did not conform to the Westphalian logic in a 
state-centric manner, and they were regarded as illegal immigrants, refugees, displaced 
persons, and terrorists. This contrasted with the transnational movements of those who 
belonged to the neo-liberal world, such as businesspersons.  
 
Fourthly, to cope with the territorial trap, the human dimension of anti-geopolitics needed 
to be introduced to the discipline. Thus, two steps based on the ideas of Jones (2006) 
were proposed to examine the neglect of the human dimension by International Relations 
regarding the Thai-Lao border after 1975. The first step involved an analysis of anti-
geopolitics scholars such as Said, Ó Tuathail, Agnew, Wilson and Donnan, and 
Routledge in regard to the European imaginative geography of Westphalian territorial 
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borders taken for granted and the voices of the peoples on the ground downgraded since 
1954. Four sets of ideas from anti-geopolitics were used to criticise the conceptualisation 
by International Relations and historiography of the Thai-Lao border. The common 
criticisms were the Orientalism of Said as an extension of Ó Tuathail’s attack on white 
man supremacy regarding the Westphalian concept, the second order of Orientalism 
found in International Relations and historiography, geopolitics discourse analysis in the 
two disciplines mentioned, and transnationalism from below discussed in historiography. 
Employing these four themes opened space for the voices of the peoples on the ground. 
For example, the Orientalism of Said revealed the fact that territorial borders in a 
Westphalian style presupposed in the two disciplines were embedded with colonial bias 
of a more rational white man versus less rational Indochinese peoples. The Westphalian 
form of state was prioritised by all scholars. Even so, the prioritised Westphalian borders 
needed to give way to the US intervention if communism was to be contained. As found 
in the work of Morgenthau, and Herz, the national interest of the US was always 
prioritised compared with the lives of local peoples in Indochina from 1954 to 1975. The 
interpretation of the human artificial territorial borders in theory not only reflected the 
fact that borders were not objective, but that subjectivity only presented the voices of 
statesmen. Secondly, Orientalism became the second order when indigenous intellectuals 
of statecraft and scholars echoed it. For example, a number of Thai scholars reproduced 
the discourse of anti-communism of the US during the Cold War and this showed when 
the Thai-Lao border was conceptualised. This second order of Orientalism was especially 
evident when the Thai-Lao border was academically reified, especially by Thai scholars, 
as the line to separate the two ideological worlds of socialism-communism and 
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liberalism-democracy. Thirdly, the geopolitical discourse analysis of Ó Tuathail and 
Agnew was used to examine important metaphors that were significantly influenced by 
the elites and theoretically constituted changes in the meaning of the Thai-Lao border as a 
result of the second order of Orientalism. The metaphors and discourse, such as the 
Domino Theory, Thailand as a frontline state of the non-communist world, border 
closures, the territorial loss of Thailand, the Mekong as a river of friendship, and the 
changing of the battlefields to marketplaces, revealed the prioritised voices of the elites. 
Fourthly, the narrative of the silenced in the borderlands and transnationalism from below 
(Routledge, 1998) to provide space for geopolitics of the peoples on the Thai-Lao border 
was discussed. The post-geopolitics of Ó Tuathail (1997) was additionally used to 
examine the Thai-Lao border, showing that, despite more advanced telecommunication 
technology, more fluid political actors, and the de-territorialisation of political space 
resulting in changes to geopolitics in the post-Cold War era, the voices of the elites were 
still theoretically prioritised. The second step is, furthermore, that the incorporation of 
anthropology discussing the Thai-Lao border supported the voices of the peoples by 
presenting the history of the borderlands and transnationalism of peoples on the ground 
during the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. Though it was impossible to reject the 
spatial conceptualisation of a Wesphalian state, anthropologists cited in this thesis tackled 
the territorial trap successfully by speaking for the voices of peoples on the ground. 
Incorporation of this framework in International Relations will lead to the inclusion of a 
human dimension on the Thai-Lao border in the future. 
 
Theoretical reconsiderations 
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In answering the first and the second research question, the colonial legacy of traditional 
geopolitics found in the border conceptualisation could be used as an example for other 
border cases – to what extent can the territorial trap constituted by the four geopolitical 
characteristics be found in the discussion on other borders in International Relations? For 
example, as the discussion of the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to the present day can be 
divided into three phases, with different degrees of different territorial traps in each 
period, it is interesting to explore the occurrence of similar phenomena in relation to 
other borders in International Relations. A similar example can be found in the work of 
Gideon Biger (2008) who recognised the Palestinian-Israeli border, in a Westphalian 
spatial conceptualisation, as a colonial legacy similar to the Thai-Lao border. He 
examined the politics of space monopolised by the Israeli, British, French, American, 
Jordanian, and Syrian elites that affected the lives of Palestinians by dividing the analysis 
into three phases; the outside political delimitation, the “Period of the Gun” – the forced 
delimitation, and the local bilateral delimitation (Biger, 2008, p. 85). This analysis of the 
transition in spatial conceptualisation can be a model for other border areas with similar 
colonial legacy characteristics. 
 
The findings of chapter 3 suggested that the ways out of the territorial trap proposed by 
Agnew and Corbridge were recognised in International Relations regarding the Thai-Lao 
border issue. However, their solutions were insufficient and needed further enrichment. 
The historical narratives, awareness of broader social and economic structures of a 
hegemon and changes in geopolitical order recognised in the discussion of the Thai-Lao 
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border in the discipline focused too much on the centre of the state and the privileged 
voice of the statesmen. Have similar situations occurred in the discussion of other 
borders? Critical political geographers’ points of view, such as the reconceptualisation of 
geopolitical discourse of the Thai-Lao border, post-Cold War geopolitics, and 
transnationalism from below, could be used in the examinations of such borders. 
Adamson similarly recognised that the fall of the Iron Curtain marked the migration of 
peoples from former communist states, such as the East Germans to West Germany. 
Undoubtedly, the former communist states could be defined as weak states that could not 
control the flow of people effectively (Adamson, 2006). The Schengen agreement of 
1985 and 1999 Amsterdam treaty made it harder, however, for peoples to illegally cross 
into the European Union (EU). States still had two functions, to decide who should enter 
and to decide who should be included as members of the host state. What Adamson 
(2006) recognised in Europe is similar to what High (2009) recognised on the Thai-Lao 
border – a borderless world is borderless only for the rich, as discussed in chapter 4, and 
for all other peoples, such a world in the post-Cold War era is a myth. In 1990s, 50% of 
funds of EU were given to former communist states in Eastern Europe, potential possible 
EU members, for technology to monitor borders (Adamson, 2006). A similar situation to 
the Thai-Lao border was the line to separate a rapid economic space and a slow one 
occurred in Europe. Yet, this thesis maintains that the borderless world is still an 
assumption in International Relations that needs to be demythologised in other areas.  
 
The answer to the fourth research question stated that anti-geopolitics was necessary to 
introduce the human dimension to the discipline. The two steps, the critical examination 
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of the European imaginative geography of the presupposed Westphalian space in 
historiography and International Relations and the incorporation of anthropology on the 
border zones used to examine the Thai-Lao border, could be applied to other border 
areas. For example, it is possible that the Orientalism of spatial conceptualisation, the 
second order of Orientalism, geopolitical metaphors and discourse analysis, and 
transnationalism from below in historiography could be used to critique border studies. 
The historiography of the borderlands, transnationalism from below during the Cold War 
and post-Cold War era in anthropological approach could then follow. Taking these 
familiar steps, the voices of the peoples on the ground may be theoretically heard, not 
only in the Thai-Lao border case but also in others. For example, Donnan and Wilson 
(1999) completed a study on the US-Mexican border, a popular area for research, that 
involved the twin cities of the American Laredo and Mexican Nuevo Laredo. Local 
historiography stated that the twin cities shared an identity (that included a baseball team 
called ‘Tecos’) that helped to escape from the territorial trap. Additionally, Anzaldúa 
(2007) discussed violence on the US-Mexican border. After the Treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo in 1848, violence continued to occur as non-Anglo-Americans were arrested, 
deported from, and killed in former Northern Mexico on land that they had previously 
regarded as their homes. This model of the analysis of the twin border cities of Donnan 
and Wilson and the personal historiography of Anzaldúa, similar to the personal 
historiography of Pholsena (2006) in Lao PDR and the analysis of twin cities in the Thai-
Lao border of Baird (2013) as discussed in chapter 4, should be an example of border 
studies in other areas and be incorporated in International Relations.  
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This thesis argues that the most effective anti-geopolitical ways of dealing with the 
conceptualisation of the Thai-Lao border requires historical backgrounds of the 
borderlands and the voices of the peoples whose movements cut across the border. At the 
same time, the historiography of the centre of the state should not be ignored because to 
emphasise only one method and overlook others results in being caught within the 
hierarchical reversal of the theory that this thesis tries to avoid. Recognition by 
International Relations of both the states and the peoples will then hopefully be achieved. 
 
Possibilities for future research 
 
Possibilities for future research include an increased focus on non-academic rhetoric, 
such as that made by practitioners. The analysis of the territorial trap and the anti-
geopolitics can be used to criticise American, Thai, and Lao practitioners’ perspectives of 
the Thai-Lao border from 1954 to 2014. Such a focus could question the rhetoric of 
statesmen and diplomats and the manner in which it constitutes theoretical discussion. 
For example, there could be investigation of the extent of the territorial traps of 
dichotomous understanding of inside/outside, the myth of the self-contained state, and 
border reification. Examination could also be made of the solutions to the territorial trap, 
such as the awareness of historical backgrounds, broader social and economic structures 
of a hegemon, and changes in geopolitical order. Future research could enquire about the 
versions of history embedded in the rhetoric of Thai and Lao statesmen, their perceptions 
of broader social and economic structures at the global level that affect the region, and 
their response to changes in geopolitical order. For example, an analysis of Thai 
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statesmen’s interpretations of the change in the US foreign policy from aggressive to 
more benign towards Lao communism would be valuable. From 1975 to 1989, direct 
quotes from Thai and Lao statesmen were rare at a time when territorial disputes were 
common on the Thai-Lao border. Later examples could exist in an examination of state 
officers’ reactions to the triumph of economic liberalisation after 1989 that resulted in 
changes in the interpretation of the Thai-Lao border echoed in academic texts. Analyses 
of anti-geopolitics employed in the thesis with academic texts such as Orientalism, the 
second order of Orientalism, and transnationalism from below could be used to approach 
the rhetoric uttered by the intellectuals of the states. In this way the primary sources 
would extend from academic texts to other genres, such as newspapers and official 
announcements from the states.   
 
This thesis mainly focused on documentary sources and fieldwork is necessary in future 
research. Historiography in International Relations should not be limited to the 
Westphalian concept with perspectives from the two capitals, Bangkok and Vientiane, as 
it has been in the past. The primary sources of the historiography of the borderlands and 
twin cities along the Thai-Lao border and the personal historiography of transnational 
peoples promise to add a human dimension to the discipline. As discussed in chapter 4, 
the historiography of the borderlands and anthropological transnationalism with the 
model of Laredo and Nuevo Laredo on the US-Mexican border by Donnan and Wilson 
(1999) were able to help scholars escape from the territorial trap and added a human 
dimension to International Relations. However, the literature discussed in the thesis could 
still be enriched. The examination of the borderlands’ historiography in chapter 4 covered 
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only three pairs of twin cities of Thailand and Lao PDR, Nan and Luang Prabang, 
Mukdahane and Savannakhet, and Ubon Ratchathani and Champassak. The 1810 
kilometres of the Thai-Lao border has other twin cities, such as Chiang Rai and 
Houaixay, Phayao and Xaingabouli, Nong Khai and Vientiane, Buengkarn and Pakxam, 
and Nakon Phanom and Thakek. Primary sources of historiography in relation to these 
twin cities require further exploration. 
 
In addition, all anthropological research discussed in the thesis was based on secondary 
sources and ethnographic fieldwork would strengthen it. This thesis argued that the 
historiography of the borderlands helped escape from the territorial trap but personal 
histories, as shown by the works of Baird (2013), High (2009), and Souvannavong 
(1999), recognised the voices of the peoples who crossed and continue to cross the Thai-
Lao border. These voices that project transnational narratives could be regarded as one 
version of history. Pholsena (2006) explored the personal histories of people from ethnic 
groups and argued that their versions constituted a national version of Lao 
historiography, though these histories did not always fit with contextual changes. 
Histories at all levels, including state to state, borderlands, and personal accounts, should 
be together taken into theoretical consideration as they shaped each other (Pholsena, 
2006). To recognise the voices of the peoples on the ground, Pholsena first presented a 
change in the national version of historiography. The prioritised lowland Lao versions 
were replaced by Marxist-Leninist versions in 1975. She then presented the voices of the 
peoples, saying that the participants from the ethnic minority of Kha were proud of their 
roles during the Cold War but became marginalised as the Cold War finished. During the 
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Cold War, the ethnic minorities fulfilled the ideological expectations of Marxist-
Leninism and they together with the communist lowland Lao helped fight against the US 
and the Royal Lao Government. However, at the end of the Cold War, some Lao civil 
servants with ethnic minority backgrounds were no longer recognised and were unfairly 
treated when the time of bureaucratic promotions came, compared with the lowland Lao 
(Pholsena, 2006). While not related to border issues, the work of Pholsena is an example 
of an approach that is useful in future research of the Thai-Lao border. This thesis argues 
that such an approach could be applied to investigations of the experiences of 
transnational Lao and Thai persons whose movements transcended the Thai-Lao border. 
As discussed in chapter 4, examples exist in the works of Leepreecha (2011) and 
Chanthavanich (2011) that revealed the plight of the Hmong in camps in Thai territory 
and Baird (2013) and Souvannavong (1999) that explored the personal histories of elite 
Lao in exile.  
 
Limitations of the thesis 
 
One possible limitation of the thesis is that the primary sources were academic texts in 
International Relations, history, and anthropology because the research questions focused 
on theoretical discussion of the Thai-Lao border. The primary sources from intellectuals 
of statecraft, such as state officers and diplomats that showed the territorial trap and 
solutions as proposed by Agnew and Corbridge were recognised but downgraded and 
hence limited. Improvements to this thesis could be made by supporting evidence by 
statements by statesmen. However, this limitation can be answered by stating that, 
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because the four research questions of the thesis concentrated on the theory of 
International Relations, academic texts were the major focus. If the rhetoric of state 
practitioners was included, it was to support the content of those academic texts. For 
example, as chapter 2 discussed white man supremacy used to justify the US intervention 
in Indochina, both academic texts by Morgenthau, Herz, and Waltz and the rhetoric of 
state practitioners, such as Kissinger, Eisenhower and Truman, were cited, the latter 
supporting the former. Very often, Morgenthau and Herz expressed the necessity for the 
US intervention in Indochina. Similar claims that revealed western supremacy of the US 
were found in Truman; the US needs to intervene in other parts of the world to contain 
communism. The discourse of Lao territory being part of the Thai state lost to France in 
1893 was also supported by academic texts from International Relations and history and 
practitioners. Certainly, academic texts should be the focus because they were examined 
to directly respond to the four research questions. If more statements and rhetoric of 
statesmen were the focus, the research questions would be framed differently. 
 
Another possible limitation of the thesis is that the theoretical analysis of the Thai-Lao 
border since Lao independence covers a long period of time of 60 years. As a result, this 
thesis focused more on the Cold War mentalities in International Relations, with 
particular reference to political realism. There is limited space for other theoretical 
frameworks such as neo-institutionalism and constructivism that have been prominent in 
the post-Cold War era. However, this thesis argued that the Thai-Lao border 
conceptualised by neo-institutionalism and constructivism was no less different from 
political realism. The territorial trap of the myth of the self-contained state, dichotomous 
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understanding of inside/outside, and border reification monopolised by the elites was 
found in the authors whose approach appeared to be non-realist, such as Amer (1999) and 
Paribatra (2013), but their spatial conceptualisation was heavily influenced by realism. 
This was discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
Possible realist explanations were anticipated by the anthropologists Pholsena and 
Banomyong (2006), nevertheless, regarding the Thai-Lao border when Lao PDR was 
integrated into ASEAN. The framework of three schools of International Relations, 
realism, neo-institutionalism and constructivism, was applied and the territorial trap 
remained in the theory. Pholsena and Banomyong, trying to understand interstate politics 
from the realist point of view, expected that realists would explain that Lao statesmen 
wanted to settle Thai-Lao border conflicts from a more equal position at the negotiating 
table. The Lao Minister of Foreign Affairs in the late 1990s, Somsavat Lengsavad, stated 
that Lao PDR was treated as an equal partner to the Thai state, different to situations 
during the Cold War when Lao PDR was not a member of ASEAN. ASEAN integration 
was desirable for Lao statesmen because it meant that each member country respected the 
idea of non-intervention (Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006). This equal partnership to settle 
border conflicts with the Thai state led to other economic matters in Lao international 
affairs. Institutionalism explained that co-operation was hoped for, rather than 
competition because Lao statesmen were aware that Lao PDR was still economically 
weak compared to her non-Indochinese neighbours. To be treated as an equal partner in 
ASEAN was thus expected. Constructivism, moreover, would explain that because of the 
reduction of the Soviet role after the end of the Cold War, ASEAN integration was 
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welcome by Lao PDR. Nevertheless, Vietnam was still perceived as her major ally, 
followed by China, while ASEAN replaced the role played by the Soviet Union 
(Pholsena & Banomyong, 2006).  
 
This thesis contends that these three schools are caught within the territorial trap. 
Settlement of the border equally as expected by Lao statesmen, according to realism, 
repeated the dichotomous understanding of inside/outside as mentioned. Border 
reification of the elites and the myth of the self-contained state were also noted when 
constructivism and neo-institutionalists expected co-operation. However, awareness of 
mainstream theory in International Relations by Pholsena and Banomyong revealed that 
the role of the state was not ignored. Together with anthropological work, Pholsena and 
Banomyong’s work supported the voices of the peoples on the ground.  
 
In addition, the academic texts explored in this thesis were mainly in English and Thai. 
Therefore, the territorial border conceptualisation discussed was mainly taken from non-
indigenous scholars such as theorists in International Relations and experts in Thai-Lao 
historiography. In regard to indigenous texts, however, there were more by Thai scholars 
than by Lao. For example, only the works in English of Ngaosyvathn (1985) and 
Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvath (1994) in International Relations, and Souvannavong 
(1999), and Pholsena (2006) in anthropology were explored in this thesis. Academic texts 
in Lao were absent, except for the cited work of Evans (2002) that was translated into 
Lao. Similarly, the translated work of the forefather of Lao historiography, Maha Sila 
Viravong (1964), was recognised. The number of Lao texts was few compared with Thai 
texts, but it was assumed that the territorial trap would be revealed even in Lao texts. This 
is work for the future. 
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